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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to empirically test the oft-noted hypothesis that shared
mental models lead to implicit coordination. Specifically, this dissertation investigated
the underlying mechanisms of implicit coordination and how different aspects of shared
mental models affect the process. The research questions tested in this study were (a)
how perceptions of sharedness affect the initiation of implicit coordination, (b) how
actual levels of sharedness affect the process of implicit coordination, and (c) how quality
of task mental models affects successful implicit coordination. Sixty same-gender, twoperson teams engaged in a complex military reconnaissance planning task in which the
team members were required to work together by exchanging information to plan routes
for one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). The
results provided partial support for the influence of different facets of shared mental
models on the process of implicit coordination. Specifically, individual mental model
quality, not perceptions of sharedness or actual mental model sharedness, was the biggest
predictor of the initiation of implicit coordination.

Additionally, perceptions of

sharedness and actual mental model sharedness interacted with one another, such that
teams in mismatched conditions (high perceptions of sharedness but low actual
sharedness [false consensus], or low perceptions of sharedness and high actual
sharedness, [pluralistic ignorance]) tended to increase their communications.

The

implications and recommendations for future research on implicit coordination and
shared mental models are discussed. Additionally, the implications for operators of
unmanned vehicles are also discussed.
iii

To my grandparents, Kenneth and Bernice

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My biggest thanks go to my mother, Candace Womer, the smartest, most honest,
and most compassionate woman I know. She taught me a long time ago that I could be
and do anything I wanted to. She has been my constant supporter throughout this
process, providing words of encouragement, honest opinions, and a calming presence. In
a way, she has taken this journey with me. I thank her a thousand-fold for being the best
mother and friend I could ask for, and I celebrate this achievement with her.
Second, this dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance of
both my advisors, Dr. Florian Jentsch and Dr. Clint Bowers, who taught me to be the best
doctor I could be. It is because of both of them that I have remained relatively sane
throughout my years here at UCF. I do not think that I could have asked for two more
dedicated, caring, intelligent, and entertaining advisors/mentors. I would also like to
extend my gratitude to the rest of my dissertation committee: Dr. Kimberly SmithJentsch, Dr. Jessie Chen, and Dr. Ben Morgan, Jr. for all their support and feedback
throughout the dissertation process.
Third, I would like to acknowledge all of my colleagues at the Team Performance
Lab and in the AEHF program for their support, motivation, brainstorming, and working
lunches. Specifically, thanks to Moshe Feldman for his invaluable help throughout the
stages of the dissertation, including data collection, coding, analysis, and editing. Also,
thanks to Ron Swanson, the best research assistant I could have asked for, who tirelessly
helped with data collection, data entry, and data coding. I would also like to thank Alicia
Sanchez and Dr. Cleve Mortimer for their help with participant recruiting. Additionally,
v

to all of those people who helped me form the ideas for this study and who allowed me to
vent my frustrations, including but not limited to: Katherine Wilson, Sherri Rehfeld, Bill
Evans, Michelle Harper, Sandro Scielzo, and Wendi van Buskirk.
Fourth, I would like to thank all my friends and family who have supported me
throughout the years in this endeavor. To my family, who made many trips to Florida
throughout the years, thank you for the much-needed distractions. Thanks to my friends
for attempting to understand what I do, for being patient with my sporadic retreats from
society, and for appropriately making fun of me.
Finally, I would like to thank Explosions in the Sky for providing me with the
background music during the writing of this entire paper. They created what I consider to
be the soundtrack for this dissertation. So if you are actually going to read this, I suggest
you listen to them while you do.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xiv
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................ xv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION................................................................................. 1
Statement of the Problem................................................................................................ 1
Purpose of the Current Study.......................................................................................... 3
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW..................................................................... 5
Implicit Coordination...................................................................................................... 5
Potential Evidence of Implicit Coordination .............................................................. 6
Reduction in Information and/or Resource Requests ............................................. 6
Increase in Unsolicited/Voluntary Information and/or Resources.......................... 7
Anticipation Ratios ................................................................................................. 8
Implicit Coordination and Shared Mental Models.................................................. 9
Summary ............................................................................................................... 11
A Working Definition of Implicit Coordination ....................................................... 12
Definition .............................................................................................................. 13
Initiating Behavior ................................................................................................ 16
Recognition ........................................................................................................... 17
Interpretation......................................................................................................... 18
Responding Behavior............................................................................................ 19
Expected Outcome ................................................................................................ 20
vii

Facilitating Factors of Implicit Coordination ........................................................... 20
Motivation............................................................................................................. 21
Belief in the Efficacy of Initiating Behavior......................................................... 22
Belief that the Initiating Behavior will be Interpreted Correctly.......................... 22
Summary ................................................................................................................... 23
Mental Models .............................................................................................................. 24
Definitions of Mental Models ................................................................................... 25
Types of Shared Mental Models ............................................................................... 27
Difficulties in Conducting Mental Model Research ................................................. 27
Mental Model Content .......................................................................................... 28
Mental Model Sharedness..................................................................................... 29
Mental Model Assessment.................................................................................... 29
Mental Model Sharedness......................................................................................... 31
Team-Related Mental Models................................................................................... 32
Relationship with Team Processes........................................................................ 33
Relationship with Team Performance................................................................... 34
Task-Related Mental Models .................................................................................... 34
Relationship with Team Processes........................................................................ 35
Relationship with Team Performance................................................................... 36
Summary ................................................................................................................... 36
Implicit Coordination and Mental Model Sharedness .............................................. 40
Hypothesis 1...................................................................................................... 42
viii

Mental Model Accuracy and Quality............................................................................ 43
Task-Related Mental Models .................................................................................... 45
Summary ................................................................................................................... 46
Implicit Coordination and Mental Model Quality .................................................... 46
Hypothesis 2...................................................................................................... 47
Perceptions of Sharedness ............................................................................................ 50
Development of Perceptions of Shared Mental Models ........................................... 53
Empirical Evidence of Perceptual Influences ........................................................... 54
Summary ................................................................................................................... 57
Implicit Coordination and Perceptions of Sharedness .............................................. 58
Hypothesis 3...................................................................................................... 59
Overall Summary .......................................................................................................... 63
CHAPTER THREE: METHOD ....................................................................................... 64
Participants.................................................................................................................... 64
Experimental Design..................................................................................................... 65
Experimental Task ........................................................................................................ 65
Equipment..................................................................................................................... 66
Computers ................................................................................................................. 66
Software .................................................................................................................... 67
Recording Equipment ............................................................................................... 68
Materials ....................................................................................................................... 69
Training Materials..................................................................................................... 69
ix

Scenario Materials .................................................................................................... 70
Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 70
Data Coding .................................................................................................................. 73
Mental Model Quality............................................................................................... 73
Initiating Behaviors................................................................................................... 74
Responding Behaviors .............................................................................................. 77
Team Processes ......................................................................................................... 79
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS ......................................................................................... 81
Organization.................................................................................................................. 81
Scenario Comparison.................................................................................................... 84
Data Cleaning ............................................................................................................... 85
Biographical Data ..................................................................................................... 85
Study Variables ......................................................................................................... 86
Random Assignment and Manipulation Checks........................................................... 86
Psychometric Properties of Manipulation Check Measures ..................................... 89
Perceptions of Sharedness..................................................................................... 89
Actual Mental Model Sharedness ......................................................................... 91
Mental Model Quality........................................................................................... 92
Manipulation Checks ................................................................................................ 93
Perceptions of Sharedness..................................................................................... 93
Actual Mental Model Sharedness ......................................................................... 93
Tests of Hypotheses ...................................................................................................... 94
x

Analysis for Hypothesis 3 ......................................................................................... 94
Analysis for Hypothesis 1 ......................................................................................... 94
Verbal Responding Behaviors .............................................................................. 94
Action Responding Behaviors .............................................................................. 95
Analysis for Hypothesis 2 ......................................................................................... 96
Summary of Hypothesis Testing............................................................................... 97
Supplemental Analyses................................................................................................. 97
Initiating Behaviors................................................................................................... 98
Responding Behaviors .............................................................................................. 98
Team Processes ....................................................................................................... 100
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION................................................................................... 103
Evidence for Implicit Coordination ............................................................................ 103
Perceptions of Sharedness .......................................................................................... 104
Actual Mental Model Sharedness ............................................................................... 106
Verbal Responding Behaviors ................................................................................ 106
Action Responding Behaviors ................................................................................ 108
Supplemental Findings on Initiating Behaviors...................................................... 109
Mental Model Quality................................................................................................. 109
Supplemental Findings on Initiating Behaviors...................................................... 111
Interactive Effects of Perceptions and Actual Sharedness.......................................... 112
Limitations and Directions for Future Research......................................................... 113
Communications ..................................................................................................... 113
xi

Workload................................................................................................................. 115
Performance ............................................................................................................ 116
Implications and Conclusions..................................................................................... 117
Operationalization of Implicit Coordination........................................................... 117
Importance of Mental Model Quality ..................................................................... 118
Perceptions vs. Actual Sharedness.......................................................................... 119
Successful vs. Unsuccessful Implicit Coordination................................................ 119
Application to Unmanned Vehicles ........................................................................ 120
APPENDIX A IRB APPROVAL FORMS..................................................................... 122
APPENDIX B INFORMED CONSENT FORM ........................................................... 125
APPENDIX C BIOGRAPHICAL DATA FORM.......................................................... 128
APPENDIX D SELF MONITORING MEASURE........................................................ 131
APPENDIX E EXTRAVERSION MEASURE ............................................................. 135
APPENDIX F RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING QUIZ............................................. 138
APPENDIX G MENTAL MODEL MEASURE............................................................ 140
APPENDIX H PERCEPTIONS OF SHAREDNESS PRE-MEASURE........................ 145
APPENDIX I APPROPRIATENESS MEASURE......................................................... 147
APPENDIX J PERCEPTIONS OF SHAREDNESS POST-MEASURE....................... 152
APPENDIX K NASA-TLX INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMS...................................... 154
APPENDIX L DEBRIEFING FORM ............................................................................ 160
APPENDIX M PERCEPTIONS OF SHAREDNESS MANIPULATION MATERIALS
......................................................................................................................................... 162
xii

APPENDIX N DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRAINING MODULES......................... 167
APPENDIX O SCENARIO MATERIALS .................................................................... 179
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 201

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the essential steps that define successful implicit
coordination. ............................................................................................................. 16
Figure 2. Proposed relationship between shared task mental models and implicit
coordination. ............................................................................................................. 42
Figure 3. Proposed relationship between the quality of task mental models and implicit
coordination. ............................................................................................................. 48
Figure 4. Expected proportional relationship between sharedness and quality of task
mental models. .......................................................................................................... 49
Figure 5. Proposed relationship between perceptions of sharedness and implicit
coordination. ............................................................................................................. 60
Figure 6. Expected proportional relationship between perceptions of sharedness and
actual sharedness of task mental models................................................................... 61
Figure 7. Screen shot from Marratech 5.1 software.......................................................... 68
Figure 8. Sample screen shot from Team 15, al Kufah Scenario. .................................... 77
Figure 9. Two-way interaction between administration and question on perceptions of
sharedness measures. ................................................................................................ 91
Figure 10. Two-way interaction between manipulated perceptions of sharedness and
manipulated actual mental model sharedness on (square root) synthesis responding
behaviors. ................................................................................................................ 100
Figure 11. Two-way interaction between manipulated perceptions of sharedness and
manipulated actual mental model sharedness on weighted team processes. .......... 102
xiv

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Factors that Facilitate Implicit Coordination ....................................................... 21
Table 2 Summary of Relationships found between Shared Mental Models and Team
Processes and Team Performance Presented Chronologically ................................. 38
Table 3 Differing Combinations of Accuracy and Sharedness of Mental Models ........... 44
Table 4 Co-orientation Applied to Shared Mental Models............................................... 53
Table 5 Social Relations Model Applied to Team Member Shared Perceptions ............. 56
Table 6 Experimental Design............................................................................................ 65
Table 7 Experimental Assignments .................................................................................. 71
Table 8 Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations between Study Variables... 82
Table 9 Means and Standard Deviations for Individual Difference Variables by Assigned
Condition................................................................................................................... 88
Table 10 MANCOVA Table for Between-Subjects Effects of Actual Mental Model
Sharedness for Action Responding Behaviors.......................................................... 96
Table 11 Summary of Hypothesis Testing........................................................................ 97

xv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Teams are fundamental to success in a variety of complex domains, ranging from
potentially life-threatening environments (including the military, emergency response
efforts, aviation and air traffic control, and medicine), to the business world,
entertainment, and leisure activities (e.g., team sports). Success in these domains is often
characterized by the skilled and coordinated performance of highly interdependent tasks,
which require team members to interact with one another in order to accomplish team
goals. Furthermore, teams are often required to perform complex tasks under conditions
of extreme workload and great time pressure (as when emergency first responders and/or
surgical teams are fighting to save lives or when air traffic controllers are trying to
manage a large number of airplanes in a restricted space), heightened security concerns
(such as when overt communication might be heard by opposing forces during military
operations), and/or great social or organizational pressure (such as with business
operations and sports teams that are looking to beat the competition).
In instances such as these, successful team performance requires team members to
share information and task resources, have an understanding of the team goals, and
coordinate their activities in order to achieve established goals. In high-pressure, highworkload domains, it is important for team members to be able to adjust their team
coordination processes in order to maintain team performance in the presence of
increasing task demands. For example, previous research has found that when highperforming teams experienced conditions of increased workload, they adaptively shifted
1

from explicit forms of coordination to more implicit forms of coordination in order to
maintain performance levels (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989). Specifically, team members
tended to volunteer more information or behaviors without specific requests to do so, thus
facilitating team coordination in order to accomplish team goals. This beneficial adaptive
strategy was named implicit coordination, which was thought to occur because the team
members had shared mental models (SMMs) that allowed them to anticipate one
another’s needs (Kleinman & Serfaty).
Most prior investigations of implicit coordination have been conducted within the
military domain.

Yet, it certainly seems reasonable to assume that if implicit

coordination is advantageous to teams in one complex domain, it may very well be useful
in other complex domains as well. Currently, however, relatively little is known about
implicit coordination and the conditions under which it can be invoked to enhance team
coordination processes and performance. Because research in this area is limited and the
related concepts are not fully understood, it is currently impossible to design team
performance and team training situations that fully exploit the use of implicit
coordination processes.

However, gaining insight into the processes of implicit

coordination and the conditions under which it can best be utilized could have
tremendous potential for enhancing team processes, team performance, and team training
scenarios in a variety of domains. If such information were available, it might be
possible to develop new team training methods and scenarios so that future teams could
be trained to be aware of and to use implicit coordination in order to maintain or enhance
their own processes and performance.
2

Purpose of the Current Study
In a variety of modern operational domains, teams are required to perform
complex tasks in time-sensitive, high-pressure environments. It is essential to ensure that
these teams are equipped with the skills required for successful team performance.
Harnessing the strengths of implicit coordination might be a strategy from which these
teams could greatly benefit. While a number of studies have suggested that teams
employ implicit coordination under some conditions (e.g., Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Urban,
Weaver, Bowers, & Rhodenizer, 1996), little research has sought to examine the
antecedent conditions and underlying mechanisms of implicit coordination.

More

specifically, it is currently not known what activates implicit coordination or what role
SMMs play in this process. In order for implicit coordination to be utilized to its fullest
potential, therefore, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms behind the process, the
conditions that are necessary for implicit coordination, and the conditions under which
implicit coordination is a beneficial strategy.
Thus, the purpose of the current investigation was to examine the factors that play
a role in implicit coordination. This study was designed to investigate the process of
implicit coordination, specifically focusing on the roles of (a) mental model sharedness,
(b) mental model quality, and (c) team member perceptions of sharedness.

The

overarching goals were to determine which specific aspects of SMMs are relevant and
necessary for the initiation of implicit coordination and for the successful maintenance or
enhancement of team processes and performance. The current study was intended to
provide a better understanding of implicit coordination. This, in turn, will make it
3

possible for others to both develop and train teams that are characterized by factors
conducive to implicit coordination. This could lead to improved team processes and
performance in any number of domains that require team coordination to accomplish
complex tasks.

4

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Implicit Coordination
In 1989, Kleinman and Serfaty published the results of a study that investigated
adaptive team coordination strategies. Using a resource allocation task, the authors
required two-person teams to perform under varying levels of workload (manipulated by
task tempo). Dependent measures were timeliness and accuracy in assigning resources,
as well as the frequency of different types of communication. The results of the study
showed that the workload manipulation had a significant impact on overall team
performance and on the type of communications exhibited. Specifically, as task tempo
increased, communication rates changed such that: under low and moderate tempos,
explicit communication was more prevalent, while under high tempo, performance
remained constant but communication rates decreased.

The authors interpreted this

decrease in resource requests and the concomitant increase in unsolicited resource
transfers as a shift to what they termed implicit coordination. They further suggested that
this strategy occurred because the team members had “mutual mental models to
anticipate each other’s resource needs and actions” (Kleinman & Serfaty, p. 25).
A few years later, Serfaty, Entin, and Volpe (1993) further explored the concept
of implicit coordination by studying team adaptation to stress. The authors noted that
implicit coordination “relies on anticipation of the information and resource needs of the
other team members as obtained through the exercise of mental models of the other
decision-makers, or via the exercise of a common mental image of the situation” (p.
1229). Further, they noted that implicit coordination requires both shared and accurate
5

mental models. Serfaty et al. had manipulated three variables, uncertainty, time-pressure,
and ambiguity, to ascertain how high-performing teams would adapt to stressful
situations. The results showed that, under stressful conditions, the teams that were able
to maintain performance levels and very low error rates were also characterized by
changed communication patterns.

Specifically, these team members significantly

increased their unsolicited and anticipatory behaviors, which the authors interpreted as
evidence that the teams were coordinating implicitly.
Potential Evidence of Implicit Coordination
Following this early research by Serfaty and others, a number of studies have
found that teams seem to adopt an implicit coordination strategy under certain conditions.
These studies have also served to identify the primary behaviors that have been
associated with the occurrence of implicit coordination. The following review discusses
the specific behaviors that have been observed and associated with implicit coordination
in prior studies and the hypothesized linkage between implicit coordination and SMMs.
Reduction in Information and/or Resource Requests
One of the main findings that has been presented as evidence of implicit
coordination is that higher-performing teams tend to reduce their communications related
to requesting information and/or resources, as well as asking questions in general. For
example, Kleinman and Serfaty (1989) found that, in higher-performing teams,
communication requests for resources were dramatically reduced in the high-workload
condition, as compared to both the low- and moderate-workload conditions. Similarly, in
her study of crewmember decision making in the aircraft cockpit, Orasanu (1990) found
6

that, during periods of high workload, good captains tended to reduce communications
overall, including the amount of requested information. On the other hand, poorerperforming captains actually increased their overall communications, including their
information requests. In addition, Urban, Bowers, Monday, and Morgan (1993) found
that, under conditions of high workload, higher-performing teams asked more questions
overall, but asked fewer questions about resources and responsibilities than lowerperforming teams. In a follow-up study, Urban, Bowers, Monday, and Morgan (1995)
found that, overall, higher-performing teams asked fewer questions and provided fewer
answers that included requests. Finally, Waller, Gupta, and Giambatista (2004), in their
study of nuclear power plant control crews, found that higher-performing teams engaged
in significantly less information collection than lower-performing teams. Thus, it appears
that under high workload conditions, higher-performing teams engage in fewer requests
for information, regardless of whether their overall communication rates fluctuate. These
occurrences of reduced communication have been identified as a component of implicit
coordination.
Increase in Unsolicited/Voluntary Information and/or Resources
The other major finding that suggests the presence of implicit coordination has
been an increase in the amount of information or resources that are provided without
specific requests. Kleinman and Serfaty (1989) noted in their initial study that almost
every single resource transfer was unsolicited in higher-performing teams under high
workload.

Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Milanovich (1999) found that higher-

performing teams were characterized by a higher rate of information provided in
7

advance, specifically during conditions of high workload. Likewise, Volpe, CannonBowers, Salas, and Spector (1996) found that higher-performing teams volunteered
significantly more information, but this finding was not specific to conditions of high
workload. Thus, it appears that implicit coordination occurs when team members provide
information or resources voluntarily without explicit verbal request, making it possible
for teams to reduce their requests for information without experiencing disruptions in
team performance.
Anticipation Ratios
Because both a reduction in requests and an increase in unsolicited information
and/or resources are representative of implicit coordination behaviors, some studies have
looked at the ratio of requests to transfers as an indication of implicit coordination.
Specifically, anticipation ratios, which are the number of transfers divided by the number
of requests for each specific team member, have been used to investigate the presence or
absence of implicit coordination. It is thought that higher anticipation ratios are indicative
of information and/or resources being sent more often than they were requested
(MacMillan, Entin, & Serfaty, 2004). For example, in Serfaty et al.’s (1993) study of
team adaptation and coordination, it was found that the anticipation ratios for teams under
high time pressure were significantly higher than under either low or moderate time
pressure, although it was not specified whether these results were applicable overall or
applied only to high-performing teams. Entin and Serfaty (1999) found similar results;
namely, that higher-performing teams were characterized by higher anticipation ratios.
However, these were overall results and not specific to high workload. Thus, the results
8

of both studies suggested that better performing team members had increased their
unsolicited resource transfers but decreased requests for those resources.
Before leaving this topic, a word of caution should be noted regarding the use of
the anticipation ratio metric. While this is a convenient way to represent the number of
transfers made per request given, examining data in terms of this single index alone can
obscure the richness of the underlying team processes. Very different components of
team coordination occur when requests are reduced as compared to when unsolicited
behaviors are executed. These behaviors might occur in different team members, at
different times, for different purposes, and with different consequences.

Therefore,

investigations of team processes should include assessments and analyses of both reduced
requests and increased unsolicited behaviors. Failure to understand the relationship
between these separate measures of team interaction could result in a limited
understanding of the nature of team processes under different conditions. Consequently,
the current study will focus on the sequence of behaviors that begins with an unsolicited
behavior (and a lack of request) and leads to improved team processes.
Implicit Coordination and Shared Mental Models
Beginning with Kleinman and Serfaty’s (1989) initial assertion that implicit
coordination was associated with SMMs, many other authors have followed suit,
suggesting that observed changes in communication could be attributed to SMMs. For
example, Entin and Serfaty (1999) suggested that team members rely on mental models
of each other’s tasks to anticipate their resource needs and that the resulting higher
anticipation ratios are at least “partial confirmation” (p. 322) of the existence of SMMs.
9

Urban, Bowers, Monday, and Morgan (1995), without explicitly stating that their study
was evidence of implicit coordination, posited two possible explanations for their
observed changes in communication patterns: (a) effective teams simply communicated
more clearly, or, in line with implicit coordination, (b) team members of more effective
teams were better able to anticipate the needs of their teammates. Moreover, Orasanu
(1990) also suggested that team members of higher performing teams developed SMMs
that enhanced their team performance, via improved communication processes, under
conditions of high workload.
Two prior studies have actually used measurements of SMMs in an attempt to
support the existence of implicit coordination. First, Stout et al. (1999) conducted a study
of the relationship between planning, SMMs, and team coordination. The authors used
the rate of communication provided in advance as their assessment of coordination
between team members.

As previously mentioned, these authors found that under

conditions of high workload, team members in better performing teams provided higher
rates of information in advance. However, Stout et al. found no significant relationship
between SMMs and the rate of communication provided in advance. More recently,
Waller et al. (2004) conducted a study of nuclear power plant crews, focusing on what
they called SMM development. While they found that higher-performing teams engaged
in less information collection, they also did not find a significant relationship between
information collection and SMM development. Thus, neither study actually established a
link between SMMs and the behaviors indicative of implicit coordination.

10

One likely explanation for these null findings is because none of the prior studies
have measured or manipulated SMMs in ways that would allow the determination of
whether SMMs were actually related to the communication pattern changes thought to be
indicative of implicit coordination. Therefore, there are no available data to demonstrate
that SMMs are decisively linked to the use of implicit coordination. Indeed, without
having or providing empirical confirmation, these prior studies have assumed the
existence of a relationship between SMMs and implicit coordination and have used the
concept of SMMs as an explanation for the occurrence of implicit coordination.
Summary
The studies reviewed above indicate that implicit coordination is associated with a
decrease in requests for information or resources and/or an increase in the voluntary,
unsolicited provision of information or resources. Together, these may be measured in
terms of the anticipation ratio. However, it should be noted that these studies all focused
on communication analysis and that their findings were interpreted post hoc as
demonstrating implicit coordination. That is, implicit coordination was defined post hoc
as the pattern of team coordination behaviors that (a) often occurs under conditions of
high workload and (b) is characterized by a reduction in certain aspects of
communication. It should be further noted that the observance of implicit coordination in
prior studies has been attributed to the presence of SMMs among the team members.
However, to date, no empirical studies have conclusively and causatively linked SMMs
to implicit coordination. What is known is that high-performing teams tend to exhibit
different communication patterns than lower-performing teams, often under conditions of
11

high workload. Whether or not this differential communication pattern is a function of,
facilitated by, or limited by SMMs, however, has not been irrefutably shown. In order to
examine these issues further, the following section provides a discussion of the definition
and operationalization of implicit coordination.
A Working Definition of Implicit Coordination
Prior studies on implicit coordination have generally taken a macro or global
approach to team coordination by analyzing patterns of behavior or ratios of behavior.
While this approach was sufficient in uncovering the pattern of behaviors, it has not been
particularly useful in determining whether implicit coordination is the result of a process
or sequence of behaviors. In this study, a more micro level approach was taken, focusing
on a specific sequence of behaviors. This approach is taken in an attempt to determine
the specific steps involved in the process of implicit coordination and to determine
whether, in fact, teams shift their behaviors in a standard way or in a haphazard way.
The American Heritage Dictionary (2000a) defines the term “implicit” as
“implied or understood though not directly expressed.” Communication is defined by the
American Heritage Dictionary (2000b) as “the exchange of thoughts, messages, or
information, as by speech, signals, writing, or behavior.” Finally, to coordinate means to
“harmonize in a common action or effort” (American Heritage Dictionary, 2000c).
Combining these definitions, it appears that communication is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for coordination, and thus implicit communication is encompassed in
implicit coordination. In addition to implicit communication though, successful implicit
coordination requires some action or follow through that brings a team closer to its goals.
12

Thus, the behaviors constitute “coordination” because multiple team members are
actively interacting, and this coordination is “implicit” because the initiating behaviors
are performed without explicit requests.
Beyond the above definitions, recent writers have described implicit coordination
as “team members offering each other voluntarily the necessary information” (Rasker,
Post, & Schraagen, 2000, p. 1169), “the ability of team members to act in concert without
the need for overt communication” (MacMillan et al., 2004, p. 63), and the interactions of
team members “without consciously trying to coordinate” (Espinosa, Lerch, & Kraut,
2004, p. 107). While each of these descriptions of implicit coordination is helpful, none
fully operationalizes the construct. In addition, none of the definitions is specific enough
to allow one to differentiate implicit coordination from similar constructs, such as
anticipatory, supporting, or back-up behaviors (see Porter, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Ellis, West,
& Moon, 2003; Smith-Jentsch, Zeisig, Acton, & McPherson, 1998). Therefore, based on
the above definitions and other related literature, the following discussion provides a first
attempt to operationally define implicit coordination, specify what makes it different
from similar constructs, and describe the types of behaviors that are encompassed in this
term.
Definition
Successful implicit coordination is defined here as the act of one team member
voluntarily initiating team coordination behaviors that are recognized and exploited by
another team member, and which should result in improved team processes. For the
purposes of this discussion, team performance is assumed to occur in situations that
13

require team members to interactively share task-related information and performance
resources, share an understanding of the performance requirements and team goals, and
coordinate their activities dynamically in order to achieve the performance goals of the
team. Furthermore, a period of team performance is assumed to include performance
sequences in which one team member typically requests information or a task-related
action from another team member at the appropriate time in the performance sequence.
If the second team member responds in a timely manner by providing the requested
information or action so that team performance occurs, team coordination has occurred;
in this instance, the coordination is referred to as explicit coordination.

However,

according to the current definition, an occurrence of implicit coordination consists of a
sequence of unified behaviors that exhibit the following three specific criteria: (a) the
team member initiating the coordination must do so without an explicit request from
another team member, (b) the team member on the receiving end must recognize the
behaviors of his/her teammate and be able to exploit that behavior, which should lead to
(c) an observable positive impact on team processes. In a specific team performance
situation, teams that exhibit more of these behavioral sequences, as compared to
behavioral sequences that are initiated by a request for information or resources (e.g.,
explicit coordination) are said to be implicitly coordinating.
It should be noted that the above definition expands previous definitions by
placing more emphasis on the role of the second team member. This emphasis allows for
a differentiation between implicit coordination and other behaviors, such as backup
behaviors. Dimensions of backup behaviors include: (a) providing assistance to team
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members who need it, and (b) ensuring that the second team member recognizes that
assistance was provided (Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, 2000).

The proposed

definition of implicit coordination takes backup behaviors one step further, incorporating
the second team member’s actions directly into the definition.

Specifically, if the

behaviors by the first team member are neither recognized nor exploited by the second
team member, then the attempt at implicit coordination has not been successful.
Furthermore, if the behaviors are not useful to the second team member, then
performance will not be improved and implicit coordination has not been successful.
Thus, implicit coordination can only be successful if the three criteria of the definition
have been met.
Figure 1 depicts the essential steps that define the proposed definition of
successful implicit coordination. This depiction and the following descriptions of each
step are presented here for the first time. They are not products of previous research, but
are the proposed steps of implicit coordination that will be tested in this study.
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Initiating
Behavior

Recognition

Team Member 1: Performs implicit
coordination initiating behavior

Observable
Behavior

Team Member 2: Recognizes implicit
coordination behavior

Unobservable
Cognition

Interpretation

Team Member 2: Interprets implicit
coordination behavior

Unobservable
Cognition

Responding
Behavior

Team Member 2: Exploits implicit
coordination behavior

Observable
Behavior

Improved Team Processes

Observable
Outcome

Expected
Outcome

Figure 1. Graphical representation of the essential steps that define successful implicit
coordination.

Initiating Behavior
Under the above definition, any coordinative behaviors, including explicit, verbal
communications, can be encompassed in implicit coordination, as long as the defining
criteria are present. When a team member initiates a behavioral sequence in the absence
of a request to do so, and another team member can exploit the initiating behavior to
improve team processes, then that behavioral sequence can fall under the rubric of
implicit coordination.

It should be noted that while some highly proceduralized,

sequential tasks could also fall under the above definition of implicit coordination, these
types of tasks are not the focus of the current study. For example, tasks that require teams
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to follow a detailed checklist, such as in the handling of hazardous materials, or in the
firing of nuclear missiles, will not be the focus of this study. The reason for this is that
transferring information or resources could simply be the next step in the procedure and
thus would not be indicative of implicit coordination.
So, initiating behavior is the first step in the process of implicit coordination. In
this step, the first team member initiates and carries out a team performance behavior,
action, communication, procedure, etc. in an effort to coordinate with a second team
member. By definition, an initiating behavior must be some observable, measurable
behavior on the part of a team member who seeks to coordinate with another team
member. Further, this behavior must serve to initiate a behavioral sequence that leads to
a response on the part of another team member. In fact, this behavior could even be the
absence of an action (for example, realizing a team member is overloaded and therefore
not passing him or her additional work); however, because of the difficulties in observing
and measuring an intentional lack of behavior this form of behavior has been excluded
from the current definition and experimental study. As used here, the initiating behavior
must simply be some observable behavior on the part of one team member to coordinate
with another team member.
Recognition
It is important to emphasize that a second team member plays an active role in the
process of implicit coordination. In order for successful implicit coordination to take
place, the second team member must recognize that the first team member has initiated a
relevant and useful behavior. If the second team member does not notice the first team
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member’s initiating behaviors, then the behavioral sequence initiated by the initiating
behavior will be broken and implicit coordination will not occur. Recognition of the
initiating behavior and its significance is a necessary, but unobservable, part of implicit
coordination. It is assumed to occur as a cognitive event that takes place in the second
team member when he or she responds appropriately to an initiating behavior.
Interpretation
Next, the second team member must correctly interpret the initiating behavior.
That is, after a second team member has recognized the occurrence of an initiating
behavior, he or she must interpret the meaning and performance implications of the
behavior and select an appropriate response. Interpretation is also considered to be an
unobservable cognitive event. Its occurrence is assumed to have occurred when the team
member makes an appropriate response to the initiating behavior.
It is hypothesized that SMMs become important during this step and the next one.
The team members must have a shared understanding of what is happening and what
needs to be done in the context of their team performance situation. If the team members
do not have SMMs, then it is possible that either (a) the first team member will have
performed some behavior that is actually not useful to the second team member, or (b)
the second team member will not know how to exploit the behavior of the first team
member. Either way, implicit coordination cannot result if either team member fails to
understand and predict the other’s actions.
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Responding Behavior
This step in implicit coordination is critical because it is part of what distinguishes
implicit coordination from other similar constructs, such as backup behavior.

The

occurrence of a responding behavior is the step in which the second team member
actually uses the initiating behavior to the advantage of the team. For example, if
information or a resource has been passed, it is at this point that the second team member
uses that information or resource. Responding behaviors can include any behavior that
directly exploits the initiating behavior in some way--hopefully to improve team
processes--and that is observable and measurable. If the second team member recognizes
the behavior and knows what is expected but does not follow through, then according to
the current definition, implicit coordination has not resulted.

Further, without the

occurrence of the responding behavior, the prior occurrence of recognition and
interpretation cannot be assumed.

Again, it is recognized that in some highly

proceduralized, sequential tasks, one team member might transfer a resource because he
or she knows that his or her teammate will need it at some later point; however, these
types of tasks are not the focus of this study. Implicit coordination necessitates that the
second team member can exploit the actions of the first team member so that team
processes are maintained or improved. The occurrence of the responding behavior makes
it possible for the final step to occur in the team performance sequence that constitutes
implicit coordination.
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Expected Outcome
The expected outcome from successful implicit coordination is the observable
maintenance or improvement of team processes. This outcome relies on both team
members completing their respective steps in the process as defined above. Specifically,
it requires that the first team member performs some observable initiating behavior.
Furthermore, it requires that that the second team member (a) recognizes the initiating
behavior, (b) correctly interprets the initiating behavior, and (c) exploits that behavior to
result in improved team processes. All of these steps are thought to be mediated by
SMMs that allow the second team member to correctly interpret the actions of the first
team member.
Facilitating Factors of Implicit Coordination
While the above definition of implicit coordination helps to operationalize the
construct of implicit coordination, there are other important factors that must be taken
into account when discussing the underlying mechanisms of implicit coordination. These
facilitating factors are important because they can serve to increase the likelihood that a
team member will attempt implicit coordination. While implicit coordination can take
place in the absence of these factors, the presence of these factors might greatly increase
the likelihood that team members will engage in implicit coordination. Table 1 provides
a list of these facilitating factors and a description of each.
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Table 1
Factors that Facilitate Implicit Coordination
Facilitating Factor

Description

1. Motivation

The more motivated a team member is to improve team
performance, the more likely is it that he or she will attempt
implicit coordination

2. Belief that an initiating
behavior exists

If a team member believes that there exists a behavior that
can help improve team performance, the more likely it is that
a team member will engage in implicit coordination attempts

3. Belief that initiating behavior
will be interpreted correctly

If a team member believes that another team member will
interpret the initiating behavior correctly, the more likely it
is that he or she will attempt implicit coordination

Motivation
The first factor that should facilitate attempts of implicit coordination is the
motivation on the part of a team member of wanting to engage in implicit coordination.
As long as this motivation does not stem from an explicit request for help from another
team member, it can facilitate the process of implicit coordination. This motivation can
be based on the recognized critical nature of the situation, or an interpretation of a sign
from another teammate, including obvious signs of frustration, such as yelling or
swearing, and from less obvious events, such as a sudden increase or decrease in
communication. The motivation could also be derived from a desire to maintain the
current level of performance under increases in the perceived level of workload, or from
the fact that a team member wants to improve performance on the given task.
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Belief in the Efficacy of Initiating Behavior
Implicit coordination is also likely to be facilitated by a belief on the part of the
first team member that he or she can do something that will improve the situation. This
facilitation to the process is actually derived from two sources: (a) the first team member
believes that there exists a behavior, communication, method, or procedure that, if
executed, will improve the situation and (b) the first team member believes that he or she
will be successful in carrying out this coordination behavior (i.e., the first team member
has self-efficacy). If either of these conditions does not exist, then it is unlikely that an
attempt at implicit coordination will even take place. If the first team member is unaware
of a viable available behavior to perform, then there is nothing to attempt. On the other
hand, if there is a viable option but the team member does not believe that he or she will
be successful in completing that option, then it is also unlikely that implicit coordination
will be attempted. Thus, implicit coordination attempts will be facilitated by both a belief
that something can be done and that it can be done successfully.
Belief that the Initiating Behavior will be Interpreted Correctly
The third factor facilitating attempts of implicit coordination is the belief that the
second team member will interpret the initiating behavior correctly, which is based on a
belief that the two team members view things similarly (i.e., have SMMs). The minimal
condition necessary for the first team member to attempt implicit coordination is that he
or she believes he or she shares a correct mental model with the other team member (i.e.,
a perception of sharedness). That is, the first team member must believe that the second
team member has a similar understanding of the task and the team such that he or she will
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be able to successfully interpret and exploit the actions of the first team member. If the
first team member does not believe that the second team member shares his or her views,
then he or she will be unlikely to attempt to engage in implicit coordination. As will be
discussed further below, these perceptions of sharedness may be completely separate
from the actual level of sharedness between team member mental models.
Summary
Prior studies have demonstrated that high-performing teams can adapt their
communication patterns during periods of high workload in order to compensate for
increases in performance demands. While this finding provides potential evidence for
implicit coordination, none of the studies reviewed here investigated the process whereby
one team member voluntarily offers information or resources and another team member
exploits those resources to maintain or enhance team processes and performance. In
contrast, prior studies all focused on the reduction of requests and the increase in
initiating behaviors. None of the prior studies mentioned the use of any measure of
whether there was a responding behavior resulting from the initiating behavior. The
results were for high-performing teams, so it is certainly possible that these teams were
engaging in implicit coordination; however, it is also possible that the results of these
studies can be explained in terms of backup behaviors that are the result of one team
member’s efforts. Thus, a more thorough investigation into the process of implicit
coordination is needed in order to differentiate between these one-sided behaviors and
team coordination.

23

Furthermore, while prior studies have presented some evidence for the presence
of implicit coordination, the link between the shift to implicit coordination and SMMs is
still a hypothesis that has yet to be fully investigated. This represents a potentially crucial
oversight in the research to date regarding implicit coordination. While the notion that
SMMs play a role in implicit coordination is logical, research is needed to assess the
nature of the relationship between SMMs and implicit coordination behaviors. Before
proposing specific ways to overcome this limitation in the previous literature, it will be
necessary to discuss the construct of SMMs to determine what is currently known about
them and to examine how SMMs might impact the use and efficiency of implicit
coordination. This discussion is provided in the following section.
Mental Models
A number of researchers have suggested that the change from explicit to implicit
coordination between team members can be attributed to mutual or shared mental models
(SMMs) that allow team members to anticipate each other’s needs (Cannon-Bowers,
Salas & Converse, 1993; Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Espinosa, Kraut, Lerch, Slaughter,
Herbsleb, & Mockus, 2001; Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989; MacMillan, Paley, Levchuk,
Entin, Freeman, & Serfaty, 2001; Stout & Salas, 1993; Urban et al., 1996; Volpe et al.,
1996; Weick & Roberts, 1993). In fact, even researchers not specifically referring to
implicit coordination have suggested that SMMs should lead to improved team processes
(Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997; Rentsch & Hall, 1994; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992;
Walsh, Henderson & Deighton, 1988) and team performance (Langan-Fox, Code, &
Langfield-Smith, 2000; Porac & Thomas, 1990; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001).
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Mohammed and Dumville (2001) noted that the general consensus in the SMM literature
was that increased sharedness should lead to improved team effectiveness.
In their review of the literature on this topic, Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) asked
whether too much sharedness can be detrimental to team performance. Specifically,
might too much sharedness lead to a phenomenon similar to Janis’ (1972) notion of
groupthink, where a singular view might lead team members to make incorrect or poor
decisions in order to preserve the group’s cohesion? Cannon-Bowers et al. did not think
so and instead concluded that teams that do not have SMMs are more likely to perform
poorly or fail altogether, and, thus, “shared mental models [should] be fostered among
team members as much as possible” (p. 237). Furthermore, Cannon-Bowers et al. offered
two potential strategies to overcome possible negative effects of too much sharedness: (a)
emphasize assertiveness skills to make team members more likely to challenge or
question decisions, and/or (b) provide decision support systems that could suggest
alternative options for the team to consider.
The following section describes those aspects of SMMs that are relevant to the
current study. First, mental models and SMMs are defined. Next, the various types of
mental models are differentiated and discussed in terms of their importance in this study.
Finally, the section concludes with a discussion of the daunting nature of research on
mental models and the difficulty involved in comparing results across studies.
Definitions of Mental Models
There is no single definition of a mental model that is universally accepted. What
researchers do agree on is that a mental model is an internal representation of how
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something works or how things or concepts are connected with each other (cf. Eberts,
1994; Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Norman, 1988; Rouse & Morris,
1986; Wilson & Rutherford, 1989). The definition that best suits the purposes of the
current research was adopted from Wilson and Rutherford, who noted that:
… a mental model is a representation formed by a user of a system and/or
task, based on previous experience as well as current observation, which
provides most (if not all) of their subsequent system understanding and
consequently dictates the level of task performance. (p. 619)
Furthermore, within the team context, the concept of SMMs has arisen to explain how
team members coordinate with one another and adapt to changing environments (see
Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Cannon-Bowers et al. defined general SMMs as:
Knowledge structures held by members of a team that enable them to
form accurate explanations and expectations for the task, and, in turn, to
coordinate their actions and adapt their behavior to demands of the task
and other team members. (p. 228)
Both of the definitions above emphasize the fundamental role that mental models
and SMMs play in how a person and/or team will perform on a given task. It is this key
emphasis on the impact that SMMs have on team processes that makes these definitions
essential for the current study. Because the current study focuses on the relationship
between SMMs and implicit coordination, it is only logical to define these constructs in
ways that emphasize their influence on team behaviors and performance. Although other
terms have been used to describe knowledge structures (e.g., schemas, action scripts,
expectations) and shared knowledge (e.g., shared cognition, shared understanding,
transactive memory), the concepts of mental models and SMMs have always, at least in
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theory, been linked to implicit coordination. Thus, these concepts are the focus of the
current study.
Types of Shared Mental Models
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) hypothesized that team members may have multiple
mental models of their task and their team, including models that contribute to an
understanding of (a) the equipment with which they need to interact (equipment model),
(b) the task and the method of completion (task model), (c) team member roles and
responsibilities (team interaction model), and (d) the knowledges, skills, and abilities
(KSAs) of the other team members (team model). Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas,
and Cannon-Bowers (2000) later reorganized the four types into two general categories:
task-related (both equipment and task mental models) and team-related (both team
interaction and team mental models).
For the purposes of the current study, Mathieu et al.’s distinction between taskrelated and team-related mental models will be used. The findings of the current study
might suggest that future research should delve into the more specific categories.
However, because the current goal is only to determine whether SMMs are related to
implicit coordination, the simpler team vs. task delineation is appropriate and sufficient.
Difficulties in Conducting Mental Model Research
Similar to the previously addressed problem of variations in the definitions of
implicit coordination, the construct of SMMs has had its fair share of ambiguity as well.
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) hypothesized that different SMMs exist, yet there have been
inconsistencies in how researchers have defined, labeled, and evaluated these SMMs
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(Mohammed, Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000). The following sub-sections will specifically
address three aspects of SMMs that are relevant to the current study; namely, (a) mental
model content, (b) mental model sharedness, and (c) mental model assessment. For an indepth discussion of the various other problems that plague SMM research, please see
Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001), Klimoski and Mohammed (1994), or Mohammed et al.
(2000).
Mental Model Content
While it has been suggested that there are different types of mental models, the
specific content of these different mental models is still not clear. Granted, the teamrelated vs. task-related delineation put forth by Mathieu et al. (2000) seems fairly simple.
However, the specific content of those mental models has changed from study to study
based on the researchers’ decisions about what was and was not important. Thus, even
though there are different types of mental models, there are still no standards that define
exactly what kind and specificity of information should be included in them. One of the
consequences of this lack of standardization is that it becomes difficult to compare results
across studies. While two different studies might purport to have assessed team SMMs,
the content of those team SMMs may be completely different (Mohammed et al., 2000).
This means that if one study found significant relationships between SMMs and other
team variables, such as team performance, and the other study did not, the findings might
have occurred because of the different content of the SMMs in the two studies. In order
to overcome this limitation, future researchers should specify not only the type of SMMs
they are measuring, but also specify the focus or emphasis of the content. This will allow
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for not only a better understanding of the SMM literature in general, but also will
facilitate the process of comparing results across studies.
Mental Model Sharedness
A second aspect of SMMs that has varied across studies and made comparisons
difficult has been the authors’ understanding of what is defined as sharedness and how
sharedness should be measured. There are at least three competing views on what
“shared” actually means. For instance, shared could mean (a) overlapping between team
members, (b) distributed across an entire team, or (c) compatible (cf. Cannon-Bowers &
Salas, 1997, 2001; Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000). Overlapping refers to
how similar two mental models are to one another. This is one of the most oft used
definition of sharedness. Distributed across an entire team refers to the team having a
complete mental model by combining pieces of each team member’s individual model.
Finally, compatible mental models should lead to expectations that are correct and/or
similar, which lessen the importance of having identical models (Cannon-Bowers &
Salas, 2001). Thus, when comparing the results of various studies, it is important to pay
attention to how the authors have defined sharedness and how that sharedness was
actually assessed.

For the purposes of this study, the most common definition of

sharedness, i.e., overlapping, will be used.
Mental Model Assessment
A third major aspect of SMM research that has differed from study to study and,
therefore, affects the comparison of study results, is the assessment of the mental models,
in terms of both measurement and analysis. In fact, the major hurdles in mental model
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research have been how to measure one’s mental model and how to assess the sharedness
between multiple models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994).

A number of different

techniques have been used in attempts to elicit and measure individuals’ mental models.
These have included, but have not been limited to: similarity (or pairwise) ratings (cf.
Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002), card sorting (cf. Evans, Hoeft, Jentsch, &
Bowers, 2002; Hoeft, Evans, Jentsch, & Bowers, 2003; Smith-Jentsch, Campbell,
Milanovich, & Reynolds, 2001), concept mapping (cf. Evans, Hoeft, Kochan, & Jentsch,
2005; Evans, Kochan, & Jentsch, 2003; Jonassen, Beissner, & Yacci, 1993), verbal
protocols (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1984), and textual analysis (cf. Carley, 1997).
Issues of reliability and validity have been raised with regard to each specific
method of mental model assessment. For example, Hinsz (1995) emphasized that it is
necessary to use more than one assessment method, especially because of reliability
concerns. Since mental models are dynamic and may indeed be unreliable themselves,
using one method to assess them simply does not assure any kind of consistency.
Because of the complexity of mental models, especially at the team level, Mohammed et
al. (2000) advised that multiple techniques should be used and that each choice should be
justified for a given context. It should be noted, however, that Rouse and Morris (1986)
believed that even an approach using multiple techniques to overcome the weaknesses of
other techniques would still likely not capture an entire mental model.
Once a method or methods are chosen for analysis, the process of evaluating those
mental models presents a whole new set of issues and concerns. Not only can different
measurement techniques lead to different results, but different evaluation or assessment
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techniques can as well. For example, Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, and Kraiger (2005) found
different results when they evaluated SMMs using different ways to assess sharedness.
Specifically, the authors measured both consistency (correlations between team
members’ mental models) and agreement (variance of mental models across a team) and
found that the consistency measure was more strongly related to team performance.
Therefore, authors who use the same measurement techniques might still find different
results based on slightly varied scoring and/or comparison methods, once again
contributing to the complexities in comparing results across studies.
Keeping in mind that there are difficulties in comparing the results of different
SMM studies, the next section will review the studies that have investigated the
relationship between SMMs and team processes and performance.
Mental Model Sharedness
The most widely studied attribute of mental models in teams is the degree of
sharedness (similarity, overlap, convergence, agreement, etc.) between team members’
individual mental models. The majority of research exploring the influence of SMMs has
used the level of sharedness as the primary assessment of SMMs, with more similarity
suggesting that team members have better SMMs. In general, the results have shown that
more sharedness or overlap between mental models is associated with enhanced team
coordination processes, which in turn have been found to be associated with better team
performance (cf. Heffner, Mathieu, & Cannon-Bowers, 1998; Heffner, Mathieu, &
Goodwin, 1998; Rentsch, 1993). However, it should be noted that none of these studies
investigated the relationship between mental model sharedness and implicit coordination.
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A number of the prior studies of SMMs in teams have shown direct or indirect
linkages with multiple other team process and performance variables. Klimoski and
Mohammed (1994) stated that SMMs set “up a chain of effects influencing multiple
determinants of team effectiveness” (p. 425). Stout et al. (1999) showed that teams who
planned better, also developed better SMMs and used more efficient communication
strategies under conditions of high workload. However, similar to many other published
studies in the past, Stout et al. did not specify which type of SMM was measured.
Mathieu et al. (2000) have noted that, due to the results of recent studies on the unique
effects of different mental models, “work on ‘the’ team model may be short-sighted at
best, and confounded at worst” (p. 281). Furthermore, Mohammed and Dumville (2001)
stated that “team mental models should not be referenced in the abstract without
specifying whether the focus is on teamwork [or] taskwork” (p. 104). In attempts to
overcome these problems, a number of studies have examined the impacts of the different
types of SMMs on team processes and performance. These studies are described below.
Team-Related Mental Models
As stated earlier, team-related mental models are representations of the different
team member roles, their KSAs, how they are supposed to coordinate with one another,
etc. Various studies have found mixed results in terms of the relationships between teamrelated mental model sharedness and team processes, on the one hand, and team-related
mental model sharedness and team performance, on the other. For a number of reasons,
it seems reasonable to expect that sharedness among team-related mental models impacts
team processes and performance. First, it makes sense that the more familiar team
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members are with each other and the more experience they have working together, the
easier it should be to coordinate and accomplish team goals. Second, even a shared
generic understanding of which team member is responsible for each sub-task should
allow team members to predict more accurately the behaviors of their teammates, and
also to have a better understanding of their own tasks. Third, a shared understanding of
the teammates and their roles should also increase the accuracy with which team
members could interpret the behaviors of the other team members. Each of these factors
should lead to improved team processes, and in turn, enhanced team performance. The
research results, however, have been somewhat mixed, which likely has been a result of
the previously mentioned difficulties in conducting mental model research.
Relationship with Team Processes
Relatively few studies have directly investigated the relationship between teamrelated mental model sharedness and team processes. Of the available studies, some have
failed to find any relationship (Marks, Zaccaro & Mathieu, 2000; Mathieu, Heffner,
Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2005; Sabella, 2000), while others report having
found a significant relationship between the two variables. For example, Heffner (1997)
found that the degree of sharedness between team mental models was a significant
predictor of team processes, which were measured along six attributes: (a) leadership, (b)
assertiveness, (c) decision making/mission analysis, (d) adaptability/flexibility, (e)
situation awareness, and (f) communication. Mathieu et al. (2000) found similar results
when looking at team processes in terms of three specific dimensions:

(a)

communication, (b) strategy formation and coordination, and (c) team cooperation.
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Finally, Marks et al. (2002) found that sharedness of team interaction mental models was
a significant and positive predictor of two team processes: (a) backup behaviors and (b)
team coordination.
Relationship with Team Performance
Findings regarding the relationship between sharedness of team-related mental
models and team performance have been equally mixed. Specifically, a number of
studies have found no direct relationship between sharedness and team performance
(Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2005; Sabella, 2000; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2005). Yet
other studies have found direct relationships or mediated relationships between the two
variables.

Minionis (1995) found that sharedness was significantly and positively

correlated with coordinated performance. Fleming, Wood, Ferro, Bader, and Zaccaro
(2003) also found that shared team-interaction mental models were positively related to
team performance. Marks et al. (2000) found a significant, positive relationship between
team mental model sharedness and team performance that was partially mediated by team
processes. Finally, both Mark et al. (2002) and Mathieu et al. (2000) found that the
relationship between team-interaction mental model sharedness and team performance
was fully mediated by team coordination variables.
Task-Related Mental Models
Task-related mental models include task-specific information about how to
perform and complete the task, as well as the equipment needed to complete the task. In
terms of the number of studies that investigated the influence of mental model sharedness
on team processes and team performance, task mental models have received even less
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attention than team-related mental models. Nevertheless, there are reasons to expect
task-related mental model sharedness to be related to team processes and performance.
First, an overall shared understanding of the task should allow team members to
appropriately distribute the responsibilities to ensure goal attainment. Second, a shared
understanding of the task should facilitate team coordination because team members
should be aware of what needs to be done and why. Third, a shared understanding of the
task could even compensate for a lack of familiarity with teammates. As long as all of
the team members understand the task, then they should be able to predict and interpret
their teammates’ behaviors.

Similarly, these factors should all be associated with

improved team processes, and in turn, team performance. The available studies in this
regard are reviewed in the following two sections.
Relationship with Team Processes
No readily available studies were found that looked solely at the influence of taskrelated mental model sharedness on team processes and performance. However, a number
of the studies that investigated team-related mental models also included an analysis of
the relationship between task-related mental models and team processes or performance.
The three studies that have evaluated the relationship between task mental model
sharedness and team processes have all found a significant, positive relationship between
the two (Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2005). While generalization
from these three studies must be approached with caution, it can be safely noted that none
of the available studies have found a non-significant relationship or a significant,
conflicting (i.e., inverse) relationship between the two variables.
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Relationship with Team Performance
Findings regarding the relationship between task-related mental model sharedness
and team performance are similar to those regarding team-related mental model
sharedness and team performance. That is, a number of different studies have provided
evidence for differing relationships. At least one study found no relationship between
task mental model sharedness and team performance (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2005). On the
other hand, another study found the exact opposite relationship; that is, Fleming et al.
(2003) found a significant positive relationship between the two variables. Alternately,
Mathieu et al.’s (2000) results showed that task mental model sharedness had an indirect
relationship with team performance, being mediated via team processes. Two other
studies have found evidence of a partially mediated relationship between task mental
model sharedness and team performance (Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2005). In both
cases, the team processes were measured using the six dimensions of (a) leadership, (b)
assertiveness, (c) decision making/mission analysis, (d) adaptability/flexibility, (e)
situation awareness, and (f) communication. It should be noted that the one study that
did not find a relationship between task mental model sharedness and team performance
(Smith-Jentsch et al., 2005) was a post hoc study that did not have a team process
measurement; therefore, the possibility of an indirect or mediated relationship cannot be
ruled out from the results.
Summary
A general overview of the above-mentioned studies can be found in Table 2. The
general pattern of results suggests that mental model sharedness appears to be related to
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team processes and team performance. Of the ten studies that assessed the relationship
between SMMs and team processes, seven showed significant positive results. Of the 16
studies that assessed the relationship between SMMs and team performance, 13 found a
significant and positive relationship. What is important to note here is that, even with all
the confounding variables that affect comparisons between studies, the overwhelming
evidence is that SMMs do have an impact on how teams coordinate and perform. Thus,
the hypothesis that SMMs play a role in implicit coordination is a logical one and will be
investigated further in the current study.
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Table 2
Summary of Relationships found between Shared Mental Models and Team Processes and Team Performance Presented
Chronologically
Study
Minionis (1995)

Type of SMMs
Team SMMs

Relationship with Team Processes
Not noted

Carley (1997)

Not specified

Not noted

Heffner (1997)

Team SMMs

Team SMMs significant positive predictor of
team processes

Task SMMs

Task SMMs significant positive predictor of
team processes

Stout, CannonBowers, Salas, &
Milanovich (1999)
Mathieu, Heffner,
Goodwin, Salas, &
Cannon-Bowers
(2000)

Not Specified

No significant relationship between SMMs and
information provided in advance

Relationship with Team Performance
Significant positive relationship between
Team SMMs and coordinated performance
Higher performing teams had more elaborate
and different information in their mental
models compared to lower performing teams
Team process significantly influenced team
performance, no direct relationship with
Team SMMs
Team process partially mediated the
relationship between task SMMs and team
performance
Indirect positive relationship between SMMs
and performance via planning

Team SMMs

Significant positive relationship between Team
SMMs and team processes
Significant positive relationship between Task
SMMs and team process

Relationship between Team SMMs and
performance fully mediated by team process
No direct relationship, indirect relationship
via team process

Marks, Zaccaro, &
Mathieu (2000)

Team Interaction
SMMs

Sabella (2000)

Team SMMs

Task SMMs

Team Interaction SMMs significant positive Positive relationship between Team
predictor of communication processes
Interaction SMMs and team performance
partially mediated by team process
Team SMMs not a significant predictor of
Team processes significantly predicted
coordination quality (backup behavior)
performance but no relationship between
Team SMMs and performance
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Study

Type of SMMs

Relationship with Team Processes

Marks, Sabella,
Burke, & Zaccaro
(2002)

Team Interaction
SMMs

Fleming, Wood,
Ferro, Bader, &
Zaccaro (2003)

Team Interaction
SMMs

Positive relationship between Team
Interaction SMMs and team performance
completely mediated by coordination
processes
Not noted
Significant positive relationship between
Team Interaction SMMs and team
performance
Not noted
Significant positive relationship between
Task SMMs and team performance
No significant positive relationship between No significant relationship between Team
Team SMMs and team process
SMMs and team performance
Task SMMs significant positive predictor
Positive relationship between Task
of team processes
SMMs and team performance partially
mediated by team process
Not noted
Team Interaction SMMs not a significant
predictor of team performance
Not noted
Task SMMs not a significant predictor of
team performance
Not noted
Interaction significant positive predictor
of team performance

Task SMMS
Mathieu, Heffner,
Goodwin, CannonBowers, & Salas
(2005)

Team SMMs

Smith-Jentsch,
Mathieu, & Kraiger
(2006)

Team Interaction
SMMs
Task SMMs

Task SMMs

Interaction between
Team Interaction
and Task SMMs

Team Interaction SMMs significantly
improved backup behaviors and
significantly predicted team coordination
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Relationship with Team Performance

Implicit Coordination and Mental Model Sharedness
While the studies that have assessed the relationship between both team and task
mental model sharedness were reviewed in the previous section, the focus of the study
proposed here was specifically on task mental models. This decision was made based
two factors. First, the number of studies that have focused on task-related mental models
are fewer than for team-related mental models. Consequently, much less is known about
the influence of task-related mental models. Second, while being familiar with one’s
teammate and his/her roles is likely to enhance any type of coordination, it was a realistic
assumption that having a shared understanding of the task will have a stronger overall
effect on the process of implicit coordination.

Team members might be able to

compensate for a lack of task understanding if they have a great deal of experience with
one another; however, this study utilized ad hoc teams brought together for the express
purposes of participating in a research study. Thus, especially in this environment, task
mental models are expected to be more appropriate.
It has already been noted that SMMs are hypothesized to be related to implicit
coordination because SMMs allow team members to anticipate each other’s needs. It
makes sense that shared task mental models should facilitate team processes by allowing
team members to coordinate more effectively with one another. However, in discussing
the definition of successful implicit coordination earlier, it was noted that SMMs should
be important in making it possible for the second team member to interpret and respond
to initiating behaviors, but not as support for the first team member to attempt implicit
coordination. In fact, one can go so far as to intentionally not include SMMs among the
facilitating factors that increase the likelihood that a team member will engage in implicit
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coordination. It is reasonable to conclude that teams who have shared task mental
models can be expected to be more efficient in their coordination, because team members
will be more likely to attempt implicit coordination at the appropriate and necessary
times and with the appropriate initiating behaviors. However, team members who do not
have shared task mental models may be just as likely to attempt implicit coordination,
which will likely be unsuccessful when they carry out an action that is inappropriate or
do so at an inappropriate time, etc.
There are two reasons to believe that shared task mental models, even though they
may not be predictive of attempts to coordinate implicitly, are essential for the correct
interpretation and response behaviors in implicit coordination. First, if team members
have a shared understanding of the task, then it is more likely that the initiating behavior
was an appropriate behavior that the second team member can interpret easily. Second,
the second team member should know what to do in response to the initiating behavior.
Thus, shared task mental models should facilitate the process of implicit coordination.
Furthermore, from the reviews on implicit coordination and on mental model sharedness,
it would certainly not be a stretch to hypothesize that the two are related. Task mental
model sharedness has been linked to both team processes and team performance; implicit
coordination is an example of one type of team process. Thus, the likelihood that shared
task mental models are related to the use of implicit coordination is high.
Therefore, for the current study, it was hypothesized that shared task mental
models between team members would be positively related to the responding behaviors
of the second team member. That is, shared task mental models would allow the second
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team member to correctly recognize, interpret, and react to the first team member’s
initiating behavior. This leads to the first experimental hypothesis for the current study:
Hypothesis 1: The level of sharedness (i.e., overlap) between team
members’ task mental models will be a significant predictor of the use of
implicit coordination, such that higher levels of sharedness will be
associated with more responding behaviors.
Figure 2 presents a graphical depiction of the proposed process of implicit coordination
and the hypothesized relationship between shared task mental models and responding
behaviors.

Shared Task
Mental Models
H1

Initiating
Behavior
Team Member A

Responding
Behavior

Improved
Team Processes

Team Member B

Figure 2. Proposed relationship between shared task mental models and implicit
coordination.

Confirmation of this hypothesis would provide the first direct empirical evidence
to support the much-referenced hypothesis that SMMs are related to implicit
coordination. Specifically, it would show that shared task mental models play a role in
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implicit coordination by aiding the second team member to correctly recognize, interpret,
and react to the first team member’s initiating behavior.
Mental Model Accuracy and Quality
Whereas there is overwhelming evidence that the level of sharedness among team
member mental models impacts team processes, issues related to the quality of those
SMMs have received much less attention. As noted previously, it has been hypothesized
that implicit coordination requires not only shared mental models, but accurate mental
models as well (Serfaty et al., 1993). Other authors have also argued that the correctness
of SMMs may be essential for effective teams (see Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1990;
Cooke et al., 2000; Druskat & Pescosolido, 2002; Ellis, 2005; Evans, Harper, & Jentsch,
2004; Hall, Volpe, & Cannon-Bowers, 1992; MacMillan et al., 2004; Rentsch & Hall,
1994; Rentsch, Heffner, & Duffy, 1994; Rouse et al., 1992; Smith-Jentsch, Campbell,
Milanovich, & Reynolds, 2001; Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998;
Stout, 1994). There are a number of different terms that can be used to express how
“good” a mental model actually is; the two most often used are accuracy and quality. In
the past, accuracy has usually been assessed by comparing an individual’s mental model
with one correct, referent model. In contrast, quality has been assessed subjectively by
an expert or by comparing an individual’s mental model to any number of “correct”
models. Although these terms are often used interchangeably, more detail is needed for
the purposes of this study. The following discussion differentiates between studies that
emphasized accuracy vs. quality.
Langan-Fox, Wirth, Code, Langfield-Smith, and Wirth (2001) posited that it is
likely that team members must first develop an accurate mental model and then develop
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SMMs. In fact, Converse, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas (1991) suggested that accuracy is a
fundamental part of the SMM hypothesis. Further, Smith-Jentsch, Blickensderfer, Salas,
and Cannon-Bowers (2000) suggested that having both shared and accurate team mental
models should allow team members to (a) understand coordination breakdowns, (b) focus
on specific goals, and (c) generalize lessons learned from previous experience. Table 3
presents the possible combinations between accuracy and sharedness among team
member mental models.

Table 3
Differing Combinations of Accuracy and Sharedness of Mental Models
Low Accuracy

High Accuracy

Low Sharedness

Team members have neither
accurate nor shared mental models

Team members have accurate
mental models that are not similar
to those of their teammates*

High Sharedness

Team members share inaccurate
mental models

Team members have accurate
mental models that are similar to
those of their teammates

*Note: It is possible to have accurate mental models that are not shared in situations where the content of
the mental models is different, the organization scheme or structure is different, or there are multiple
“correct” methods or answers. In these instances, the mental models may still be of high quality, even
though they aren’t deemed “accurate” by some standard.

While it is expected that accurate and shared mental models typically form the
most effective combination, little of the sharedness research has actually measured
accuracy or quality in any way. One possible reason may be due to the increased
difficulties in conducting research on the correctness of mental models and SMMs. For
instance, can an average measure of accuracy across a team truly be useful in predicting
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team processes? A shared accuracy of 50% could mean more than one thing: two team
members could both have 50% accuracy in their mental models; one team member could
have 10% accuracy and the other 90% accuracy; etc. Should accuracy be measured and
analyzed at the individual level rather than the team level? Which is more important, the
relationship between some team accuracy score and overall team processes or the
relationship between accuracy of one’s own mental model and one’s behaviors? These
are questions that have yet to be answered. Furthermore, there is currently no research
available that conclusively links the correctness of mental models with the use of implicit
coordination. The few studies that have explored the relationship between mental model
accuracy or quality and team processes and/or performance are described next.
Task-Related Mental Models
No studies that have focused on teams have looked at the accuracy or quality of
task mental models without also taking into account the level of sharedness between team
members. Only two studies (Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2005) have investigated the
relationship between task-related mental model sharedness and quality and team
processes and performance, and the findings on the relationship between task-related
mental model quality and team processes and performance were both the same: no
significant relationship was found. Task mental model quality alone has not been found
to significantly predict team processes or team performance. Further, the interaction
between task mental model sharedness and quality has not been found to significantly
predict team processes or performance. The findings of two studies are obviously not
conclusive in showing that no relationship exists; however, at this time, no published
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studies have reported that the quality of task-related mental models is related to any other
team variables.
Summary
In light of the dearth of research examining the accuracy or quality of SMMs, it is
clear that there is still much to learn about the interaction between the sharedness and
quality of mental models. It appears that prior research has placed much more emphasis
on the level of sharedness between mental models than on the quality of those SMMs.
As no significant findings have been found regarding the quality of task-related mental
models, it may be that task-related mental model quality does play a secondary role to
mental model sharedness in terms of the impact on or relationship with team processes
and team performance. Thus, while it seems logical to hypothesize that teams with
accurate SMMs will outperform all other teams, this overview suggests that the quality
might not be as important as the sharedness.
Implicit Coordination and Mental Model Quality
While “quality” and “accuracy” have often been used interchangeably, the term
quality is preferred to accuracy and will be used here because it allows for the possibility
of multiple correct interpretations of any given situation. Quality allows team members
to organize their knowledge differently, focus on different constructs, focus on different
levels, etc., while still having “correct” mental models.

Thus, the current study

investigated the relationship between mental model quality and implicit coordination.
The review of the mental model quality literature has shown: (a) there are only a
small number of studies that have investigated the effects of mental model quality on
team processes and (b) that the results of those few studies suggest that mental model
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sharedness may be more important that mental model quality. No studies have found a
significant relationship between mental model quality and team processes or
performance; yet, quality and sharedness may interact with one another.
Based upon the available literature, it was therefore hypothesized that the quality
of mental models would be associated with improved team processes, the expected
outcome of implicit coordination, but not with more attempts at implicit coordination or
responding behaviors. It is likely that the quality of one’s mental model will result in
more appropriate initiating and responding behaviors, but not necessarily with more
initiating and responding behaviors in general. The quality of one’s mental model,
though, should allow the second team member to correctly interpret the initiating
behavior and follow through with the appropriate responding behavior, which should lead
to the improved team processes. Thus, in order to examine this relationship between
mental model quality and implicit coordination, the following hypothesis was posited:
Hypothesis 2: The average quality of team members’ task mental models
will be a significant predictor of successful implicit coordination, such
that higher quality task mental models will be associated with improved
team processes.
Figure 3 presents a graphical depiction of the proposed process of implicit coordination
and the hypothesized relationship between the quality of task mental models and the
expected outcome of successful implicit coordination, improved team processes.
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Figure 3. Proposed relationship between the quality of task mental models and implicit
coordination.

Confirmation of this hypothesis would lend some support to the notion that
accuracy or quality of mental models is important for successful team coordination. This
study would be the first to establish a link between the quality of task mental models and
the process of implicit coordination.
Additionally, an interaction between the sharedness and quality of task mental
models was initially proposed, but upon further reflection, it was removed. Specifically,
if task mental models sharedness is related to the number of responding behaviors, then
the quality of those task mental models will play a more important role when team
members have high sharedness simply because the base rate of responding behaviors will
be higher.

In other words, when team members do not have SMMs, then it is

hypothesized that they will engage in less responding behaviors and therefore have fewer
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opportunities to reach successful implicit coordination. However, this relationship is
dependent on the baseline rates for low and high levels of sharedness. As can be seen in
Figure 4, the overall base rate for low sharedness should be significantly lower than for
high sharedness, and the difference between high and low quality is therefore more
pronounced under conditions of high sharedness. Yet there is no reason to believe that
the proportion of successful implicit coordination behaviors will be any different for low
vs. high sharedness. Thus, while it is expected that the quality of task mental models will
appear to have a stronger influence under conditions of high sharedness, this relationship
is expected to be proportional and therefore not necessarily an interaction.

Estimated Team Processes

60
50
40
Low Quality

30

High Quality

20
10
0
Low Actual Sharedness High Actual Sharedness

Figure 4. Expected proportional relationship between sharedness and quality of task
mental models.
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Perceptions of Sharedness
While actual SMMs in teams may facilitate team performance through implicit
coordination, one question that has not fully been explored is the influence of perceptions
of SMMs. Specifically, must team members be aware that they share mental models in
order to use them? Klimoski and Mohammed (1994), in their discussion of what it means
to share a mental model, suggested that an awareness of that sharedness may also be
contained in the notion of sharedness. Specifically, It was suggested that there must be
some awareness among team members regarding how their teammates think and behave
in order for the team to hold SMMs. Thus, Klimoski and Mohammed argued that mental
models are only shared if team members believe they are.

In fact, Klimoski and

Mohammed stated that “similarity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for saying
that a shared mental model exists….we feel that some level of awareness is necessary” (p.
422). Furthermore, Fiore and Salas (2004) noted in the conclusion to their book on team
cognition that the two overarching themes in the book were (a) communication and (b)
awareness. Thus, the impact of team member awareness or perceptions of sharedness is
certainly a topic that deserves more attention than it has received.
This notion of shared understanding or awareness is similar to other constructs,
such as transactive memory (Wegner, 1986) and perceptual accuracy (Scheff, 1967).
Transactive memory has been defined as a memory system that is composed of (a) the
different knowledges possessed by the team members and (b) an awareness or
understanding of who knows what. In essence, the concept of transactive memory is
similar to team-related mental models, as both focus on knowledge of another teammate
and more sharedness between mental models would suggest that team members are aware
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of their teammate’s roles, responsibilities, and possibly the knowledge their teammates
must possess in order to fulfill their duties. However, transactive memory differs from
SMMs in that team members are not expected to have shared or overlapping knowledges
per se, but to simply have an understanding of how knowledge is distributed throughout
the team. Thus, a team member should know who to turn to in the event that help or
expertise on a subject is required.

Moreland (1999) suggested that accuracy of team

members’ perceptions of what the other team members know is an important component
of the transactive memory framework and will impact team processes.
On the other hand, perceptual accuracy describes the extent to which one person
can correctly predict another team member’s perceptions (as the same or different from
one’s own). This concept was introduced under the theory of co-orientation by Scheff
(1967). Co-orientation is the study of the knowledge and assumptions required for social
interaction. It is based on the merging of agreement between member’s beliefs and
attitudes and the accuracy of one’s perceptions about another’s beliefs and attitudes.
According to Scheff, there are four specific types of co-orientation: consensus (high
agreement and high accuracy), dissensus (low agreement and high accuracy), pluralistic
ignorance (high agreement and low accuracy), and false consensus (low agreement and
low accuracy). Scheff suggested that the type of co-orientation required was dependent
on how members were required to coordinate with one another.
The concept of co-orientation was expanded upon and extended to the field of
organizational climate by Poole and McPhee (1983). Rentsch and Hall (1994) then
further expanded the theory to describe “schemas about schemas” (p. 237), which is a
comparable notion to Klimoski and Mohammed’s (1994) description of team members’
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awareness of SMMs. Specifically, Rentsch and Hall discussed the similarity between
two team members, as opposed to Scheff’s (1967) original discussion of the similarity
between one person and the majority.
Expanding this notion to SMMs, co-orientation can be used to assess perceptions
of sharedness between team member mental models. Table 4 describes each of the four
types of co-orientation in terms of SMMs. Reality refers to whether or not there actually
is sharedness between team member mental models, while perceptions of sharedness
refers to whether team members believe there is sharedness. As can be seen from Table
4, it is quite possible that inaccurate perceptions of sharedness could have detrimental
effects on team performance. For instance, if team members incorrectly believe they do
not have SMMs, they may be less likely to attempt actions they feel their teammates will
not understand. Conversely, if team members incorrectly believe that they do have
SMMs, they may be constantly attempting to coordinate unsuccessfully. Yet, correct
perceptions of sharedness may improve team processes even under conditions of low
agreement by (a) forcing the team members to try to better understand each other’s
perceptions, or (b) reducing the number of unsuccessful attempts to coordinate.
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Table 4
Co-orientation Applied to Shared Mental Models
Perceptions of Low Sharedness

Perceptions of High
Sharedness

Reality:
Low Sharedness

Dissensus: team members
correctly believe that they do not
have shared mental models

False Consensus: team members
incorrectly believe that they
have shared mental models

Reality:
High Sharedness

Pluralistic Ignorance: team
members incorrectly believe that
they do not have shared mental
models

Consensus: team members
correctly believe that they have
shared mental models

Development of Perceptions of Shared Mental Models
So, how do team members develop their perceptions or beliefs of what others
know and how closely it relates to their own knowledge base?

Nickerson (1999)

suggested that people use “one’s own knowledge as the primary basis for developing a
model of what specific others know” (p. 737) and thus “other things being equal, one is
likely to overestimate the extent to which a random other person’s knowledge
corresponds to one’s own” (p. 740). This awareness or perception is then altered based
on interactions that either confirm or dispute the default model, and that model is updated
accordingly. Furthermore, Nickerson noted that “one’s best guess as to how another
person will react in a specific context is one’s awareness, or belief, of how one would
react in that context” (p. 746). Thus, following the logic of Nickerson’s argument, team
members are likely to believe they have SMMs from the onset and would try to predict
their team members’ behaviors based on what they themselves would do under the same
circumstances.
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In terms of Table 4 then, Nickerson’s (1999) hypothesis would suggest that team
members enter a new scenario believing that they have SMMs with their teammates;
which could result in either a state of consensus (correct perception) or false consensus
(incorrect perception/overestimation). If the team is in a state of consensus, then team
coordination should be facilitated because the team members know they have SMMs and
can act accordingly. However, if the team is in a state of false consensus, then team
coordination should be hindered because behaviors will be based on inaccurate
assumptions.
Empirical Evidence of Perceptual Influences
To my knowledge, there have been no studies that have analyzed the perceptions
of SMMs as opposed to the actual SMMs. Nor has co-orientation been applied to SMMs
in the previous literature. However, there have been a number of studies that have
investigated team member perceptions of other team members from various other
perspectives. In fact, Nickerson (1999) noted that there is plenty of evidence to suggest
that a person’s behavior is influenced by his/her perceptions of what other people know.
A number of studies have found that more accuracy in regard to transactive
memory is related to improved performance in groups (Austin, 2003; Libby, Trotman, &
Zimmer, 1987; Littlepage & Silbiger, 1992). Additionally, Austin found that consensus
(i.e., team members agree in their perceptions of who knows what) was significantly, and
positively, related to overall performance as well. Thus, when team members shared
accurate perceptions about their team members’ knowledge, the team was able to
coordinate effectively and attain its performance goals. In contrast, teams that were

54

characterized by shared, yet inaccurate perceptions were less likely to coordinate and
perform effectively.
Woehr and Rentsch (2003) discussed perceptions related to team members’
schemas. Wilson and Rutherford (1989) noted schemas/schemata differ from mental
models in that they are considered to be stored in memory and activated at necessary
times, while mental models are thought to arise from schemata and to be dynamically
reconstructed as they are used. Woehr and Rentsch discussed team member schema
similarity in terms of the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 1994), which breaks
interpersonal communication down into the perceiver and the perceived. Extrapolating to
teams, Woehr and Rentsch noted a number of dimensions along which team member
schema similarity and the Social Relations Model coincide.

Sample dimensions of

relevance are listed in Table 5. While these dimension descriptions are more geared
toward social phenomena rather than cognitive phenomena, such as SMMs, there are
obvious similarities that can be extracted. For example, consensus has already been
described as team members having an accurate understanding of their SMMs. In turn,
each of the dimensions listed in Table 5 could be applied to the mental model construct.
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the team members’ perceptions of one
another, it might be useful to look at a number of these dimensions when determining
how team members view each other and the team as a whole.

55

Table 5
Social Relations Model Applied to Team Member Shared Perceptions
Dimension

General Question

Consensus

Is Team Member 1 viewed
similarly by others?

Reciprocity

Do Team Member 1 and Team
Member 2 view each other
similarly?

Assumed
Reciprocity

Meta-Accuracy

Assumed
Similarity

Description
The degree of congruence
among team members’ views
of each individual member.

The degree of congruence
among team members in their
tendencies to view each other
similarly.
The degree of congruence in
Does Team Member 1 think others team members’ beliefs that
perceive him/her as s/he perceives their teammates perceive them
as they perceive their
them?
teammates.
The degree of congruence
among team members’
Does Team Member 1 know how
accuracy in understanding how
s/he is perceived?
their teammates view them.
The degree of congruence
among team members’
Does Team Member 1 perceive
perceptions that their
others as s/he perceives
teammates perceive them as
him/herself?
they view themselves.

Note: Adapted from Woehr & Rentsch (2003)

In terms of empirical data, Woehr and Rentsch (2003) investigated team
members’ perceptions of themselves and each of their teammates across an entire
semester. The results showed that perceiver effects (as opposed to partner or relationship
effects) had the biggest impact on rating variance. The authors interpreted this finding as
“individuals tend not to differentiate among teammates and thus performance appears to
be ‘in the eye of the beholder’” (Woehr & Rentsch, p. 4). Furthermore, the results also
showed that for three of the six performance dimensions evaluated, individuals rated their
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teammates as similar to themselves, which reiterated Nickerson’s (1999) hypothesis
discussed earlier.

The implications of this finding demonstrate the strength and

importance of individual perceptions and clearly support the notion that those perceptions
influence how team members will interact with one another.
Finally, taking a different perspective, Mitchell (1986) looked at measures of
knowledge of other team member behaviors by investigating internal frames of reference.
Mitchell’s study was based on Culbert and McDonough’s (1980) theory of alignment,
which Mitchell described as an internal frame of reference that “create[s] an individual
‘lens’ through which one views and interprets….[and] affect[s] significantly how people
perceive events and assign meaning, and how they interact with one another” (p. 17).
Mitchell provided training to participants on each other’s internal frames of reference,
had participants answer questions regarding each person’s relationship with each other
person, and calculated a relationship index between each pair of individuals. The results
clearly showed that those who received alignment training demonstrated significant
improvements in their knowledge about other individuals’ knowledge. Mitchell noted
that the alignment training allowed participants to share information about themselves
that allowed the others to predict and explain their behavior more accurately afterwards.
Again, this would suggest that team member perceptions will influence how they
coordinate with one another.
Summary
The research on SMMs continues to evolve. The question of how individual
perceptions of sharedness and/or others’ mental models affect behaviors and team
coordination has received some speculation, but very little direct research. A number of
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researchers have posited that some type of awareness is necessary in order to achieve
sharedness.

Studies from a number of different approaches have emphasized the

importance of individual perceptions on team processes. Further exploration into how
perceptions of sharedness affect team processes, specifically team coordination, as well
as how perceptions of SMMs interact with actual SMMs is warranted.
Implicit Coordination and Perceptions of Sharedness
There is evidence to suggest that team member perceptions of other team
members’ knowledges can significantly influence how team members interact and
coordinate with one another. Researchers have consistently suggested that SMMs are
related to implicit coordination and that without SMMs, implicit coordination would not
be possible. This is a logical argument that is being tested in the first set of hypotheses of
the current study. But how do perceptions of SMMs fit into the puzzle? What if team
members have SMMs but do not believe that they do, such as in pluralistic ignorance?
Will they not even attempt implicit coordination strategies? In contrast, what if team
members believe they have SMMs when they do not, such as in false consensus? Will
team members attempt to engage in implicit coordination unsuccessfully if their
behaviors are guided by false beliefs?

The various approaches to understanding

individual perceptions suggest that these perceptions are strong indicators of how team
members are likely to interact with one another.

In fact, it is possible that these

perceptions may be even more influential in whether team members will engage in
implicit coordination than the actual sharedness of their mental models.
As previously mentioned, the belief that the initiating behavior will be interpreted
correctly is considered to be a facilitating factor that should increase the likelihood of a
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team member attempting to engage in implicit coordination. This belief is encompassed
in the more global perceptions of sharedness, i.e., that the team members have a shared
understanding and should therefore interpret behaviors in a similar fashion. Thus, one
could hypothesize that it is these perceptions of sharedness, rather than the actual level of
sharedness between mental models, that will increase the likelihood that a team member
will begin the process of implicit coordination. Specifically, it is anticipated that team
members with perceptions of sharedness will engage in more implicit coordination
attempts than team members who do not believe they have SMMs. This leads to the final
hypothesis that asserted that the perceptions of sharedness would be positively related to
implicit coordination attempts:
Hypothesis 3: The perceptions of sharedness regarding task mental
models on the part of the first team member will be a significant predictor
of implicit coordination attempts by that team member, specifically
initiating behaviors. In other words, perceptions of more sharedness will
be associated with more initiating behaviors.
Figure 5 presents a graphical depiction of the proposed process of implicit coordination
and the hypothesized relationship between perceptions of sharedness and initiating
behaviors.
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Team Member A

H1

Responding
Behavior

Quality of Task
Mental Models
H2

Improved
Team Processes

Team Member B

Figure 5. Proposed relationship between perceptions of sharedness and implicit
coordination.

Confirmation of this hypothesis would have strong theoretical implications for the
team literature. Previous research on SMMs and team processes and performance has
always focused solely on the actual level of sharedness between mental models and has
not addressed whether team members know they have SMMs. Providing evidence that
perceptions of sharedness also drive team behaviors could support the notion that we
have been missing a key ingredient in team performance research.
Finally, having suggested that it is the perceptions of sharedness, rather than the
actual sharedness that drive implicit coordination attempts, it is necessary to also examine
the relationship between perceptions and actual sharedness. Similar to the case regarding
the interaction between sharedness and quality, upon reflection, I decided that the
difference would be proportional and, therefore, not necessarily an interaction.
Specifically, if perceptions of sharedness are related to the number of initiating behaviors,
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then the actual sharedness between those task mental models will seem to play a more
important role when team members have perceptions of high sharedness simply because
the base rate of initiating behaviors will be higher. In other words, when team members
do not have perceptions of sharedness, then it is hypothesized that they will engage in
less initiating behaviors. A graphical depiction of this is presented in Figure 6. Since it
is hypothesized that implicit coordination will be more likely attempted when team
members believe that they have SMMs, then the base rate of initiating behaviors will be
higher and the chance for responding behaviors will also be higher. Again, there is no
reason why these proportions should not be similar.

Estimated Responding Behaviors

60
50
40
Low Actual
Sharedness

30

High Actual
Sharedness

20
10
0
Low Perceptions

High Perceptions

Figure 6. Expected proportional relationship between perceptions of sharedness and
actual sharedness of task mental models.
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All of the previous research on SMMs has focused on obtaining some actual
measure of a person’s mental model and then comparing individual models against one
another. To my knowledge, no studies have investigated how perceptions of SMMs
influence team member behaviors and coordination. The above hypothesis sought to
determine whether overlooking perceptions of SMMs has been a shortcoming of previous
research in the area and sought to analyze whether or not perceptions of SMMs are
necessary for efficient team coordination. If this hypothesis were confirmed, it would
provide evidence that team members need to be aware of their SMMs in order to use
them most effectively and that merely measuring SMMs without taking into account
perceptions of SMMs may be short sighted. Significant findings here could help to
interpret previous findings that did not find a significant relationship between SMMs and
other team factors, such as team processes; perhaps the teams simply did not know they
had SMMs and thus were not able to successfully utilize them.
It should be noted here that this study was mainly concerned with how implicit
coordination in initiated and which factors are associated with that process (i.e., SMMs
and/or perceptions of sharedness). It is understood that the relationship between implicit
coordination and team performance is likely affected by SMMs as well; however, it is not
the goal of the current study to investigate which conditions lead to the best team
performance.

Before we can learn the most appropriate ways to use implicit

coordination, a firm understanding of the underlying mechanisms is required.
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Overall Summary
The hypotheses presented in this study were put forth in order to investigate the
underlying mechanisms of implicit coordination and what role SMMs play in relation to
implicit coordination. It has previously been suggested that SMMs are related to implicit
coordination. This study furthered that line of research in two specific ways. First, three
different aspects of SMMs were addressed: (a) sharedness or overlap, (b) quality, and (c)
perceptions of sharedness. Second, implicit coordination was broken down into discrete
stages that could be analyzed separately and together. By breaking down both SMMs
and implicit coordination, the relationship between SMMs and implicit coordination
could be more thoroughly analyzed. The hypotheses can be divided into three specific
categories with respect to team coordination processes: those related to initiating
behaviors, those related to responding behaviors, and those related to successful
coordination.

The design of the study was based on the hypotheses that (a) the

perception of sharedness is the main aspect of SMMs that is related to initiating
behaviors, and (b) the actual sharedness of mental models is related to responding
behaviors, and (c) the quality of mental models is related to improved team processes or
successful coordination.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD
Participants
Participants were 138 students from the University of Central Florida (UCF),
forming 69 teams of two. The data for four teams (IDs 11, 14, 31, and 34) were
discarded because they did not finish the entire session. Additionally, data from two
teams (IDs 20 and 36) were discarded because the team members did not chat with one
another at all during the session. Team 3’s data were discarded because one of the
teammates made a comment that contaminated one of the manipulations. Data from one
team (ID 51) was discarded because one of the teammates was a non-native English
speaker and had difficulty completing the tasks. Finally, the data from Team 32 was
discarded because it was obvious that one of the teammates did not take the task seriously
or respond appropriately. After removal of the aforementioned nine teams, data from 120
participants, comprising 60 teams, were used for analysis. All further descriptive and
inferential statistics reported below, including participant demographics, are based only
on these 120 participants.
The students included 72 males and 48 females, with a mean age of 20.53 years
(range 18 to 41). Participants completed the study in same-gender teams of two. Thirtyeight (63.3%) of those teams were comprised of participants who did not know each
other prior to the session, while the other 22 teams (36.7%) were comprised of friends or
siblings. Approximately half (48.3%) of the participants were freshmen, and only 9
participants (7.5%) had any military experience.

They were all recruited via the

Psychology and Digital Media Departments at UCF and received extra credit for their
participation. All participants were treated ethically according to the guidelines of the

64

American Psychological Association (APA) and the UCF Institutional Review Board
(IRB; see Appendix A for IRB Approval Form).
Experimental Design
The study employed a 2 (high vs. low actual sharedness) x 2 (high vs. low
perceptions of sharedness) between-subjects design. The third variable, quality, was a
quasi-experimental variable that was measured, but not manipulated. While this variable
was of interest, perceptions of and actual mental model sharedness were the main foci of
this study. Table 6 presents the experimental design of the study.
Table 6
Experimental Design
Low Perceptions (LP) of
Sharedness

High Perceptions (HP) of
Sharedness

Low Actual (LA)
Sharedness

LA-LP
(Dissensus)

LA-HP
(False Consensus)

High Actual (HA)
Sharedness

HA-LP
(Pluralistic Ignorance)

HA-HP
(Consensus)

Experimental Task
Recognizing the complexities of the military environment, Urban et al. (1995)
stated that “operational military environments provide ideal settings for the development
of team performance” (p. 123). Within the military environment, one particular area in
need of research is the performance of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) missions.
A strong correlation has been found between the success of an R&S mission and
subsequent operational or battlefield success (Goldsmith & Hodges, 1987). However, it
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is common knowledge that the Army is not extremely efficient in conducting R&S
missions (McCarthy, 1995), and the inclusion of robotic assets, such as unmanned ground
vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is only adding to the complexity
of these missions.
R&S is essential to the success of any military mission, and therefore, the
planning of R&S is recognized as “singularly the most significant event that takes place
in the lifecycle of a tactical mission” (White, 1997, ¶ 1). Because the planning of R&S
missions using robotic assets represents a complex domain in which team members are
required to interact with each other to complete team goals, this task provided an idea
vehicle for investigating the current hypotheses. The task chosen for this study required
teams to draw the most appropriate and efficient routes for their robotic assets onto a map
provided to them. The task was only complete when both teammates agreed on the
route(s) they had selected. Precedent for focusing on mission planning comes from
several previous studies of team coordination that emphasized the planning stages of
various mission scenarios (cf. Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Jeffrey, 1999;
Pai, 2006; Stout et al., 1999).
Equipment
Computers
The study utilized two workstations and one experimenter station. The two
workstations where the participants completed the study were nearly identical. Both
workstations used standard personal computers with ViewSonic E771 17-inch Monitors.
A standard 3 button mouse was used to draw the routes at each workstation for each
asset.

Both participants wore generic headphones for the duration of the study.
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Headphones were used to dampen any outside noise. The workstations were separated
from each other by a partition so that the participants could not see each other during the
study. Both the headphones and partition were used to help isolate participants and
discourage verbal communication. These controls were effective in preventing all teams
from verbally communicating during the experiment.
Software
The study used Microsoft® Office PowerPoint® 2003 for the training portion and
Marratech 5.1 virtual meeting software for the performance portion. Marratech was
downloaded free from www.marratech.com. The Marratech software allowed multiple
computers to network through a direct cable connection. The software allowed remote
computers to share the same desktop, view the same screen, and exchange information
through electronic chat, voice, or video. This study took advantage of the Marratech
Whiteboard and Chat functions.

The Whiteboard worked similar to common paint

programs. An image could be imported onto the Whiteboard and then participants could
draw lines and arrows, manipulate objects, and point to specific locations on the
Whiteboard. All actions of one participant could be seen by the other and vice versa.
The Chat window worked similar to common instant message programs; participants
could type a message to their teammate and that message would appear on both
computers, with the name of the sender and a time stamp. A sample screen shot is shown
in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Screen shot from Marratech 5.1 software.

Recording Equipment
All actions performed on the computers at Workstation A were recorded onto
DVD-Rs. As both computers displayed all of the same information, it was not necessary
to record both computers. An ATI All-in-Wonder X800 XL 256 MB GDDR3 PCI
Express Graphics Card was installed on Computer A. This allowed for the display to be
sent to the monitor, and to the CyberHome DVR 1600 DVD Recorder. The sessions
were monitored at the experimenter station on an Insignia 13-inch television via an SVideo cable.
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Materials
All experimental paperwork can be found in the Appendices. These include: an
informed consent form (Appendix B), a biographical data form (Appendix C), a selfmonitoring measure (adapted from Snyder &

Gangestad, 1986; Appendix D), an

extraversion measure (adapted from Costa & McCrae, 1996); Appendix E), a
reconnaissance planning quiz (Appendix F), a task mental model measure (derived from
Smith-Jentsch et al.’s [2005] Cue-Strategy Associations Measure; Appendix G),

a

perceptions of sharedness pre-measure (Appendix H), an appropriateness of implicit
coordination measure (Appendix I), a perceptions of sharedness post-measure (Appendix
J), the NASA-TLX instructions and forms (Hart & Staveland [1988]; Appendix K), and a
debriefing form (Appendix L).
Training Materials
The training materials consisted of PowerPoint slideshow presentations that
presented the participants with the essential information they needed to complete their
tasks. Two different training programs were used to instill high or low sharedness
between the teammates.

In order to achieve high sharedness, both team members

received the same training program, specifically, (a) Training Module 1 and Training
Module 1 or (b) Training Module 2 and Training Module 2. In contrast, to achieve low
sharedness, team members received different training programs, specifically, Training
Module 1 and Training Module 2.
The training materials provided the participants with general information about
military reconnaissance tasks, the importance of environmental factors, how to
strategically utilize UGVs and UAVs, and other information essential to planning a
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military reconnaissance mission. The modules differed in their emphasis on certain
strategies of using the UGV and UAV in conjunction, the importance of different factors,
the importance of utilizing all available assets, and the importance of making quick
decisions.

The modules also provided the participants with a description of the

Marratech software and the basic functions that they would be using. Appendix N
presents the differences between the two training modules.
Scenario Materials
Three different scenarios were developed and used in this study: the Training
Scenario, the Samarra Scenario, and the al Kufah Scenario. Each scenario consisted of a
map that was imported onto the Marratech Whiteboard and two packets of information.
Packet A was always given to the participant at Computer A, and Packet B was always
given to the participant at Computer B. Packet A always provided information about the
UAV and the weather, while Packet B always included information about the UGV and
the terrain. Additional information about obstacles and mission specifics were included
in both packets.

Some of the information was identical, while the majority of the

information was different. Appendix O presents the materials for all three scenarios.
Procedure
Participants signed up for the study in same-gender teams of two. The teams
were matched for gender and then randomly placed in one of six assigned conditions.
Table 7 shows the six assignments. There were two assignments each for Consensus and
Pluralistic Ignorance because there were two possible combinations for High Actual
Sharedness (i.e., where both teammates received Training Module 1, or both teammates
received Training Module 2).
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Table 7
Experimental Assignments
Assignment
1
2
3
4
5
6

N

Dissensus
False
Consensus
Pluralistic
Ignorance
Consensus
Pluralistic
Ignorance
Consensus

Training Module
Computer B
HQ2
HQ2

Perceptions

32
32

Training Module
Computer A
HQ1
HQ1

10

HQ1

HQ1

Low

12
18

HQ1
HQ2

HQ1
HQ2

High
Low

16

HQ2

HQ2

High

Low
High

Note: Divide N by 2 to get number of teams. Assignments 3 and 5 and Assignments 4 and 6 are collapsed
during analysis to create the 4 experimental conditions.

Upon entering the experimental environment, participants were asked to take a
seat at either of the two workstations and turn off their cell phones. They were then
asked to read and sign the Informed Consent Form (Appendix B) and to complete the
Biographical Data Form (Appendix C). Next, the participants were read an explanation
of the study.

This explanation differed between the High and Low Perceptions

conditions. If participants were in a High Perceptions condition, they were told that both
team members were receiving the same training as “Reconnaissance Equipment
Operators.” If the participants were in a Low Perceptions condition, they were told that
they would be receiving two different types of training: the participant at Computer A
would be trained as a “Reconnaissance Equipment Operator”, while the participant at
Computer B would be trained as a “Surveillance Systems Specialist”. Appendix M
provides the dual explanations that were read throughout the experiment, with the
specific differences highlighted.
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Next, participants were asked to put on headphones so that they would be
discouraged from talking to one another during the remainder of the study. They then
began their training. Depending on the condition they were in, the participants received
either Training Module 1 or Training Module 2. Both modules consisted of 78 slides that
took approximately 15-20 minutes to read through. After both participants completed the
training, they were asked to fill out the Reconnaissance Planning Quiz (Appendix F) that
was designed to reemphasize the key points of the Training Modules. Next, they were
asked to complete two personality measures, the Self-Monitoring Measure (Appendix D)
and the Extraversion Measure (Appendix E). While the participants were filling out the
personality measures, the experimenter graded the Reconnaissance Planning Quizzes.
There were two answer keys, one for each Training Module. Appendix F shows the
correct answers for each Training Module. After completing the personality measures,
the participants were given feedback on their quiz performance.
The participants were then read an explanation of their practice session and given
15 minutes to engage in a Training Scenario (Appendix O). Throughout all scenarios, the
participant on Computer A was responsible for planning a route for the UAV, while the
participant on Computer B was responsible for planning a route for the UGV. The
Training Scenario was identical to the actual performance scenarios, except that the
participants could not chat with each other and could not see what their teammate was
doing. The purpose of the Training Scenario was to allow the participants to become
familiar with the Marratech software and the types of information they would be
receiving with each subsequent performance scenario.
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After the Training Scenario, the participants were asked to complete the Mental
Model Measure (Appendix G), the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure (Appendix
H), and the Appropriateness Measure (Appendix I). All teams then completed the two
performance scenarios (Appendix O), which were counterbalanced across teams. Before
each scenario, they were read a brief description about their task. The scenarios took
approximately 15-20 minutes each to complete. After the first scenario, the participants
were given the NASA-TLX instructions and blank forms to fill out (Appendix K). They
then completed the second scenario and filled out the NASA-TLX a second time. Next,
the participants were administered the Mental Model Measure (Appendix G) for a second
time and a Perceptions of Sharedness Post-Measure (Appendix J).
The participants were then debriefed on the study, with emphasis on the deception
used (Appendix L). They were provided with the opportunity to ask any questions or
discuss their feeling about the study. Copies of the Debriefing Form and the Psychology
Department’s Research Experience form were presented to each participant. Finally, the
participants were thanked for their participation and asked not to discuss the study with
potential participants to avoid contamination of the experimental manipulations.
Data Coding
Mental Model Quality
In order to assess the quality of each team member’s mental model, unique
scoring sheets were created for the two different training modules.

As previously

discussed, the two modules provided opposing information about the types of strategies
that should be used. For example, Training Module 1 told participants to always consider
using both assets first, while Training Module 2 told participants to always consider using
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only one asset first. Thus, scoring sheets were developed that took into account these
differences.

Participants received points for following the strategies that were

emphasized in their respective training modules. The possible points ranged from 0 to 13
for each of the four scenarios within the mental model measures, resulting in an overall
total range of 0 to 52 points. Overall, the average quality score was 33.91 (SD = 7.171).
To obtain an overall team quality score, the two team members’ scores were
averaged together. These team averages were then used to split the teams into a high and
a low group, based on the median score (35.50). This resulted in 26 teams with average
low quality mental models with an average team quality score of 30.42 (SD = 6.146). Of
the 26 teams with low quality mental models, 46% (12) were composed of team members
who both had low quality mental models, while the other 54% (14) were composed of
one team member with a lower quality mental model and one with a higher quality
mental model. In contrast, there were 34 teams with average high quality mental models
(M = 36.18, SD = 5.823). Of the 34 teams with average high quality mental models, only
32% (11) were composed of team members who both had high quality mental models,
while the other 68% were composed of one team member with a lower quality mental
model and one with a higher quality mental model. Thus, only 38% of the teams were
completely high quality or low quality, while the remaining 62% were actually mixedquality prior to taking the team average.
Initiating Behaviors
Communications between teammates were analyzed by reviewing the chat file
transcripts for each scenario. First, the overall number of messages and words from each
scenario were tallied. Next, a list of all possible pieces of information that could be
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passed from one team member to the other was created. In the al Kufah Scenario, there
were 41 possible pieces of information that Team Member A could have discussed with
Team Member B and 42 possible pieces of information that Team Member B could have
discussed with Team Member A. Of those, approximately 39% were the same pieces of
information.

In the Samarra Scenario, there were 38 possible pieces of information that

Team Member A could have discussed with Team Member B and 36 possible pieces of
information that Team Member B could have discussed with Team Member A. Of those,
approximately 32% were the same pieces of information.
Three independent raters viewed each chat file and coded four types of
information exchanges: (a) the information that was requested by Team Member A, (b)
the information provided to Team Member A without a request, (c) the information that
was requested by Team Member B, and (d) the information provided to Team Member B
without a request. A total tally for each type of information exchange was calculated for
each scenario. The total tallies from each of the independent raters were then correlated
to determine inter-rater reliability. The results showed the correlations between the three
raters were r12 = .914, r13 = .871, and r23 = .848, which were all significant at the .01
level.
As one of the goals of this study was to look at specific sequences of events, it
was necessary to create one standard list of the information exchanges in order to then
investigate the next step in the chain of events. Thus, first, to determine where there were
major differences between raters, standard deviations were calculated. Any specific case
that had a standard deviation of 2.00 or above was then reevaluated until a consensus was
reached about the appropriate rating for the specific case. There were 19 specific cases
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that required re-evaluation. Seven of these were requests, so they were set aside. For the
remaining 12 cases, each file was reviewed and a final decision was reached. For all the
other cases whose standard deviations were less than 2.00, the maximum tally of the three
raters was used. This was done to optimize the number of opportunities for the sequence
of implicit coordination to occur. For ties, the items were checked for reliability across
raters. In the end, the correlations between the three raters were r12 = .927, r13 = .907,
and r23 = .894, which were all significant at the .01 level.
Thus, the information exchanges where information was provided without a
request became the initiating behaviors. A total was taken for each team member within
each scenario so that a total could be calculated for each individual and for the overall
team.
Figure 8 is a screen shot that shows some representative initiating behaviors.
Specifically, Team Member B, who was in charge of the UGV, provided Team Member
A, who was in charge of the UAV, with three critical pieces of information: (a) Initiating
Behavior 1 (IB 1) – “You have to go to Neck”, (b) Initiating Behavior 2 (IB2) – “Torso is
a place that I cannot go”, and (c) Initiating Behavior 3 (IB 3) – “Hand just needs a quick
check to see if there are any vehicles there so that means it would be better for you to go
there and just check it out real quick”. These three behaviors are highlighted in the Chat
File in yellow. These were typical information exchanges that were counted as initiating
behaviors. As can be seen from the Chat File, no request for any of this information was
made on the part of Team Member A.
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IB 1
IB 2
RB 1
IB 3
RB 2

Figure 8. Sample screen shot from Team 15, al Kufah Scenario.
Note: The Chat shows three initiating behaviors by Team Member B and their corresponding
verbal responding behaviors by Team Member A. RB 1 is a verbal Acknowledgment Responding
Behavior. RB 2 is a Synthesis Responding Behavior. The Map shows Team Member A’s route
drawn in magenta to Hand, Neck, and Torso in response to Team Member A’s initiating
behaviors. RB 3, RB 4, and RB 5 are all Action Responding Behaviors that were given a 5 rating.

Responding Behaviors
After the standard set of initiating behaviors was agreed upon, the chat files and
video recordings for each team were reviewed to look for responding behaviors.
Responding behaviors fell into three categories: (a) an acknowledgement, such as “O.K.”
or, “I did not have that info”, (b) synthesis, in which the second team member integrated
the information with the information he or she had already been given, and (c) action, in
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which the route planning decisions reflected an application of the information provided in
the initiating behavior.
First, two raters independently rated the chat file transcipts for each team for
instances of acknowledgement and synthesis responding behaviors. The two raters then
watched the DVDs for each team together and coded whether or not the corresponding
actions were present for those behavioral sequences. The possible action responding
behaviors included: (a) drawing an arrow, (b) deleting an arrow, (c) pointing to a
location, (d) changing the size or direction of an arrow, and/or (e) moving an arrow.
Each action responding behavior was rated on a 1-5 scale to indicate the degree of
confidence the action was indeed associated with the initiating behavior. Prior to rating
the action responding behaviors, the raters discussed that confidence was represented by
several factors including: (a) amount of time passed between initiating behavior and
given action, (b) content of conversation between the initiating behavior and given action,
and (c) other possible reasons for the given action. These factors were not individually
analyzed because it was deemed that they could not be uniquely separated from the core
construct.
This overall process resulted in a measure of each type of responding behavior for
each team in each scenario. The following types of responding behaviors were identified:
(a) frequency of acknowledgements, (b) frequency of synthesis communications, (c)
overall verbal responses (total acknowledgements plus synthesis), (d) frequency of all
actions, (e) frequency of all actions rated 3 or higher, (f) frequency of all actions rated 4
or higher, and (g) frequency of all responding behaviors (total verbal plus all actions).

78

Referring back to Figure 8, the three different types of responding behaviors are
also exhibited. Specifically, after Team Member B provided Team Member A with IB 1
and IB 2, Team Member B responded with an Acknowledgement Responding Behavior
(RB 1) – “OK I have no specific instruction.” After IB 3, Team Member B responded
with a Synthesis Responding Behavior (RB 2) – “So I need to go to Hand, Neck, and
Torso?” These responding behaviors are highlighted in the Chat File in blue. These were
typical information exchanges that were counted as verbal responding behaviors.
Additionally, there are three action responding behaviors visible in the figure. Based on
the three initiating behaviors, Team Member A drew a route to Hand (RB 3), Neck (RB
4), and Torso (RB 5).

The route was drawn within 5 minutes of the information

exchange, and no other significant information was exchanged in between the initiating
behaviors and the actions. Thus, each of the three actions was given a rating of 5 because
it was evident to the reviewers that the actions were a direct result of Team Member B’s
initiating behaviors. These were representative of the types of actions that were observed
throughout the coding process.
Team Processes
Finally, team process measures were created in order to determine overall team
process scores. To reiterate, there were 74 possible pieces of information that could have
been discussed in the Samarra Scenario and 83 possible pieces of information that could
have been discussed in the al Kufah Scenario. Each of these pieces of information was
rated on a 1-3 scale of how important the information was in terms of planning the routes.
Specifically, those pieces of information that were crucial to route planning were given a
3 and those that should have no effect on route planning were given a 1. In the Samarra
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Scenario, the distribution of information was: twenty-four (28.9%) pieces of information
were given the highest rating of 3, twenty-one (25.3%) pieces of information were given
the middle rating of 2, and twenty-nine (34.9%) pieces of information were given the
lowest rating of 1. In the al Kufah Scenario, the distribution of information was: twentyfive (44.6%) pieces of information were given the highest rating of 3, thirty-three
(25.3%) pieces of information were given the middle rating of 2, and twenty-five (33.8%)
pieces of information were given the lowest rating of 1. To derive a team process score,
the ratings for all pieces of information discussed, both requested information and
initiating behaviors, were totaled. Thus, the team process score was an overall score of
the relevancy of information that was discussed throughout each scenario. In the al
Kufah Scenario, these ratings ranged from 7 to 56 (M = 26.68, SD = 11.454). In the
Samarra Scenario, these ratings ranged from 0 to 48 (M = 23.73, SD = 10.186).
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
Organization
This section provides a general overview of the organization of the results section.
All analyses were conducted on SPSS 11.5 for Windows statistical software. Unless
otherwise noted, an alpha level of .05 was used. First, a comparison of the two scenarios
was conducted to determine whether there were any significant differences between them
with respect to workload and instances of implicit coordination. Next, two sub-sections
are presented that provide information on (a) data cleaning and (b) random assignment
and manipulation checks.
After these general analyses, tests of hypotheses are described. The tests of the
three hypotheses are presented in the order of the proposed steps of implicit coordination
(initiating behaviors → responding behaviors → improved team processes). Thus, first
the analysis related to initiating behaviors and the impact of perceptions of sharedness
(Hypothesis 3) is presented. Next, the analyses related to responding behaviors and the
impact of actual mental model sharedness (Hypothesis 1) are presented. Finally, the
analysis related to team processes and the impact of mental model quality (Hypothesis 2)
is presented. Additionally, supplemental analyses investigated the effect of all
independent variables on all dependent variables to assess the expected proportional
relationships (as seen in Figures 4 and 6). To begin, Table 8 presents the means, standard
deviations, and inter-correlations between the study variables.
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Table 8
Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations between Study Variables

1. Gender
2. Friends
3. Military Exp
4. RPGVS Exp
5. RPAVS Expt
6. Video Game Expt
7. PC Expt
8. Chat / IM Expt
9. Extraversion
10. Self-monitoringt
11. Perceptions Manip
12. Actual Manip
13. Perceptions Pre-testt
14. Actual Sharedness
15. Quality
16. Workload
17. # Messages
18. # Words
19. Initiating Behaviorst
20. Acknowledge RBst
21. Synthesis RBs t
22. All Actionst
23. Team Quality
24. Team Processes

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0.08
3.48
0.40
1.53
0.19
0.14
62.87
3.58
3.65
43.63
33.91
56.17
28
201
0.70
0.19
1.12
0.71
34.29
26.68

0.26
1.42
0.11
0.47
0.21
0.20
9.88
0.98
0.84
10.71
7.17
16.35
16.36
116
0.21
0.20
0.65
0.75
4.72
11.45

.01
-.17
-.46**
.37**
.56**
.13
.03
-.21*
-.27**
.07
-.05
.10
.03
.02
.01
-.11
-.08
-.03
.14
-.11
-.08
.06
-.02

-.15
-.03
-.11
.08
.15
-.02
-.06
.15
.00
.09
-.21*
.06
-.12
.18*
.34**
.09
-.05
.02
-.02
.06
-.15
-.14

.15
-.21*
-.10
-.05
-.09
.08
.10
.03
.01
.14
-.08
-.11
-.13
-.02
.02
.17
.01
.02
-.05
-.09
.07

-.39**
-.41**
-.34**
-.16
-.04
.14
-.09
.13
-.08
-.04
.21*
.10
.06
-.06
.01
-.04
.04
.03
.14
.02

.30**
.11
.12
-.13
-.13
.05
-.11
.19*
.06
.07
.10
-.12
-.13
-.10
.10
-.07
.02
.06
.03

.45**
.36**
-.26**
-.09
.13
-.01
.15
.10
-.14
.17
.03
.00
-.06
.13
-.06
.03
-.14
.03

.55**
-.02
-.06
.01
-.01
.12
.08
-.18
.07
.03
-.07
-.05
-.10
-.03
-.03
-.19
.11

-.11
.16
-.03
-.08
.20*
-.01
-.12
-.06
-.08
-.10
-.01
-.07
.01
-.02
-.15
.32*

-.20*
-.11
-.04
-.02
-.10
.00
-.21*
-.03
.01
-.01
-.02
.04
-.13
.09
-.25

.05
.06
.08
-.08
-.20*
.10
.10
.06
.03
-.06
.15
.02
-.15
.10

.00
-.14
.08
-.09
-.04
-.01
.00
-.03
.08
.00
.04
-.16
-.06

.02
.58**
.09
.08
.10
.10
-.01
.20*
.02
.02
.12
-.02

82

t

13. Perception Pre-test
14. Actual Sharedness
15. Quality
16. Workload
17. Messages
18. Words
19. Initiating Behaviorst
20. Acknowledge RBt
21. Synthesis RBt
22. All Actionst
23. Team Quality
24. Team Processes

M

SD

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

3.65
43.63
33.91
56.17
27.90
200.8
0.70
0.19
1.12
0.71
34.29
26.68

0.84
10.71
7.17
16.35
16.36
116
0.21
0.20
0.65
0.75
4.72
11.45

(.90)
.00
.01
-.01
.10
.17
.10
.08
.05
-.04
.01
.19

(.85)
.09
.24**
.07
.04
-.09
.04
-.03
-.01
.08
-.10

.06
.08
.08
.16
.10
.07
.02
.59**
.32*

.27**
.20*
.12
.09
.15
.03
.17
.05

.79**
.42**
.15
.35**
-.03
.19
.47**

.50**
.11
.40**
-.06
.28*
.57**

.32**
.64**
-.18*
.39**
.74**

.10
-.11
.15
.22

-.32**
.22
.60**

.10
.11

.29*

-

Note: * = significant at p < .05, ** = significant at p < .01. t = transformed variables used. N = 120 for all variables except team level variables (N = 60). RB
= responding behavior. All variables were measured on the individual level unless specified otherwise. Actual Sharedness is based on absolute
difference scores and therefore a higher score means less sharedness.
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Scenario Comparison
Prior to hypothesis testing, analyses of the behaviors in and the perceptions of the
Samarra Scenario and the al Kufah Scenario were conducted. First, a 2 (scenario order) x
2 (scenario) x 7 (NASA-TLX subscales) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was performed to determine whether there were significant differences in perceived
workload between the two scenarios and whether there were any order effects. The
between-subjects factor was order of scenarios, while the within-subjects factors were the
actual scenario and the NASA-TLX subscales. The results showed that the test for
between-subjects effects was not significant, F (1,118) = 0.613, p = .435, but there was a
significant within-subjects main effect for the scenario (F [1,118] = 67.559, p < .0001,
partial η2 = .364). Specifically, participants perceived the al Kufah Scenario to be
characterized by significantly higher workload than the Samarra Scenario (Mal

Kufah

=

49.76, SDal Kufah = 1.356, MSamarra = 38.899, SDSamarra = 1.328), regardless of the order of
scenarios.
In addition, a paired-samples t-test showed that there were significantly more
initiating behaviors in the al Kufah Scenario than the Samarra Scenario, t(119) = -3.042,
p = .003 (Mal Kufah = 4.53, SDal Kufah = 2.660, MSamarra = 3.72, SDSamarra = 2.464). Team
members also sent significantly more messages, t(119) = -6.285, p < .0001 (Mal Kufah =
27.90, SDal Kufah = 16.360, MSamarra = 19.87, SDSamarra = 13.005), with more words, t(119)
= -6.067, p < .0001 (Mal Kufah = 200.81, SDal Kufah = 115.868, MSamarra = 138.99, SDSamarra =
88.496) in the al Kufah Scenario than in Samarra Scenario.
Thus, participants not only found the al Kufah Scenario to be more difficult, but
they also communicated more and had more instances of initiating behaviors. Even after
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considering the total number of available pieces of information (i.e., 83 in the al Kufah
Scenario and 74 in the Samarra Scenario), the former was characterized by a greater
proportion of implicit coordination (5.5% vs. 5.0%). This, in itself, supported the notion
that teams used more implicit coordination when workload was higher.
In order to maximize the possible effect sizes for the hypothesized relationships,
the al Kufah Scenario was selected as the focus for analysis. Because the Samarra
Scenario had significantly less communications and perceived workload, I posited that its
inclusion might water down the results and detract from the findings. Therefore, for the
remainder of the results section, unless otherwise specified, all analysis will focus on
behaviors in al Kufah Scenario.
Data Cleaning
First, the data were screened for normality. There were a number of variables that
were significantly skewed and transformations were made based on the recommendations
by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). If data analysis results did not differ between the raw
data and the transformed data, then the raw data were used.
Biographical Data
Two of the biographical data variables, experience with video games and the SelfMonitoring Measure, were moderately negatively skewed and were transformed using the
square root (reflected). Two of the biographical data variables, experience with PCs and
chat/instant messaging programs, were substantially negatively skewed and were
transformed using the logarithm (reflected). Finally, experience with radio or remotecontrolled air vehicles was severely positively skewed and was transformed using the
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inverse. After transformation, these variables were no longer significantly deviating from
normality.
Study Variables
The measured perceptions of sharedness variable (Perceptions Pre-Measure Total
Score) was moderately negatively skewed and was transformed using the square root
(reflected).

Finally, a number of the dependent variables were positively skewed.

Specifically, number of initiating behaviors, number of acknowledgement responding
behaviors, and total verbal responding behaviors were all substantially positively skewed
and transformed using the logarithm. The number of synthesis responding behaviors,
total action responding behaviors, total 4+ rated action responding behaviors, and total 3+
action responding behaviors were all moderately positively skewed and were transformed
using the square root. After transformation, these variables were no longer significantly
deviating from normality.
Random Assignment and Manipulation Checks
To confirm the random assignment of teams to the different experimental
conditions, a random assignment check was performed by running a one-way (assigned
experimental condition: dissensus, false consensus, pluralistic ignorance, consensus),
between-subjects multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on individual difference
data that should not have been influenced by that assignment.

These individual

difference variables were (a) age, (b) Self-Monitoring score, (c) Extraversion score, (d)
experience with video games, and (e) experience with instant messaging chat programs.
The results showed that the random assignment of teams to the different experimental
conditions was successful in that there were no significant effects on any of the individual
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difference variables. Table 9 presents the means and standard deviations of the random
assignment check.
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Individual Difference Variables by Assigned Condition

M (SD)
20.53
(3.737)
42.23
(6.999)
62.87
(9.878)
4.44 (1.494)

High Perceptions of
Sharedness
Different
Same
Training
Training
(False
(Consensus)
Consensus)
M (SD)
M (SD)
19.96
20.78
(1.732)
(4.917)
43.00
40.66
(7.092)
(8.253)
63.75
60.03
(11.131)
(11.125)
4.36 (1.521) 4.19 (1.424)

Low Perceptions of
Sharedness
Different
Same
Training
Training
(Dissensus)
(Pluralistic
Ignorance)
M (SD)
M (SD)
20.64
20.66
(4.130)
(3.404)
42.36
43.00
(6.372)
(6.085)
62.75
65.03
(8.329)
(8.283)
4.50 (1.552) 4.72 (1.508)

5.43 (0.886)

5.39 (0.832)

5.32 (1.090)

Overall
(N = 122)
Variables
Age (years)
Self-Monitoring Scoret
Extraversion Score
Experience with video
gamest
Experience with chat or
instant messaging
programst

5.50 (0.950)

Note: t = transformed scores used. No significant differences found.
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5.50 (0.672)

MANOVA Results

F (3, 116)
0.278

p
.841

0.591

.622

1.485

.222

0.874

.457

0.288

.834

Psychometric Properties of Manipulation Check Measures
Perceptions of Sharedness
The perceptions of sharedness were manipulated by explaining to teams that they
were receiving similar or different training. A Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure
was used to assess the team members’ actual perceptions of sharedness prior to
performance, and a Perceptions of Sharedness Post-Measure was used to assess the team
members’ actual perceptions of sharedness after performance. Table 10 presents the
descriptive statistics of the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure items. As can be seen
from Table 10, participants tended to lean toward the higher end of the scale more than
the lower end. Specifically, the Mode was never lower than 4, and for four of the seven
items, none of the participants selected the lowest rating of 1.
Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure Items
M
1. You and your teammate have a shared
4.53
understanding of the task.
2. Your teammate will be able to anticipate your
3.48
behaviors.
3. You will be able to anticipate your teammate’s 3.52
behaviors.
4. Your teammate has a good understanding of
4.41
your role in the team.
5. You have a good understanding of your
4.52
teammate’s role in the team.
6. Your teammate will understand what you are
4.15
doing.
7. You will understand what your teammate is
4.16
doing.
Overall pre-teamwork total
28.98

SD Mode
1.092
5

Min
1

Max
6

1.174

4

1

6

1.223

4

1

6

1.104

5

2

6

1.108

5

2

6

.993

4

2

6

.935

4

2

6

6.133

33

11

42

Note: Items 1-7 rated on a scale of 1= Not at All to 6 = Completely. Overall pre-teamwork total is simply
the sum of the first seven items for each person.

Even though the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure showed that teams were
already leaning toward higher perceptions of sharedness, a comparison of the Pre- and
Post-Measures was conducted to determine if those perceptions shifted in a systematic
way during performance.

A 4 (assigned experimental condition: dissensus, false

consensus, pluralistic ignorance, consensus) x 2 (administration: pre-measure, postmeasure) x 7 (individual items on Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure) mixed-model
ANOVA was conducted with assigned experimental condition as the between-subjects
variable and administration and questions as the within-subjects variables. There was no
significant effect for condition, F(1, 116) = 0.668, p = .574. There were, however,
significant main effects for both administration (F[1, 116] = 157.726, p < .0001, partial η2
= .576) and question (Greenhouse-Geisser F[3.287, 381.330] = 70.824, p < .0001, partial
η2 = .379), and a significant interaction between the two (Greenhouse-Geisser F[4.038,
468.448] = 3.944, p = .004, partial η2 = .033). Figure 9 presents a graphical depiction of
the two-way interaction. As can be seen in Figure 9, participants reported higher scores
on all seven of the Perceptions Post-Measure items as opposed to the Perceptions PreMeasure.

90

6

Level of Agreement

5

4

Pre-Measure
Post-Measure

3

2

1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Items on Measure

Figure 9. Two-way interaction between administration and question on perceptions of
sharedness measures.

Actual Mental Model Sharedness
Similar to the perceptions of sharedness manipulation, while the actual mental
model sharedness was manipulated by giving teammates the same or different training, a
Mental Model Pre-Measure was used to assess the team members’ actual sharedness
prior to performance and a Mental Model Post-Measure was used to assess the team
members’ actual sharedness after performance. A comparison of the Pre- and PostMeasures was conducted to determine if actual sharedness among team members’ mental
models shifted during performance. A 4 (assigned experimental condition: dissensus,
false consensus, pluralistic ignorance, consensus) x 2 (administration: pretest, posttest) x
4 (scenario) x 6 (strategy) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted with assigned
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experimental condition as the between-subjects variable and administration, scenario, and
strategy as the within-subjects variables. There was no significant effect for condition,
F(1, 116) = 1.106, p = .350. There was also no significant effect for administration, F(1,
116) = 0.294, p = .589, suggesting that participants’ mental models about the most
effective strategies to use did not shift during performance.
Although the main focus of this manipulation was the difference between team
members, it was first necessary to assess whether the two training modules produced
different mental models.

A 2 (training) x 4 (scenario) x 6 (strategy) mixed-model

ANOVA was conducted with training module as the between-subjects variable and
scenario and strategy as the within-subjects variables. The results showed that the test for
between-subjects effects was significant, F (1, 118) = 202.363, p < .0001, partial η2 =
.632. Thus, it appears that the mental model measure was indeed sensitive enough to
capture differences in mental models.
Mental Model Quality
Although mental model quality was a quasi-independent variable because it was
only measured and not manipulated, it was still important to determine whether there
were differences in quality between participants who received Training Module 1 and
participants who received Training Module 2. An independent samples t-test showed that
there were no significant differences in quality based on the training module received,
t(118) = .994, p = .347.

Thus, there was no evidence that either training module

produced superior mental models.
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Manipulation Checks
Perceptions of Sharedness
Prior to testing the hypotheses, a manipulation check was performed on the
perceptions of sharedness manipulation. A one-way (manipulated perceptions: low, high)
between-subjects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on the (square root)
Perceptions Pre-Measure Total using friends/not friends and experience with video games
as a covariate. The friends/not friends variable was used because it was expected that
those teams who had knowledge of each other prior to the study would have higher
perceptions of sharedness. The experience with video games variable was used because
participants completed the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure immediately after they
completed their training session in which they interacted with the Marratech 5.1 software.
After adjustment by the covariates, the perceptions of sharedness manipulation
had a significant effect on the (square root) Perceptions Pre-Measure Total, t(116) =
1.846, p = .034 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .029. This effect was in the expected direction,
with the higher perceptions group scoring lower on the transformed Perceptions PreMeasure Total, which are a reflection of the raw data. Thus, the instructions about
whether teammates received the same or different training significantly influenced
participants’ measured perceptions of sharedness when the effects of friends/not friends
and video game experience were controlled for.
Actual Mental Model Sharedness
Prior to testing the hypotheses, a manipulation check was also performed on the
actual sharedness manipulation. As it was not expected that any other factors would
influence this manipulation, no covariates were used. An independent samples t-test
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investigated the impact of the manipulated level of sharedness (high vs. low) on the
absolute difference scores between teammates on the Mental Model Pre-Measure. The
results were significant, t(58) = -5.446, p < .0001 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .338. The
results were in the expected direction, with teams who received the same training (i.e.,
higher actual sharedness) exhibiting lower difference scores (M = 37.00, SD = 8.990)
than those who received different training (M = 49.44, SD = 8.680). Thus, receiving the
same or different training significantly influenced participants’ actual mental model
sharedness.
Tests of Hypotheses
Analysis for Hypothesis 3
To recap, Hypothesis 3 stated that perceptions of higher sharedness would lead to
more initiating behaviors. To test this hypothesis, a one-way (manipulated perceptions:
low, high) between-subjects univariate ANCOVA was performed on the (log) initiating
behaviors using role in team (assigned computer) as a covariate. After adjustment by the
covariate, the manipulated perceptions of sharedness did not significantly impact the
(log) initiating behaviors, t(117) = 0.312, p = .38 (one-tailed). These results did not
support Hypothesis 3. No evidence was found that perceptions of sharedness led to more
initiating behaviors.
Analysis for Hypothesis 1
Verbal Responding Behaviors
Hypothesis 1 stated that higher levels of actual mental model sharedness would
lead to more responding behaviors. First, the effect of team members’ actual mental
model sharedness on verbal responding behaviors was evaluated. A one-way
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(manipulated actual mental model sharedness: low, high) between-subjects multivariate
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was performed on the transformed verbal
responding behaviors (log acknowledgement responding behaviors, square root synthesis
responding behaviors, and log total verbal responding behaviors), using (log) initiating
behaviors as a covariate. After adjustment by the covariate, the manipulated mental
model sharedness did not significantly impact (square root) synthesis responding
behaviors (t[117] = -0.420, p = .34 [one-tailed]); however, manipulated mental model
sharedness did significantly influence (log) acknowledgement responding behaviors
(t[117] = -2.316, p = .011 [one-tailed], partial η2 = .044), albeit in the opposite direction
than hypothesized. These results did not support Hypothesis 1. No evidence was found
that higher actual mental model sharedness led to more verbal responding behaviors.
Action Responding Behaviors
Next, the effect of team members’ actual mental model sharedness on action
responding behaviors was evaluated. A one-way (manipulated actual mental model
sharedness: low, high) between-subjects MANCOVA was performed on the transformed
action responding behaviors (square root of actions rated 4 or more, square root of
actions rated 3 or more, and square root of all rated actions), using (log) initiating
behaviors as a covariate. The results are presented in Table 11. After adjustment by the
covariate, the manipulated mental model sharedness did not significantly impact any of
the action responding behaviors. These results failed to provide support for Hypothesis
1. No evidence was found that higher actual mental model sharedness led to more action
responding behaviors.
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Table 10
MANCOVA Table for Between-Subjects Effects of Actual Mental Model Sharedness for
Action Responding Behaviors
Factor
Square root of 4+ Rated
Action Responding Behaviors
Error
Square root of 3+ Rated
Action Responding Behaviors
Error
Square root of All Rated
Action Responding Behaviors
Error

SS

df

0.074

1

Mean
Square
0.065

F

p

0.188

.666

46.091
0.245

117
1

0.394
0.224

0.510

.476

56.062
0.020

117
1

0.479
0.020

0.037

.849

64.658

117

0.553

Analysis for Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that the quality of team’s mental models would be a
significant predictor of weighted team processes, which are the outcome of successful
implicit coordination. This analysis was conducted at team level because team processes
are a team level variable and an individual analysis would not be logical. An independent
samples t-test showed that average team quality significantly affected the team processes,
t(58) = -2.779, p = .004 (one-tailed), partial η2 = .118. The effect was in the predicted
direction, with teams with, on average, higher quality mental models exhibiting better
team processes (M = 30.09, SD = 11.427) than teams with lower quality mental models
(M = 22.23, SD = 10.045). These results supported Hypothesis 2 which had stated that
higher quality mental models lead to better team processes.
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Summary of Hypothesis Testing
Table 11 presents a summary of the hypothesis testing, including the types of
analysis used and the findings from each analysis.
Table 11
Summary of Hypothesis Testing
H# H1
3

MHP > M
LP

1

2*

MHA >
MLA

Test of
Hypothesis
ANCOVA,
covariate: role
in team
MANCOVA,
covariate:
initiating
behaviors

MHQ > M Independent
samples t-test
LQ

Dependent
Variable(s)
Logarithm of
initiating
behaviors
Logarithm of
acknowledgement
responding
behaviors;
Square root of
synthesis
responding
behaviors;
Square root of all
action responding
behaviors
Weighted team
processes

Finding

Result

t(117) = 0.312,
p = .38 (onetailed)
t(117) = -2.316,
p = .011 (onetailed)**;

Not
Supported
Not
supported

t(117) = -0.420,
p = .34 (onetailed);
F(1, 117) = 0.037,
p = .848
t(57) = -2.779,
p = .004 (onetailed),
partial η2 = .118

Supported

Note: *Hypothesis 2 is analyzed on the team level. ** Effect in opposite direction than predicted.

Supplemental Analyses
The expected proportional relationships between perceptions of sharedness and
actual sharedness, and actual sharedness and mental model quality, were investigated via
a series of 2 (perceptions) x 2 (actual sharedness) x 2 (quality) analyses on each of the
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stages of implicit coordination. Continuing with the same organization scheme, these
results are presented in the order of the proposed implicit coordination stages.
Initiating Behaviors
Although the hypothesis that perceptions of sharedness facilitated the process of
implicit coordination was not supported, additional analyses were conducted to determine
whether actual mental model sharedness or quality of mental models affected initiating
behaviors. A 2 (manipulated perceptions: low, high) x 2 (manipulated actual sharedness:
low, high) x 2 (measured quality: low, high) between-subjects ANCOVA was performed
on the (log) initiating behaviors using role in team (assigned computer) as a covariate.
After adjusting for the covariate, only individual mental model quality had a significant
effect on (log) initiating behaviors, F(1, 111) = 4.551, p = .035, partial η2 = .039.
Individuals with higher quality mental models had significantly more (log) initiating
behaviors than individuals with lower quality mental models (MHigh = .7283, SDHigh =
.19258, MLow = .6617, SDLow = .21954).
Responding Behaviors
Although the hypothesis that actual mental model sharedness would drive
responding behaviors was not supported, additional analyses were conducted to
determine whether manipulated perceptions of sharedness or quality of mental models
affected responding behaviors.

A 2 (manipulated perceptions: low, high) x 2

(manipulated actual sharedness: low, high) x 2 (measured quality: low, high) betweensubjects MANCOVA was performed on the transformed verbal responding behaviors
using (log) initiating behaviors as covariates. The results showed that there were no
significant main effects for perceptions of sharedness or mental model quality; however,
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there was a significant two-way interaction between perceptions of sharedness and actual
mental model sharedness, F(1, 110) = 8.943, p = .003, partial η2 = .075. As can be seen
from Figure 10, participants provided more synthesis responding behaviors when they
were in a manipulated mismatched condition, that is participants who received the same
training but were told they got different (pluralistic ignorance) or participants who
received different training but were told they got the same training (false consensus). In
other words, participants whose perceptions did not match their reality tended to “think
aloud”, discuss their options with their teammates, or obtain permission from their
teammates, as opposed to simply taking the information and applying it directly to their
route planning. This was not the expected proportional relationship that was displayed in
Figure 6, in which participants with both high perceptions and high actual sharedness
(consensus) were expected to have the highest number of responding behaviors, while
participants with both low perceptions and low actual sharedness (dissensus) were
expected to have the lowest number of responding behaviors.
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SQRT Synthesis Responding Behaviors

1.4

1.2
Low Actual
Sharedness

1

High Actual
Sharedness

0.8

0.6
Low Perceptions

High Perceptions

Figure 10. Two-way interaction between manipulated perceptions of sharedness and
manipulated actual mental model sharedness on (square root) synthesis responding
behaviors.

Additional analyses showed no evidence of the impact of perceptions of
sharedness, actual mental model sharedness, or mental model quality on any action
responding behaviors.
Team Processes
Finally, analyses were conducted to determine whether manipulated perceptions
of sharedness or manipulated actual mental sharedness affected responding behaviors. A
2 (manipulated perceptions: low, high) x 2 (manipulated actual sharedness: low, high) x 2
(measured average quality: low, high) between-subjects ANOVA was performed on the
weighted team processes. The results showed that there were no significant main effects
for perceptions of sharedness or actual mental model sharedness; however, there was a
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significant two-way interaction between the two, F(1, 52) = 4.044, p = .050, partial η2 =
.072.

This effect exhibited almost the same pattern as was found for the synthesis

responding behaviors. As can be seen from Figure 11, teams had higher weighted team
process scores when they were in a manipulated mismatched condition, that is
participants who received the same training but were told they got different (pluralistic
ignorance) or participants who received different training but were told they got the same
training (false consensus). In other words, teams whose perceptions did not match their
reality tended to exchange more information, and/or more important pieces of
information than teams whose perceptions matched their realities. This interaction was
not the expected proportional relationship shown in Figure 4. It was expected that actual
sharedness and mental model quality would affect team processes, not actual sharedness
and perceptions of sharedness.
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32

Weighted Team Processes

30
28
Low Actual
Sharedness

26

High Actual
Sharedness

24
22
20
Low Perceptions

High Perceptions

Figure 11. Two-way interaction between manipulated perceptions of sharedness and
manipulated actual mental model sharedness on weighted team processes.
Note: Higher score means better team processes.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
The research reported here investigated the process of implicit coordination, and
the effects of perceptions of sharedness, actual mental model sharedness, and quality of
mental models on the different proposed stages of that process. Specifically, it was
hypothesized that (a) perceptions of sharedness would facilitate initiating behaviors, (b)
actual mental model sharedness would drive the corresponding responding behaviors, and
(c) mental model quality would influence team processes. The results of this study
provided only partial support for the impact of mental models on the process of implicit
coordination in teams. The specific findings are discussed in the following sections.
Evidence for Implicit Coordination
First, this study did provide additional support for the existence of implicit
coordination. To reiterate, implicit coordination has been found to occur when teams are
experiencing higher levels of workload (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989). In this study,
participants reported significantly higher levels of workload for the al Kufah Scenario,
regardless of the order of scenarios.

A comparison of the frequency of initiating

behaviors showed that there were significantly more initiating behaviors in the al Kufah
Scenario than in the Samarra Scenario. Thus, teams were engaging in more attempts at
implicit coordination under conditions of greater perceived workload. This supports the
underlying notion that high perceived workload facilitates implicit coordination. At the
same time, given the range of possible workload scores, there are definitely tasks that
could result in higher workload scores. Hence, even higher workload could results in
more evidence for implicit coordination.
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Perceptions of Sharedness
Many of the researchers who previously referred to or found evidence for implicit
coordination have suggested that the phenomenon is driven by team members having
SMMs. This dissertation sought to determine whether team members must have SMMs
or simply believe that they do. In this study, perceptions of sharedness were manipulated
by telling teammates that they would receive the same or different training. It was
expected that those who were told they were receiving the same training would have
perceptions of higher sharedness than those who were told they would be receiving
different training. Although this was found, participants tended to have high perceptions
of sharedness even if they were in the condition in which they were told they received
different training. As the participants had minimal interaction with one another prior to
filling out the Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure, this might have been a
manifestation of Nickerson’s (1999) hypothesis that, when people have limited
information about another person, they tend to use themselves as default models for their
teammates and, consequently, overestimate the extent to which they have SMMs.
Additionally, it was found that whether or not the teammates were friends, and
their individual reported experience with video games, also affected the reported
perceptions of sharedness. Although the effect of prior knowledge of each other was a
predictable relationship, the effect of video game experience was not. While participants
reported their video game experience at the beginning of the study, they filled out the
Perceptions of Sharedness Pre-Measure directly after completing the 15-minute Training
Scenario. Thus, it may have been that when participants filled out the Perceptions of
Sharedness Pre-Measure, they were focused more on their own self-efficacy in terms of
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video games than on the instructions that they received the same or different training.
This suggests that teammates may have focused on the “Assumed Similarity” dimension
of the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 1994), in which team members perceived their
teammates as they perceived themselves, rather than vice versa. This also falls in line
with Woehr and Rentsch’s (2003) findings that perceiver effects had a bigger effect than
partner effects. In other words, perceptions about oneself had more of an impact than
perceptions about one’s teammate.

In the end, however, the manipulation did

significantly impact measured perceptions of sharedness, when the effects of these two
covariates were adjusted for.
I hypothesized that higher perceptions of sharedness would be associated with
more initiating behaviors, or attempts at implicit coordination, because participants who
believed they had a shared understanding would believe their teammates would know
what to do with the information they were providing. The results of this study found no
evidence to support the predicted relationship.

Due to the significantly negatively

skewed distribution of the measured perceptions of sharedness, it might have been that
perceptions were simply not low enough for the low group to show differences from the
high group. Indeed, it is possible that the effect of perceptions of sharedness on implicit
coordination is only evident when people have very low perceptions of sharedness. In
other words, there might have been a range restriction in terms of the participants’ actual
perceptions of sharedness.
The above findings might also have been a manifestation of the amount of time in
which teams completed the task. That is, while there was no time limit, teams normally
only took approximately fifteen minutes per scenario. This likely led to the significantly
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positively skewed distribution of the number of initiating behaviors. The average number
of initiating behaviors per person per scenario was less than five. The question of
whether longer interactions with one another would result in a more pronounced effect of
perceptions of sharedness is at best questionable.

As perceptions are molded with

interaction, it is likely that the participants would have simply had even higher
perceptions of sharedness by the completion of the task.
Actual Mental Model Sharedness
In addition to assessing the perceptions of sharedness, it was also important to
determine the impact that the actual level of sharedness had on coordination between
team members. The manipulation check for actual mental model sharedness was highly
significant.

Those participants who received different training had different mental

models in terms of the appropriate strategies to use to complete the task under varying
conditions.

Additionally, those teammates who received different training had

significantly more differences between their mental models than those teammates who
received the same training. Further, as a function of the positively skewed distribution of
initiating behaviors, the distribution of responding behaviors was also positively skewed.
There were an average of less than 3 verbal responding behaviors and less than 2 action
responding behaviors per scenario. To test Hypothesis 2, that more sharedness would be
associated with more responding behaviors, two separate analyses were run for verbal
and action responding behaviors.
Verbal Responding Behaviors
For verbal responding behaviors, only verbal acknowledgements were
significantly affected by actual mental model sharedness; however, this effect was
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contrary to the predicted direction.

Specifically, it was lower actual mental model

sharedness that led to more acknowledgement responding behaviors than higher
sharedness. One possible reason for these at first contradictory findings may have been
that acknowledgement responding behaviors may not actually be an indication that the
information is being used, or used effectively. An “O.K.” signifies that someone has
received the message, but does not indicate that the person understands the information,
believes

the

information

is

relevant,

or

plans

on

using

the

information.

Acknowledgement responding behaviors are the lowest form of observable responding
behaviors, and they may in fact be the nice person’s non-response. Thus, the finding that
less actual sharedness led to more acknowledgements was not terribly surprising.
Additionally, it should be noted that the effect size for this relationship was only 1%,
suggesting that there are certainly other factors that played a role in how teammates
coordinated with and responded to each other.
On the other hand, there was no significant effect for actual mental model
sharedness on synthesis responding behaviors. Thus, in contrast to what was expected,
high actual sharedness was not associated with more synthesis responding behaviors.
One possible reason for this finding was the significantly positively skewed distribution
of recorded synthesis responding behaviors. As has already been noted, there were less
than 3 verbal responding behaviors per person per scenario. Of these, there were more
acknowledgements than synthesis responding behaviors. Therefore, the lack of an effect
here might again have been due to range restriction in that there was simply not enough
variability in synthesis responding behaviors to uncover its true relationship with actual
mental model sharedness.
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Another possible reason is that rather than verbally use the information,
teammates might have been processing the information in their minds in order to use
later.

Obviously, only observable responding behaviors could be analyzed.

The

possibility that the information was received and processed without any further
discussion cannot be overlooked. Indeed, participants might have used the information in
subsequent actions without any verbal indication whatsoever.

Therefore, it was

necessary to examine the effects of actual mental model sharedness on action responding
behaviors as well.
Action Responding Behaviors
Similar to the findings for synthesis responding behaviors, no significant findings
supported the hypothesis that actual mental model sharedness made an impact on action
responding behaviors either. So, even if participants were not discussing the information
but simply using it later, there was still no evidence of an effect of actual mental model
sharedness on responses to initiating behaviors.

Action responding behaviors also

suffered from the range restriction issues of the verbal responding behaviors; however,
they had an added complication. As has already been noted, the average number of
observable action behaviors was less than 2 per person. Coding action responding
behaviors was a difficult task because, while verbal responses always immediately
followed the initiating behaviors, actions did not. It is entirely possible that there were
action behaviors that could have been included in the overall count, but the participant
made no indication that the action was associated in any way with the information
initially provided. Either way, there was no evidence that supported Hypothesis 1.
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Supplemental Findings on Initiating Behaviors
Though not significant, one interesting finding related to actual mental model
sharedness was the lack of an effect on initiating behaviors, or the beginning step in
implicit coordination. While this study hypothesized that perceptions of sharedness
would facilitate implicit coordination, numerous others (cf., Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989;
Serfaty, Entin, & Volpe, 1993) have posited that it is the actual sharedness between team
members’ mental models that facilitates implicit coordination. However, to date, no
published evidence has supported the notion that actual mental model sharedness is the
driving force. The two previous studies that measured SMMs and behaviors indicative of
implicit coordination did not find a link between SMMs and implicit coordination (Stout
et al., 1999; Waller et al., 2004).

This study did not find a direct link between actual

mental model sharedness and the initiation of implicit coordination either.
Mental Model Quality
In addition to studying how perceptions of sharedness and actual mental model
sharedness affected implicit coordination, the effect of mental model quality on implicit
coordination was also assessed. Mental model quality was measured by comparing
individual’s mental models against expert mental models for the target task. Even with
half of the teams composed of mixed quality mental models, the average team mental
model quality score still significantly affected team processes, in the predicted direction.
Teams with high quality mental models exhibited significantly better team processes than
those with low quality mental models. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. It should be
noted, however, that the effect size for this relationship was only 11%, again suggesting
that there are certainly other factors affecting this process.
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Even so, this finding is important for a number of reasons. First, the analysis was
conducted at the team level; and, therefore, only average quality scores were used. An
investigation into how an individual’s mental model quality affects his/her actions would
likely lead to even greater effect sizes. Yet, even those averaged scores still impacted
team processes. Furthermore, it should be noted that half of the teams actually consisted
of team members who had received different training and, consequently, had different
mental models. That means that even team members who had high quality, but different
mental models had better team processes than team members who both had low quality
mental models. This finding is contrary to Mathieu et al.’s (2005) findings that those
teams with high quality but different mental models had the lowest team process scores.
These discrepant findings may be a function of how team processes were measured. In
the current study, team processes were only assessed at the communication level.
Mathieu et al. also included five other dimensions of teamwork: leadership, assertiveness,
decision making, adaptability, and situation awareness. It would be interesting to further
investigate the differential effects of mental model quality and SMMs on the various
aspects of team processes to determine which specific aspects are hindered or helped by
the different combinations.
Moreover, as noted in the literature review, very little previous research has
assessed the relationship between mental model quality and team processes, and none
found a significant relationship between the two without factoring in mental model
sharedness (Heffner, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2005).

Two recently published articles,

however, both found a direct relationship between mental model accuracy and team
performance, without the inclusion of sharedness (Edwards, Day, Arthur, & Bell, 2006;
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Lim & Klein, 2006). In fact, Edwards et al. found that mental model accuracy was a
stronger predictor of team performance when the focus was solely on task mental models,
as in this study. Thus, the results of this study fall in line with the most currently
published findings on SMMs and mental model accuracy.
Additionally, the findings of this study certainly support the authors who have
argued that correctness of mental models is important for team processes (cf. Rouse et al.,
1992; Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998).

These results also

support the notion that, for tasks or situations in which it is possible to accomplish goals
in more than one manner, it is important to consider multiple correct or ideal mental
models. Using one correct or expert model and assessing “accuracy” may be shortsighted and might result in unintentionally overlooking true relationships between
variables. Using only one expert model also eliminates the ability to consider unique and
interactive effects of sharedness and quality, which can be “conceptually and empirically
separable” (Mathieu et al., 2005, p. 52). Therefore, future researchers should be wary of
not including some quality index in their analyses of mental models or SMMs.
Supplemental Findings on Initiating Behaviors
Additional analyses also found an unexpected relationship between mental model
quality and initiating behaviors. While neither perceptions of sharedness nor actual
mental model sharedness significantly impacted the frequency of initiating behaviors,
mental model quality did. Specifically, those individuals with higher quality mental
models voluntarily gave significantly more information to the teammates than those with
lower quality mental models. This finding is interesting because (a) it is part of a small,
but growing, number of studies that have found that quality or accuracy is important for
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team processes and/or performance (Edwards et al., 2006; Lim & Klein, 2006), and (b) it
is actually contrary to the prior assumption that SMMs lead to implicit coordination. In
this study, having a good understanding of the task was the prompting factor for implicit
coordination, not having a shared understanding of the task.
Interactive Effects of Perceptions and Actual Sharedness
Perhaps the most interesting finding of this study was the interactive effect of
perceptions of sharedness and actual mental model sharedness that emerged during data
analysis. A similar pattern was found for all three stages of implicit coordination (though
not significant for initiating behaviors). Specifically, in this study, teams who were in
mismatched conditions (pluralistic ignorance: teammates were told they received the
same training but in reality got different training; false consensus: teammates were told
they received different training but in reality got the same training) had significantly
more synthesis responding behaviors and significantly higher team process scores than
those teams whose perceptions matched their realities. As previously mentioned, this
means that participants whose perceptions did not match their reality tended to discuss
their intentions and actions much more than participants whose perceptions matched their
realities. Additionally, teams whose perceptions did not match their realities tended to
exchange more information overall. These findings were in contrast to the expected
proportional relationships presented in Figures 4 and 6. Not only were the relationships
different, but for team processes, it was expected that actual mental model sharedness
would interact with quality, not perceptions.
One plausible explanation for this relationship is that teammates realized there
was some disconnect in their understanding of their partner and/or the task and that they
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increased information exchanges in an attempt to overcome or understand that
disconnect. In terms of those with low perceptions and high actual sharedness, this might
have been a snowball effect. In other words, teams might have realized they had one
thing in common and then just continued passing information to see what else they had in
common. For those with high perceptions and low actual sharedness, the increase in
information exchanges might have stemmed from the discovery of knowledge gaps and
an effort to fill those in. As previous research has found that lower performing teams
engage in more communication than higher performing teams (cf., Orasanu, 1990; Urban
et al., 1995), it would be interesting to determine if those effects were due to perceptions
and reality being incompatible.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Communications
One of the main limitations of this study was the way in which the behaviors
encompassed

in

operationalized.

the

implicit

coordination

process

were

conceptualized

and

Specifically, as already mentioned, the number of expected target

behaviors was small, resulting in possible range restriction issues. While the core task in
this study was based on communications between the teammates, only those exchanges
of critical pieces of information were considered part of the implicit coordination process.
Therefore, even though teams engaged in approximately fifteen-minute-long chat
sessions, the coded initiating and responding behaviors were constrained to only specific
pieces of information. This could be rectified in the future by using tasks that require
more time and more interaction between teammates.
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Perhaps more importantly, this study focused on information that could be
verbally (or textually) transmitted from one team member to another. In this study, the
only type of resource that was passed between team members was information itself.
That is, all instances of implicit coordination were coded by looking at verbal
communications.

At first, this may seem counter-intuitive.

People often associate

implicit coordination with a reduction in communications; therefore, measuring implicit
coordination with communications may not fall in line with others’ understanding of the
phenomenon.

However, as noted in the introduction, the construct of implicit

coordination has previously been ill-defined, and for the purposes of this study, verbal
communications in the absence of explicit requests were included in the definition of
implicit coordination. Implicit coordination is thought to occur when information and/or
resources are passed without explicit requests. Thus, verbal information exchanges do
fall under the rubric of implicit coordination, at least until a more formal definition is
adopted by the community.
The results of this study suggest it is possible that either (a) verbal
communications may not be included in the implicit coordination process, or (b) implicit
coordination may not be a useful strategy when information exchange is part of the
primary task. Indeed, if verbal information exchanges are not truly part of implicit
coordination, then the findings of this study may, in fact, be in line with previous
assumptions about implicit coordination. That is, it would not necessarily be expected
that SMMs are directly related to explicit coordination sequences. In order to gain more
insight into the process of implicit coordination, and to augment the findings of this
study, future research should analyze the process of implicit coordination when team
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members can physically pass resources to one another to determine if the same
relationships still hold true. Additionally, future work should consider situations in
which information exchange is not a primary task.
Workload
A second limitation to this study was that the task might have not been difficult
enough to elicit the levels of perceived workload that facilitate the process of implicit
coordination. While the al Kufah Scenario was characterized by more reported workload,
the average overall workload was less than 60 (out of 100). Previous researchers have
suggested that implicit coordination only occurs under extremely high levels of workload.
The workload scores in this study would not be considered extremely high; and therefore
the process of implicit coordination may not have occurred in this study as it might for
tasks characterized by higher perceived workload.
One possible way to overcome this limitation and the previously discussed
limitation on communications at the same time is to select a dual-task environment for
future research. First, dual-task environments are known to produce higher levels of
workload and are also often more representative of real-world tasks.

In dual-task

environments, team members often have their own primary tasks and then share a
secondary task. Second, because the joint task is the secondary task, then communication
between the teammates cannot be the core task. Thus, the dual-task environment should
elicit high enough levels of workload and lessen the reliance on information exchanges as
the only behavior available for analysis.
Moreover, it would also be interesting to investigate the impact of brief periods of
high workload on implicit coordination in order to observe systematic changes over time.
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As implicit coordination is thought to be an adaptive strategy that is beneficial under
conditions of high workload, a greater understanding of the phenomenon could be gained
by research focusing on (a) when/if teams shift to implicit coordination and (b) when/if
teams shift back to explicit coordination.
Performance
A third limitation of this study was that the focus was on the process of implicit
coordination and the accompanying team processes, not on the resulting team
performance. For the purposes of investigating the process of implicit coordination, a
team performance score was not necessary because the sequence of behaviors should
have been the same whether or not the process was effective. However, the idea that this
strategy is only beneficial under conditions of high workload and for high performing
teams should not be overlooked. If it is true that the process is most pronounced and
most useful for high performing teams in high workload situations, then it may be that
there are indeed relationships that would be found when factoring in team performance
scores. However, if SMMs are associated with team performance, then focusing only on
high performing teams in high workload situations may result in having many more
teams with high sharedness than low sharedness, leading to difficulty in disentangling the
relationships between the three variables. Future researchers in this area should be
cognizant of the possible relationship between implicit coordination and team
performance, even if the focus is on the specific sequence of behaviors encompassed in
implicit coordination.
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Implications and Conclusions
Although this study found only partial support for the hypotheses that perceptions
of sharedness, actual mental model sharedness, and mental model quality affect implicit
coordination, there are still a number of implications that can be derived from the
findings.
Operationalization of Implicit Coordination
First and foremost, this study sheds light on the difficulties of operationalizing the
construct of implicit coordination. In this study, I attempted to more fully operationalize
the construct by reviewing previous definitions and research and then combining the
findings to create a definition of successful implicit coordination and to identify the
sequence of behaviors that make up this process. The definition in this study focused on
behaviors that were not preceded by a request, which included explicit communications
not preceded by a request. Other researchers may oppose this idea and disregard explicit
communications altogether, whether they were previously requested (explicit) or not
(implicit). If explicit communications are not included, then researchers need to more
clearly define implicit coordination as coordination behaviors that are (a) not preceded by
a request and (b) not composed of any explicit communications. As there have been few
previous attempts to operationalize this construct, even with the findings of the current
study, there is still work needed to determine which behaviors are included in the process
and which are not.
In addition to specifying which behaviors may be included in implicit
coordination, it is also necessary to further assess the sequence of behaviors. In this
study, the initiation of implicit coordination was the transfer of information from one
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team member to another. However, as I laid out in the Introduction, possible facilitating
factors of implicit coordination included (a) motivation, (b), perceptions of a useful
course of action, and (c) perceptions of sharedness. Perhaps it is the case that the
initiation happens before the proposed stages presented in this study. In fact, it is
possible that the initiating behaviors coded here were actually responding behaviors to
some other behavior that prompted the exchange of information. It may very well be that
the relationship between SMMs and implicit coordination would be unmasked if the
beginning stage of implicit coordination actually preceded the exchange of information.
Thus, this study demonstrates the complexity of the construct implicit coordination and
highlights the need for future researchers to more clearly define what they include as
implicit coordination behaviors.
Importance of Mental Model Quality
This study was the first study designed specifically to investigate the relationship
between SMMs and implicit coordination.

Surprisingly, the results of this study

suggested that an individual’s mental model quality was more important for facilitating
implicit coordination than the level of sharedness between team members, at least in tasks
where team performance relies solely on the transfer of information. In fact, this study
does not support the position that implicit coordination is the result of SMMs that allow
teammates to anticipate each other’s behaviors. Conversely, the findings suggest that the
behaviors are driven by an individual’s understanding of the task and the appropriate
strategies to complete said task. In that sense, while it takes more than one person to
complete the proposed stages of implicit coordination, the actual driving force might be
at the individual level. In this study, individual mental model quality predicted initiating
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behaviors and average team mental model quality predicted team processes. Thus, this
study provided evidence for the importance of mental model quality, and future research
is needed to further explore its effects on team coordination.
Perceptions vs. Actual Sharedness
This study also provides partial support for the hypothesis that for team members
to have SMMs, they must be aware of their sharedness (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994).
Specifically, the findings suggest that awareness or perceptions of sharedness
significantly interacted with actual levels of sharedness. The results of this study showed
that teams whose perceptions did not match reality in terms of sharedness exhibited
different behavioral patterns than those teams whose perceptions matched their reality.
Specifically, teams in the mismatched conditions seemed to communicate more, possibly
because they recognized the mismatch and were attempting to compensate or uncover
their discrepancies. These results, therefore, highlight the importance of team members’
perceptions about themselves and their teammates, and future studies on SMMs should
not overlook the possible interactive effects of perceptions and actual sharedness.
Successful vs. Unsuccessful Implicit Coordination
This study has also provided evidence for multiple stages of implicit coordination
and for the existence of unsuccessful attempts at implicit coordination. First, I was able
to successfully analyze the unique steps in the sequence of behaviors involved in implicit
coordination. For each sequence of behaviors, therefore, it was possible to observe the
beginning and ending behaviors. Consequently, the results of this study showed that not
every initiating behavior was followed by a responding behavior or an improvement in
team processes. This is important because it suggests that one cannot assume that the
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increase in unsolicited transfers (initiating behaviors) is always successful, i.e., a good
and/or useful. If one team member is simply doing a data dump, or passing as much
information as possible, it is likely that this would not be a beneficial strategy.
Furthermore, if there is a decrease in requests from a team member, it may simply be that
that team member does not need additional information. So, while implicit coordination
has always been touted as a good thing, the presence of initiating behaviors without
responding behaviors suggests that additional research is necessary to determine the
factors that influence successful vs. unsuccessful implicit coordination.
Application to Unmanned Vehicles
Finally, this study also has implications for UAV and UGV operators working
together in complex military environments. Quality, and not sharedness, was found to be
a significant predictor of initiating behaviors and team processes. This finding suggests
that UAV and UGV operators, who have a firm grasp of their own tasks, including their
own capabilities and limitations, should be able to work together efficiently, even if they
have never operated the other type of unmanned vehicle. Furthermore, the findings on
the interaction between perceptions of sharedness and actual mental model sharedness
suggest that those teams whose perceptions match their realities will not need to
communicate as much, which can be extremely important in time-sensitive missions with
heightened security issues.

Therefore, if teammates are briefed on each others’

capabilities beforehand, in terms of their experience with operating UGVs, UAVs, and in
mixed-vehicle teams, the likelihood that they will be in a mismatched condition will be
greatly reduced. As technological advances are made, teams of UAV and UGV operators
will become much more prevalent. Keeping in mind that there are multiple aspects of
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mental models that play a role in team coordination can help in training these teams to
perform at optimal levels.
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Student Informed Consent Form
PID No.:________

Name:

I am 18 years of age or older and agree to participate in the study “Military Reconnaissance Mission
Planning,” conducted by principal investigator; Raegan Hoeft, under the guidance of Florian Jentsch.
In this research, I will participate in a study targeted at measuring coordination and
communication during a military reconnaissance planning task. The experiment will consist of
one session with two parts. Since communication will be measured, I understand, and consent, that I
will be video and/or audio taped during the study. The first part will consist of paperwork
including biographical data and some teamwork surveys. The second part will focus on training
and two trials planning a military reconnaissance task for about 30 minutes each with a
workload and team coordination survey following the trials, which should take approximately 5
minutes. Performance on these tasks will remain completely confidential (see below). Including
training, performance during the sessions, paperwork, and debriefing, this experiment will last
approximately 2 hours. Upon completion of the study, credit for participation in an experiment
will be given in accordance with the procedures established within the Department of
Psychology.

Risks and Benefits
Participation in the current study includes minimal risks commonly associated with the use of
computer display terminals. All performance and personal data will be kept confidential.
If you believe you have been injured during participation in this research project, you may file a claim
with UCF Environmental Health & Safety, Risk and Insurance Office, P.O. Box 163500, Orlando, FL
32816-3500 (407) 823-6300. The University of Central Florida is an agency of the State of Florida for
purposes of sovereign immunity and the university's and the state's liability for personal injury or
property damage is extremely limited under Florida law. Accordingly, the university's and the state's
ability to compensate you for any personal injury or property damage suffered during this research
project is very limited.
Information regarding your rights as a research volunteer may be obtained from:
UCFIRB Office
University of Central Florida (UCF) Office of Research
Orlando Tech Center
12443 Research Parkway, Suite 302
Orlando, Florida 32826
Telephone: (407) 823-2901
Confidentiality of Personal Data:
All data I will contribute to this study will be held in strict confidentiality by the researchers. That is,
my individual data will not be revealed to anyone other than the researchers and their immediate
assistants.
To insure confidentiality, the following steps will be taken: (a) only researchers will have access to the
data in paper or electronic form. Data will be stored in locked facilities; (b) the actual forms will not
contain names or other personal information. Instead, a number assigned by and only known to the
experimenters will match the forms to each participant; (c) only group means scores and standard
deviations, but not individual scores, will be published or reported.
MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH IS COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY. I CAN
WITHDRAW MY PARTICIPATION AT ANY TIME WITHOUT PENALTY - THIS INCLUDES
REMOVAL/DELETION OF ANY DATA I MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED. SHOULD I DECIDE
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NOT TO COMPLETE THE STUDY, HOWEVER, I WILL BE ELIGIBLE ONLY FOR THE
COURSE CREDIT FOR THAT PART OF THE STUDY WHICH I HAVE COMPLETED.
This research is conducted by Raegan Hoeft, the principal investigator. I have been given the
opportunity to ask the research assistants any questions I may have. For further questions regarding
this research, contact Raegan Hoeft:
Raegan Hoeft
Team Performance Lab
University of Central Florida

Phone: (407) 921-3554

Orlando, FL 32816-1390
Date:

Signature:
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Biographical Data Form
Please complete the following questions. Any information you provide is voluntary and
will be kept strictly confidential. A participant number will be assigned to your
responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data. The information
you provide will be used only for the purposes of this study. If you have any questions,
please ask.
1.
Age: ____
2.
Gender: ____ M
____ F
3.
Handedness: ____ Right-handed ____ Left-handed ___ Ambidextrous
4.
Year in school: ____ Freshman ____ Sophomore ____ Junior ____ Senior
____ Graduate
5.
Major: ______________________
6.
Military experience (including ROTC), area and length of time:____________
Active duty _______ National Guard _______ Reserve _______
7.
Native language (if not English): _________________
8.
Do you wear prescription glasses or corrective contact lenses? ___ Yes ___ No
If yes, are you wearing them now? ___ Yes ___ No
9.
Do you have any previous flying or sailing experience? ___ Yes ___ No
10.
Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with
seeing or working with any type of radio or remote controlled ground vehicles
(cars, trucks, toys, etc.):
1
NOT AT ALL
FAMILIAR

2

3

4

5

6
VERY
FAMILIAR

11.
Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with
seeing or working with any type of radio or remote controlled air vehicles (airplanes,
helicopters, blimps, etc.):
1
NOT AT ALL
FAMILIAR

2

3

4

5

6
VERY
FAMILIAR

12.
Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with
seeing or working with any type of video games:
1
NOT AT ALL
FAMILIAR

2

3

4

5

6
VERY
FAMILIAR

13.
Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with
seeing or working with any type of personal computers (PCs):
1
NOT AT ALL
FAMILIAR

2

3

4
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5

6
VERY
FAMILIAR

14.
Using the scale below, please indicate how you would rate your experience with
seeing or working with any type of instant messenger or chat program:
1
NOT AT ALL
FAMILIAR

2

3

4
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5

6
VERY
FAMILIAR
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Personality Measure 1
Please complete the following questions by circling your answer. Any information you provide is
voluntary and will be kept strictly confidential. A participant number will be assigned to your
responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data. The information you
provide will be used only for the purposes of this study. If you have any questions, please ask.
Using the scales below, please circle your answer:
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of others.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

3. I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

6. I would probably make a good actor.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

7. In a group of people, I am rarely the center of attention.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4
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8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like a very different person.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

10. I am not always the person I appear to be.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their
favor.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

12. I have considered being an entertainer.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

15. At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4
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16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for the right end).
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

18. I may deceive people by being friendly even when I really dislike them.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4
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5

6
STRONGLY
AGREE

APPENDIX E
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Personality Measure 2
Please complete the following questions by circling your answer. Any information you provide is
voluntary and will be kept strictly confidential. A participant number will be assigned to your
responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data. The information you
provide will be used only for the purposes of this study. If you have any questions, please ask.
Using the scales below, please circle your response:
1. I like to have a lot of people around me.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

2

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

2. I laugh easily.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

3. I don’t consider myself especially “light-hearted”.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

4. I really enjoy talking to people.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

5. I like to be where the action is.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

6. I usually prefer to do things alone.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

7. I often feel as if I am bursting with energy.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3
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8. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

3

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

4

5
STRONGLY
AGREE

9. I am not a cheerful optimist.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

10. My life is fast-paced.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

11. I am a very active person.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

12. I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas.
1
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

2

3
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Reconnaissance Planning Quiz
1. Is it more important to be quick or accurate?
(Correct for Training Module 1)
a. Quick
b. Accurate
(Correct for Training Module 2)
2. Should you try to protect your assets or use all your available assets?
a. Protect your assets
(Correct for Training Module 2)
b. Use all available assets
(Correct for Training Module 1)
3. Is it more appropriate to attempt an Augmenting Strategy or a Cueing Strategy
first?
a. Augmenting Strategy
(Correct for Training Module 1)
b. Cueing Strategy
(Correct for Training Module 2)
4. Is it more appropriate to attempt a One Asset Only Strategy or a Redundancy
Strategy first?
a. One Asset Only Strategy
(Correct for Training Module 2)
b. Redundancy Strategy
(Correct for Training Module 1)
5. Which is more likely to affect your assets?
a. Terrain
(Correct for Training Module 2)
b. Weather
(Correct for Training Module 1)
6. Should you contact your superiors if you are missing information or have
questions?
a. No
(Correct for Training Module 1)
b. Yes
(Correct for Training Module 2)
7. Are your assets cheap and easy to replace or expensive and difficult to replace?
a. Cheap and easy to replace
(Correct for Training Module 1)
b. Expensive and difficult to replace (Correct for Training Module 2)
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Cue-Strategy Association Measure
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following
situation.
Scenario 1:

Intent:

Find a safe route for command to send a relief truck
through
Time:
No immediate time pressure
Enemy:
Mildly hostile
Weather:
Clear, sunny day
Terrain:
No discernable obstacles
Information: Complete and up to date

1. Using an augmenting strategy where the UAV and UGV are sent along different
routes
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

2. Contact command for further orders before deciding how to proceed
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3. Use a redundancy strategy where both the UAV and UGV are sent along the same
routes
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

4. Send only a UAV
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

5. Send only a UGV
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

6. Use a cueing strategy where the UAV goes to the Objective and reports back
whether the UGV is needed
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4
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5

6
Completely
Appropriate

Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following
situation.
Scenario 2:

Intent:
Time:
Enemy:
Weather:
Terrain:
Information:

Find out where the enemy is and what the threat level is
No immediate time pressure
Unknown threat level, specific Objectives unknown
Stormy night, rainy with strong winds
Jungle with thick vegetation
Incomplete and outdated information

1. Using an augmenting strategy where the UAV and UGV are sent along different
routes
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

2. Contact command for further orders before deciding how to proceed
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3. Use a redundancy strategy where both the UAV and UGV are sent along the same
routes
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

4. Send only a UAV
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

5. Send only a UGV
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

6. Use a cueing strategy where the UAV goes to the Objective and reports back
whether the UGV is needed
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4
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5

6
Completely
Appropriate

Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following
situation.
Scenario 3:

Intent:

Find out where exactly where enemy is within confined
area
Time:
1 hour window to get in and out, must plan quickly
Enemy:
Hostile enemy, Objectives unknown
Weather:
75% chance of sandstorm in next two hours
Terrain:
Desert filled with landmines
Information: As up to date as possible

1. Using an augmenting strategy where the UAV and UGV are sent along different
routes
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

2. Contact command for further orders before deciding how to proceed
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3. Use a redundancy strategy where both the UAV and UGV are sent along the same
routes
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

4. Send only a UAV
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

5. Send only a UGV
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

6. Use a cueing strategy where the UAV goes to the Objective and reports back
whether the UGV is needed
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4
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5

6
Completely
Appropriate

Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following
situation.
Scenario 4:

Intent:

Unclear whether need specific or generic enemy location
info
Time:
No immediate time pressure
Enemy:
Hostile enemy spread out over a large area
Weather:
No significant information available
Terrain:
No significant information available
Information: Incomplete

1. Using an augmenting strategy where the UAV and UGV are sent along different
routes
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

2. Contact command for further orders before deciding how to proceed
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3. Use a redundancy strategy where both the UAV and UGV are sent along the same
routes
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

4. Send only a UAV
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

5. Send only a UGV
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

6. Use a cueing strategy where the UAV goes to the Objective and reports back
whether the UGV is needed
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4
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5

6
Completely
Appropriate
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Pre- Teamwork Measure
Please complete the following questions by circling your answer. Any information you
provide is voluntary and will be kept strictly confidential. A participant number will be
assigned to your responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data.
The information you provide will be used only for the purposes of this study. If you have
any questions, please ask.
Using the scales below, please indicate the extent to which you believe:
1. that you and your teammate have a shared understanding of your task:
1
NOT AT ALL
SHARED

2

3

4

5

6
COMPLETELY
SHARED

5

6
COMPLETELY
ANTICIPATE

5

6
COMPLETELY
ANTICIPATE

5

6
COMPLETELY
UNDERSTAND

4

5

6
COMPLETELY
UNDERSTAND

4

5

6
ALWAYS
UNDERSTAND

4

5

6
ALWAYS
UNDERSTAND

2. your teammate will be able to anticipate your behaviors:
1
NOT AT ALL
ANTICIPATE

2

3

4

3. you will be able to anticipate your teammate’s behaviors:
1
NOT AT ALL
ANTICIPATE

2

3

4

4. your teammate has a good understanding of your role in the team:
1
NOT AT ALL
UNDERSTAND

2

3

4

5. you have a good understanding of your teammate’s role in the team:
1
NOT AT ALL
UNDERSTAND

2

3

6. your teammate will understand what you are doing:
1
NEVER
UNDERSTAND

2

3

7. you will understand what your teammate is doing:
1
NEVER
UNDERSTAND

2

3
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Appropriateness Measure
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following
situation.
Scenario #1
You and your teammate have been planning R&S missions together for a long time; you
were both trained at the same facility and have been in the same unit ever since. You
believe you both have a firm grasp on what the appropriate way to plan is. You are faced
with a time critical situation in which you need to plan a mission as quickly as possible so
that the commander can be updated on the current status of the enemy. You find that you
are the one who has been given the information regarding the commander’s intent.
REMEMBER – time is of the essence!
1. Immediately share the commander’s intent information with your teammate
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

2. Tell your teammate that you have the information, but only share the specifics if
asked
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3. Remember that you have the information, but relay it only if your teammate asks
for it
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

4. Make a decision about the commander’s intent based on the information given to
you
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

5. Ask your teammate if he or she has any other information about the commander’s
intent
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

6. Verify your interpretation with your teammate before reaching a conclusion
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4
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5

6
Completely
Appropriate

Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following
situation.
Scenario #2
You and your teammate have just been given your first R&S missions to plan. Your
teammate has just been transferred from another unit; however you know that he or she
was trained at the same facility as you were. You are faced with a time critical situation
in which you need to plan a mission as quickly as possible so that the commander can be
updated on the current status of the enemy. You find that you are the one who has been
given the information on the probable characteristics of the enemy units. REMEMBER –
time is of the essence!
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for this situation.
1. Immediately share the information about the enemy with your teammate
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

2. Tell your teammate that you have the information, but only share the specifics if
asked
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3. Remember that you have the information, but relay it only if your teammate asks
for it
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

4. Make a decision about the enemy’s threat level based on the information given to
you
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

5. Ask your teammate if he or she has any other information about the enemy
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

6. Verify your interpretation with your teammate before reaching a conclusion
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4
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5

6
Completely
Appropriate

Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following
situation.
Scenario #3
You and your teammate have just been given your first R&S missions to plan; your
teammate has just been transferred from another unit and received training from a
different facility than you did. You are faced with a time critical situation in which you
need to plan a mission as quickly as possible so that the commander can be updated on
the current status of the enemy. You find that you are the one who has been given the
information about the capabilities of your assets. REMEMBER – time is of the essence!
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for this situation.
1. Immediately share the information about your assets with your teammate
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

2. Tell your teammate that you have the information, but only share the specifics if
asked
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3. Remember that you have the information, but relay it only if your teammate asks
for it
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

4. Make a decision about which assets to use based on the information given to you
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

5. Ask your teammate if he or she has any other information about the asset
capabilities
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

6. Verify your interpretation with your teammate before reaching a conclusion
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4
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5

6
Completely
Appropriate

Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for the following
situation.
Scenario #4
You and your teammate have worked together planning R&S missions numerous times;
your teammate has received a different type of training than you, and you believe you
have a better understanding of the task than he or she does. You are faced with a time
critical situation in which you need to plan a mission as quickly as possible so that the
commander can be updated on the current status of the enemy. You find that you are the
one who has been given the information about each Objective. REMEMBER – time is of
the essence!
Rate the appropriateness of the following strategies in planning for this situation.
1. Immediately share the information about the Objective with your teammate
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

2. Tell your teammate that you have the information, but only share the specifics if
asked
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

3. Remember that you have the information, but relay it only if your teammate asks
for it
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

4. Make a decision about how to gather information about each Objective based on
the information given to you
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

5. Ask your teammate if he or she has any other information about the Objective
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4

5

6
Completely
Appropriate

6. Verify your interpretation with you teammate before reaching a conclusion
1
Not at All
Appropriate

2

3

4
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5

6
Completely
Appropriate
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Post-Teamwork Measure
Please complete the following questions by circling your answer. Any information you
provide is voluntary and will be kept strictly confidential. A participant number will be
assigned to your responses and in no way will your name be associated with the data.
The information you provide will be used only for the purposes of this study. If you have any
questions, please ask.
Using the scales below, please indicate the extent to which you believe:
1. that you and your teammate had a shared understanding of your task:
1
NOT AT ALL
SHARED

2

3

4

5

6
COMPLETELY
SHARED

4

5

6
COMPLETELY
ANTICIPATED

4

5

6
COMPLETELY
ANTICIPATED

5

6
COMPLETELY
UNDERSTOOD

4

5

6
COMPLETELY
UNDERSTOOD

4

5

6
ALWAYS
UNDERSTOOD

4

5

6
ALWAYS
UNDERSTOOD

2. your teammate anticipated your behaviors:
1
NOT AT ALL
ANTICIPATED

2

3

3. you anticipated your teammate’s behaviors:
1
NOT AT ALL
ANTICIPATED

2

3

4. your teammate had a good understanding of your role in the team:
1
NOT AT ALL
UNDERSTOOD

2

3

4

5. you had a good understanding of your teammate’s role in the team:
1
NOT AT ALL
UNDERSTOOD

2

3

6. your teammate understood what you were doing:
1
NEVER
UNDERSTOOD

2

3

7. you understood what your teammate was doing:
1
NEVER
UNDERSTOOD

2

3
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NASA-TLX Instructions
Part I
Rating Scales. We are not only interested in assessing your performance but also the
experiences you had during the experiment. In the most general sense, we are examining
the “workload” you experienced. Workload is a difficult concept to define precisely but a
simple one to understand generally. The factors that influence your experience of
workload may come from the task itself, your feelings about your own performance, how
much effort you put into it, or the stress and frustration you felt. In addition, the
workload contributed by different task elements may change as you become more
familiar with the task. Physical components of workload are relatively easy to
conceptualize and evaluate. However, the mental components of workload may be more
difficult to assess.
Since workload is something that is experienced individually by each person, there are no
set “rulers” that can be used to estimate the workload associated with different activities.
One way to find out about workload is to ask people to describe the feelings they
experienced while performing a task. Because workload may be caused by different
factors, we would like you to evaluate several of them individually rather than by
lumping them into a single, global evaluation of overall workload. This set of six rating
scales was developed for you to use in evaluating your experiences during this task.
Please read the descriptions of the scales carefully. If you have any questions about any
of the scales in the table, please ask me about them. It is extremely important that they be
clear to you. You may keep the descriptions with you for reference while completing the
scales.
For each of the six scales, you will evaluate the task by marking an X in a multiple of 5
that can range from 0 to 100 to reflect the point that matches your experience. Pay close
attention to each scale’s endpoint description when making your assessments. Note that
when the rating scale for PERFORMANCE appears, the scale will go from “good” on the
left to “bad” on the right. This means that a low number will represent good
performance, while a high number will signify poor performance. This order has been
confusing for some people. Read the description for each scale carefully before making
your rating.
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NASA-TLX Instructions
Part II
Pairwise Comparisons. Rating scales of this sort are extremely useful, but their utility is
diminished by the tendency people have to interpret them in different ways. For example,
some people feel that mental or temporal demands are the greatest contributors to
workload regardless of the effort they expended in performing a given task or the level of
performance they achieved. Others feel that if they performed well the workload must
have been low; and if they performed poorly, then it must have been high. Still others
believe that effort or feelings of frustration are the most important determinants of their
experiences of workload. Previous studies using this scale have found several different
patterns of results. In addition, the factors that determine workload differ depending on
the task. For instance, some tasks might be difficult because they must be completed very
quickly. Other tasks may seem easy or hard because the degree of mental or physical
effort required. Some task may seem difficult because they cannot be performed well no
matter how much effort is expended.
The next step in your evaluation is to assess the relative importance of the six factors in
determining how much workload you experienced. You will be presented with pairs of
rating scale titles (e.g. EFFORT vs. MENTAL DEMAND) and asked to choose which of
the two items was more important to your experience of workload in the task that you just
performed. Each pair of scale titles will appear together and you will be asked to circle
the more important one. After indicating your response to a pair of scale titles, please go
on to the next pair until you have selected a response for all pairs.
Please consider your choices carefully and try to make them consistent with your scale
ratings. Refer back to the rating scale definitions if you need to as you proceed. There is
no correct pattern of responses. We are only interested in your opinions.
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RATING SCALE DEFINITIONS

Title
MENTAL
DEMAND

PHYSICAL
DEMAND
TEMPORAL
DEMAND

PERFORMANCE

EFFORT
FRUSTRATION
LEVEL

Endpoints

Descriptions
How much mental and perceptual activity was
required (e.g. thinking, deciding, calculating,
remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the
LOW/HIGH
task easy or demanding, simple or complex,
exacting or forgiving?
How much physical activity was required (e.g.
pushing, pulling, turning, controlling, activating,
LOW/HIGH
etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or
brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious?
How much time pressure did you feel due to the
rate or pace at which the task or task elements
LOW/HIGH
occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely or
rapid and frantic?
How successful do you think you were in
accomplishing the goals of the task set by the
GOOD/POOR experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied were
you with your performance in accomplishing
these goals?
How hard did you have to work (mentally and
LOW/HIGH
physically) to accomplish your level of
performance?
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed,
LOW/HIGH
and annoyed versus gratified, content, relaxed,
and complacent did you feel during the task?
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Scoring Form 1
1. Mental Demand - Individual

Low

High

2. Physical Demand - Individual

Low

High

3. Temporal Demand - Individual

Low

High

4. Performance - Individual

Good

Bad

5. Effort - Individual

Low

High

6. Frustration - Individual

Low

High
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Scoring Form 2
For each of the pairs (e.g., mental demand vs. effort) choose which one of the two items
was more important to your experience of workload (Circle).

Circle one of each pair:

Effort
or

Temporal Demand
or

Performance

Frustration

Temporal Demand
or

Physical Demand
or

Effort

Frustration

Performance
or

Physical Demand
or

Frustration

Temporal Demand

Sources of

Physical Demand
or

Temporal Demand
or

Workload

Performance

Mental Demand

Frustration
or

Performance
or

Effort

Mental Demand

Performance
or

Mental Demand
or

Temporal Demand

Effort

Mental Demand
or

Effort
or

Physical Demand

Physical Demand

Comparisons

Frustration
or
Mental Demand
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Debriefing Form
This experiment was designed to examine team communication and performance in planning
reconnaissance missions with unmanned ground and aerial vehicles. More specifically, we were
interested in looking at how and when you engaged in implicit coordination, which is giving
information or resources to your teammate without being asked for them. We manipulated
whether or not you received the same training as your teammate and then also manipulated
whether or not you believed you received the same training. Therefore, some of you were in a
condition in which we deceived you into believing your teammate received the same or different
training than you when that was untrue. This deception was necessary to determine whether your
perceptions influenced your actual performance. If you have any questions about the study or
would like to discuss your experience regarding this deception, please feel free to ask them now.
We want you to know that we could not do our work without your help, so your participation is
greatly appreciated. If you would like to learn more about the findings of this study, please feel
free to contact Raegan Hoeft at 407-921-3554 or hoeft2@hotmail.com.
Thank you for your participation.
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The following materials were read to participants at specified times during the scenarios.
The highlighted portions are the differences between the Low and High Perceptions
conditions.
Military Reconnaissance Planning Study Explanation – Low Perceptions
Thank you for your participation in our study. Today you will be working together as a
team to plan military reconnaissance missions using robotic assets, specifically
unmanned aerial and unmanned ground vehicles. Each of you will be in charge of one
specific asset. We are interested in how teams of operators plan these missions, the types
of information they find important, the strategies they use, etc. First you will be given
training on how to plan reconnaissance missions and how you will complete today’s
tasks. You will receive two different types of training. One of you will be the
“Reconnaissance Equipment Operator” and the other will be the “Surveillance Systems
Operator”. You will be given a notepad and pen should you want to take notes during the
training. The training will be given via Microsoft PowerPoint. To move forward to the
next slide you can either click on the mouse button or use the space bar. Once you
complete the training, you will be asked to complete some paperwork and then plan a
number of reconnaissance missions. The entire session should last approximately 2
hours. Again, you will be given different training for Reconnaissance Equipment
Operator and Surveillance Systems Operator. Do you have any questions?
Military Reconnaissance Planning Study Explanation – High Perceptions
Thank you for your participation in our study. Today you will be working together as a
team to plan military reconnaissance missions using robotic assets, specifically
unmanned aerial and unmanned ground vehicles. Each of you will be in charge of one
specific asset. We are interested in how teams of operators plan these missions, the types
of information they find important, the strategies they use, etc. First you will be given
training on how to plan reconnaissance missions and how you will complete today’s
tasks. You will both receive the same training as “Reconnaissance Equipment
Operators”. You will be given a notepad and pen should you want to take notes during
the training. The training will be given via Microsoft PowerPoint. To move forward to
the next slide you can either click on the mouse button or use the space bar. Once you
complete the training, you will be asked to complete some paperwork and then plan a
number of reconnaissance missions. The entire session should last approximately 2
hours. Again, you will both be given the same training for Reconnaissance Equipment
Operators. Please let me know when you have completed the training. Do you have any
questions?
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Practice Session Explanation – Low Perceptions
Now that you have completed your individual training as Reconnaissance Equipment
Operator and Surveillance Systems Operator, you will be given a 15 minute practice
session before the actual performance portion of this study. This practice session is to
allow you to become familiar with how to use the software and with the type of
information that you will be provided with during each scenario. You have received
different training, and during the remainder of the study, you will be in charge of drawing
the route for only one robotic asset. The Reconnaissance Equipment Operator at
Computer A (point to the person at computer A) will be in charge of the UAV while the
Reconnaissance Equipment Operator at Computer B (point to the person at computer B)
will be in charge of the UGV. During the practice session, you will not communicate
with one another, you will simply take the time to get used to the software and to practice
planning a route for your asset. You will receive a packet of information that will help
you in your planning. Feel free to write on the paperwork if it will help you. You can
highlight or underline important pieces of information, or you can make notes for
yourself, whatever will help you plan the mission. On the map, there is a red arrow
pointing down from the top edge. This is where your routes should begin and end. Do
you see the red arrow? Do you have any questions? Please put your headphones on now.
You may begin.
Practice Session Explanation – High Perceptions
Now that you have both completed your training as Reconnaissance Equipment
Operators, you will be given a 15 minute practice session before the actual performance
portion of this study. This practice session is to allow you to become familiar with how
to use the software and with the type of information that you will be provided with during
each scenario. You have both received the same training; however, during the remainder
of the study, you will be in charge of actually drawing the route for only one robotic
asset. The Reconnaissance Equipment Operator at Computer A (point to the person at
computer A) will be in charge of the UAV while the Reconnaissance Equipment Operator
at Computer B (point to the person at computer B) will be in charge of the UGV. During
the practice session, you will not communicate with one another, you will simply take the
time to get used to the software and to practice planning a route for your asset. You will
receive a packet of information that will help you in your planning. Feel free to write on
the paperwork if it will help you. You can highlight or underline important pieces of
information, or you can make notes for yourself, whatever will help you plan the mission.
On the map, there is a red arrow pointing down from the top edge. This is where your
routes should begin and end. Do you see the red arrow? Do you have any questions?
Please put your headphones on now. You may begin.
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First Scenario Explanation – Low Perceptions
We are now ready to begin the performance part of the experiment. You are now going
to plan your first mission together as a team. You will each be given a packet of papers
to help you plan the mission. It is up to you to determine what information is important
and what isn’t, what you want to share with your teammate and what you don’t. You will
not necessarily have all of the same information as your teammate. You will not be
allowed to talk to one another during the planning; you must communicate with each
other via the Chat Window on the right hand side of the screen. While you will each be
planning the routes for separate vehicles, you must ultimately agree on those routes
before you are finished. Remember, you were trained as a Reconnaissance Equipment
Operator and you will be responsible for the UAV route. You were trained as a
Surveillance Systems Operator and you will be responsible for the UGV route. Your
computers are already set to the appropriate colors for each route. As with the training,
you can highlight or underline important pieces of information, or you can make notes to
yourself in your packet of information.
For Scenario 1: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing up from the bottom edge.
For Scenario 2: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing in from the right edge.
This is where your routes should begin and end. Do you see the red arrow? Do you have
any questions? You may begin.
First Scenario Explanation – High Perceptions
We are now ready to begin the performance part of the experiment. You are now going
to plan your first mission together as a team. You will each be given a packet of papers
to help you plan the mission. It is up to you to determine what information is important
and what isn’t, what you want to share with your teammate and what you don’t. You will
not necessarily have all of the same information as your teammate. You will not be
allowed to talk to one another during the planning; you must communicate with each
other via the Chat Window on the right hand side of the screen. While you will each be
planning the routes for separate vehicles, you must ultimately agree on those routes
before you are finished. Again, although both of you were trained as Reconnaissance
Equipment Operators, Computer A will still be responsible for the UAV route and
Computer B will still be responsible for the UGV route. Your computers are already set
to the appropriate colors for each route. As with the training, you can highlight or
underline important pieces of information, or you can make notes to yourself in your
packet of information.
For Scenario 1: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing up from the bottom edge.
For Scenario 2: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing in from the right edge
This is where your routes should begin and end. Do you see the red arrow? Do you have
any questions? You may begin.
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Second Scenario Explanation – Low Perceptions
You are now going to plan your second mission together as a team. Again, you will each
be given a packet of papers to help you plan the mission. It is up to you to determine
what information is important and what isn’t, what you want to share with your teammate
and what you don’t. You will not necessarily have all of the same information as your
teammate. You will not be allowed to talk to one another during the planning; you must
communicate with each other via the Chat Window on the right hand side of the screen.
While you will each be planning the routes for separate vehicles, you must ultimately
agree on those routes before you are finished. Again, you were trained as a
Reconnaissance Equipment Operator and you will be responsible for the UAV route.
You were trained as a Surveillance Systems Operator and you will be responsible for the
UGV route. Your computers are already set to the appropriate colors for each route. As
with the first mission, you can highlight or underline important pieces of information, or
you can make notes to yourself in your packet of information.
For Scenario 1: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing up from the bottom edge.
For Scenario 2: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing in from the right edge.
This is where your routes should begin and end. Do you see the red arrow? Do you have
any questions? You may begin.
Second Scenario Explanation – High Perceptions
You are now going to plan your second mission together as a team. Again, you will each
be given a packet of papers to help you plan the mission. It is up to you to determine
what information is important and what isn’t, what you want to share with your teammate
and what you don’t. You will not necessarily have all of the same information as your
teammate. You will not be allowed to talk to one another during the planning; you must
communicate with each other via the Chat Window on the right hand side of the screen.
While you will each be planning the routes for separate vehicles, you must ultimately
agree on those routes before you are finished. Again, although both of you were trained
as Reconnaissance Equipment Operators, Computer A will still be responsible for the
UAV route and Computer B will still be responsible for the UGV route. Your computers
are already set to the appropriate colors for each route. As with the first mission, you
can highlight or underline important pieces of information, or you can make notes to
yourself in your packet of information.
For Scenario 1: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing up from the bottom edge.
For Scenario 2: On the map, there is a red arrow pointing in from the right edge.
This is where your routes should begin and end. Do you see the red arrow? Do you have
any questions? You may begin.
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Differences between Training Modules
Emphasis on Speed (Module 1) vs. Accuracy (Module 2)
Module 1

Module 2

Developing R&S Plan

Developing R&S Plan

• R&S planning is extremely time-critical

• R&S planning must be as accurate as
possible

– Requests for immediate R&S missions are
common
– Quick decision-making is key

– Requests are usually placed 24 hours in advance
– Accurate decision-making is key

• You must immediately begin planning the mission as
soon as the request is received
• You must be able to make quick decisions so that the
mission can commence as soon as possible
• You must be able to make quick decisions – use all of
the information that is available and relevant

• You must familiarize yourself with all available
information first in order to have a complete
understanding of the task
• You must be able to make accurate decisions so that
the mission can be as successful as possible
• You must be able to make well-informed decisions – use
only the information that is accurate and up-to-date

Developing R&S Plan

Developing R&S Plan

• R&S planning is extremely time-critical

• R&S planning must be as accurate as possible

– Continued…

– Continued…

• If you are missing information, you must make your
best educated guess and plan accordingly
• You are discouraged from requesting additional
information from your superiors because there is no
guarantee that they have that information or can get
it to you in time
• Keep this time-critical factor in mind as you learn
about the different types of information you may or
may not have available

• If you are missing information, you should
never guess what that information might be
• You are encouraged to request additional
information from your superiors in order to
make sure your information is up-to-date
• Keep this accuracy factor in mind as you learn about the
different types of information you may or may not have
available

– Do not sacrifice accuracy for quickness!! It is better
to be correct than fast.

– Do not sacrifice quickness for accuracy! It is
better to be fast than perfect.

Summary
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Summary

Planning is time-critical
Do not ask superiors for help
Use all your assets
UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and
can only provide an overview rather than specific
details
Always consider using an Augmenting or
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does
not utilize all assets

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

168

Planning must be accurate
Ask superiors for help if you are missing
information
Protect your assets as much as possible
UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one
place to another
Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all
assets

Emphasis on UAV (Module 1) vs. UGV (Module 2)
Module 1

Module 2

Your Assets

Your Assets
• One unmanned ground vehicle (UGV):

• One unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

– Advantages

– Advantages
•
•
•
•

• Eliminates risk to soldier’s life
• Can provide specific information about the enemy or
location
• Can be shut down to reserve fuel
• More resilient to crashing or malfunctioning than UAV

Eliminates risk to pilot’s life
Fairly cheap to make and maintain
Can fly over obstacles on the ground
Can travel great distances quickly

– Disadvantages

– Disadvantages
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Can only provide general information about the enemy
Has a maximum endurance based on fuel supply
Greater likelihood to crash and be destroyed than UGV
Strongly impacted by weather conditions

Your Assets

Fairly expensive to make and maintain
Must work around obstacles on the ground
Greater likelihood to get “stuck” than UAV
Strongly impacted by terrain conditions

Your Assets
• More about UGVs:

• More about UAVs:

– UGVs are used primarily for information
collecting, destroying enemy targets, and urban
search and rescue (USAR) missions
– UGVs range in size from small USAR robots to
six ton armed robotic vehicles (ARVs)
– Military personnel guide UGVs from control
stations using computers, often from a remote
location

– These robotic planes have been used in Iraq &
Afghanistan to seek out and destroy enemy
forces and equipment
– Most UAVs have a wingspan of about 20 feet
and can stay in the air for up to 40 hours
– Military personnel guide UAVs from control
stations using computers, often from a remote
location

Your Assets

Your Assets
• The “eyes” of the UGV

• The “eyes” of the UAV

– The UGV is equipped with powerful 360-degree
revolving camera images so controllers can gather
enough information to make sound decisions
– The visibility range of the cameras depends on the
obstacles in the environment such as trees or
buildings
– Relative to the UAV, the UGV can get up close to
provide clearer details about enemy specifics,
such as weaponry

– The UAV is equipped with powerful cameras that
can zoom in to provide overview, aerial pictures
– The visibility range of the cameras depends
greatly on favorable weather conditions (clear
skies)
– UAVs can determine enemy location and
movement over time but cannot get close enough
to provide clear details about enemy specifics
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Emphasis on UAV (Module 1) vs. UGV (Module 2) - continued
Module 1

Module 2

Your Assets

Your Assets

• Here are some sample views from UAVs

• Here are some sample views from UGVs

Summary
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Summary

Planning is time-critical
Do not ask superiors for help
Use all your assets
UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and
can only provide an overview rather than specific
details
Always consider using an Augmenting or
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does
not utilize all assets

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
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Planning must be accurate
Ask superiors for help if you are missing
information
Protect your assets as much as possible
UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one
place to another
Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all
assets

Emphasis on Using All Assets (Module 1) vs. Protecting Assets (Module 2)
Module 1

Module 2

Your Assets

Your Assets

• It is important that you utilize all assets that
are available

• It is important that you protect your assets as
much as possible

– Robotic assets, such as UGVs and UAVs, should
be used as much as possible

– Robotic assets, such as UGVs and UAVs, should
not be overused

• Military rules state that you must use of all available
assets
• Robots are fairly inexpensive and easy to replace if lost
• Using one asset to complete a task that two assets can
do more efficiently can lead a waste of time and other
resources

• Military rules state that you must protect and preserve
your assets
• Robots are very expensive and difficult to replace if lost
• Using numerous assets to complete a task that one asset
can do can lead to an unnecessary loss of assets

– It is inefficient and a waste of money to not use
assets that are at your disposal

– It is inefficient and a waste of money to use all
assets that are at your disposal when one asset
can successfully complete the task

Your Assets

Your Assets

• There are a number of different strategies for
using your assets

• There are a number of different strategies for
using your assets

– Use both assets

– Use only one asset (only UGV or only UAV)
– Use both assets

• Augmenting strategy – sending out both the UGV and the
UAV along separate routes to cover more area in less
time
• Redundancy strategy – sending both the UGV and UAV
along the same routes to the same locations to have two
views in case one asset is lost
• Cueing strategy – sending out the UAV first to determine
whether the UGV is needed at all

• Cueing strategy – sending out the UAV first to determine
whether the UGV is needed at all
• Augmenting strategy – sending out both the UGV and the
UAV along separate routes to cover more area in less
time
• Redundancy strategy – sending both the UGV and UAV
along the same routes to the same locations to have two
views in case one asset is lost

– Use only one asset (only UGV or only UAV)

Your Assets

Your Assets

• As previously noted, it is important that you try to take
advantage of all your assets

• As previously noted, it is important that you protect
your assets as much as possible

– This decision will be based on an assessment of all available
information, including time pressures and environmental
conditions (i.e., When does the commander need the
information? Is there enough time to send out both assets
along the same route or will separate routes be more
efficient? What are the weather conditions? Can both
assets even be used?)

– This decision will be based on an assessment of all available
information, including time pressures and environmental
conditions (i.e., When does the commander need the
information? Should both assets be used or will one be
sufficient? What are the terrain conditions? Which one could
be sent out alone?)
• Using only one asset should be considered first
• Cueing strategy should be considered second
• Augmenting or redundancy strategy should be a last resort

• Augmenting or redundancy strategy should be considered first
• Cueing strategy should be considered second
• Using only one asset should be a last resort
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Emphasis on Using All Assets (Module 1) vs. Protecting Assets (Module 2) continued
Module 1

Module 2

Summary
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Summary

Planning is time-critical
Do not ask superiors for help
Use all your assets
UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and
can only provide an overview rather than specific
details
Always consider using an Augmenting or
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does
not utilize all assets

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
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Planning must be accurate
Ask superiors for help if you are missing
information
Protect your assets as much as possible
UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one
place to another
Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all
assets

Emphasis on Augmenting or Redundancy Strategies (Module 1)
vs. One Asset or Cueing Strategies (Module 2)
Module 1

Module 2

Your Assets

Your Assets

• Using both the UAV and UGV

• Using either the UAV or UGV solely

– There may be occasions where using both assets
is more effective than using only one asset
– For example, environmental conditions may make
the UGV or UAV partially inoperable or inefficient
requiring backup or support from the other asset
– You may not have enough time to send out only
one asset to collect all of the information
– It will be your job to determine whether using both
assets is the best solution given the available
information and resources

– There may be occasions where using only one
asset is more effective than using both assets
– For example, environmental conditions may make
the UGV or UAV inoperable or inefficient
– You may simply be more familiar and more
comfortable with one asset as opposed to the
other
– It will be your job to determine whether using one
asset is the best solution given the available
information and resources

Your Assets

Your Assets

• Augmenting Strategy

• UGV Only Strategy
– Using only the UGV to collect all of the necessary
information from the various Objectives
– With this strategy only one route is necessary
– There must be enough time for the UGV to navigate along its
route to collect all the information
– This strategy may be best when extremely specific
information is needed and the asset must get close to the
enemy
– This strategy many also be useful when the terrain
conditions make the UAV inefficient, such as in dense urban
environments or jungle environments

– Using numerous assets at the same time to
support the R&S plan
– Sending those assets along different routes; the
UAV can go to certain Objectives while the UGV
can go to other Objectives
– This allows for the collection of the most amount of
information in the shortest amount of time
– Augmenting call also be a useful strategy when
environmental factors are influencing the
usefulness of one or more assets

Augmenting Strategy
OBJ Beta

UGV Only Strategy
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Emphasis on Augmenting or Redundancy Strategies (Module 1)
vs. One Asset or Cueing Strategies (Module 2) - continued
Module 1

Module 2

Your Assets

Your Assets

• Redundancy Strategy

• UAV Only Strategy
– Using only the UAV to collect all of the necessary
information from the various Objectives
– With this strategy only one route is necessary
– This strategy may be useful when there is a limited amount
of time to collect the information because the UAV can travel
quickly
– This strategy may be best when only general information is
needed and the asset does not need to get close to the
enemy
– This strategy many also be useful when the terrain
conditions make the UGV inefficient, such as with rivers
without bridges, mountainous regions, or roadblocks

– Using numerous assets at the same time to
support the R&S plan
– Sending those assets along the same route; the
UAV and the UGV both go to all Objectives
– This strategy ensures continuous coverage and
multiple viewpoints of all Objectives
– Augmenting call also be a useful strategy when
environmental factors are influencing the
usefulness of one or more assets

Redundancy Strategy
OBJ Beta

UAV Only Strategy
OBJ Beta

OBJ Alpha

OBJ Chi

OBJ Theta

OBJ Alpha
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OBJ Theta

Base

OBJ Delta

Note that city environments can be treacherous for UAVsBase
because there are numerous buildings, power lines, etc. that
can
interfere
with
the
communication
between
the
UAV
These
The
You
This
UAV
can
may
is are
your
see
only
take
the
military
that
strategy
Objectives,
less
the
time,
base
UAV
requires
but
does
maythe
not
also
have
be more
to deal
efficient
with
theifand
Herecommand,
isrestrictions.
a
map
of
Central
the
which
could
lead
to Objectives
complete
loss
of signal,
from
UAV
terrain
only
locations
generic
which
to
pass
your
information
all
where
Objectives
assets
Here,
you
about
the
to
collect
UAV
the
can go over
isbuildings
necessary.
Here
is
one
possible
route
OBJ Gamma
Baghdad.
and
consequently,
the
UAV.
must
need
the
The
necessary
rivers
UAV
leave
to gather
can
and
and
provide
information.
does
information.
return.
not
aerial
needviews
to follow
of each
roads
Objective.
or paths.
for
your
UAV.

Note that even though the UAV can get to the next Objective
These
are
the
The
You
Thisredundancy
can
is
your
see
military
that
strategy
by base
sending
and
the UAV
along
more
quickly,
itObjectives,
must
wait for the UGV to
arrive
before
the
you
Herelocations
You
can
isroutes,
ayou
also
map
see
of
Central
that
the
UGV
still guaranteed
needs to abide
by the of
requires
similar
from
which
your
towhere
you
send
assets
are
both
able
your
tothe
have
coverage
Here
Here
is
is
one
one
possible
possible
route
route
moving
on.
This
means
that
OBJamount
Gamma of fuel the UAV has
need
to
gather
information.
Baghdad.
roads
or
paths
while the
UAV to
does
assets
each
must
Objective.
leave
along
and
theavailable,
return.
same
route.
for
for
your
your
UAV.
UGV.
will
be
important
in
determining
whether
usenot.
this strategy.

Your Assets

Your Assets
• As previously noted, it is important that you protect
your assets as much as possible

• As previously noted, it is important that you
try to take advantage of all your assets

– This decision will be based on an assessment of all available
information, including time pressures and environmental
conditions (i.e., When does the commander need the
information? Should both assets be used or will one be
sufficient? What are the terrain conditions? Which one could
be sent out alone?)

– This decision will be based on an assessment of all available
information, including time pressures and environmental
conditions (i.e., When does the commander need the
information? Is there enough time to send out both assets
along the same route or will separate routes be more
efficient? What are the weather conditions? Can both
assets even be used? Which one could be sent out alone?)

• Using only one asset should be considered first
• Cueing strategy should be considered second
• Augmenting or redundancy strategy should be a last resort

• Augmenting or redundancy strategy should be considered first
• Cueing strategy should be considered second
• Using only one asset should be a last resort
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Emphasis on Augmenting or Redundancy Strategies (Module 1)
vs. One Asset or Cueing Strategies (Module 2) - continued
Module 1

Module 2

Summary
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Summary

Planning is time-critical
Do not ask superiors for help
Use all your assets
UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and
can only provide an overview rather than specific
details
Always consider using an Augmenting or
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does
not utilize all assets

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
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Planning must be accurate
Ask superiors for help if you are missing
information
Protect your assets as much as possible
UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one
place to another
Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all
assets

Emphasis on Weather (Module 1) vs. Terrain (Module 2)
Module 1

Module 2

Effects of Weather

Effects of Terrain

• You must have a working knowledge of
weather in order to prepare for possible
adverse conditions
• Weather factors that can affect R&S planning
–
–
–
–
–
–

• You must have a working knowledge of
terrain in order to prepare for possible
adverse conditions
• Terrain factors that can affect R&S planning

Reduced visibility
Surface winds
Precipitation
Cloud Coverage
Temperature
Humidity

– City
• Buildings and roads

– Desert
• Sand and lack of established paths

– Jungle
• Thick vegetation

Effects of Weather

Effects of Terrain

• Reduced visibility

• City environment

– Can be beneficial because conceals positions and
can aid in achieving surprise
– Can also hinder the effectiveness of R&S when
cannot see where the enemy is

– Buildings can be used for observation posts and to
conceal position from enemies but may also
obstruct views of the enemy and hide snipers
– Buildings and electrical power lines can interfere
with radio communications
– Roads and alleyways are already established
routes to navigate through the city but can also
expose forces to enemy observation and possible
fire

• Surface winds
– Strong winds limit airborne and aviation operations
– Can damage material and structures, create false
radar returns, cause personal injury, add to
reduced visibility

Effects of Weather

Effects of Terrain

• Precipitation

• Desert

– Affects mobility of forces and tracked or wheeled
equipment or vehicles
– Can reduce visibility
– Heavy rains can make some unpaved, low-lying,
and off-road areas impassable
– Can drastically reduce personnel effectiveness by
causing discomfort, increasing fatigue, and
creating other physical and psychological
problems

– Wide open spaces provide little concealment for
friendly or enemy forces
– Obstacles including quicksand, wet sand, and
sand dunes can make travel difficult
– Lack of established roads and the presence of
landmines can also make travel difficult
– Radio communications and signals should be
clear unless weather conditions are adverse

176

Emphasis on Weather (Module 1) vs. Terrain (Module 2) - continued
Module 1

Module 2

Effects of Weather

Effects of Terrain

• Cloud coverage

• Jungle

– Can influence aviation operations
– Affects ground operations by reducing illumination
and visibility or by enhancing effects of artificial
light

– Thick vegetation, rivers, swampy areas, and sharp
ridges can all slow movement and reduce radio
communications
– Tree-top canopies can reduce illumination from
below and limit visibility from aerial vehicles above
– Wildlife can also affect mobility as well as attention

• Temperature and Humidity
– High temps can lead to heat-related injuries and
engine wear that leads to equipment failures
– Low temps can lead to cold weather injuries and
cause damage to vehicle cooling systems and
engines

Effects of Weather

Effects of Terrain

• Any of these aspects of weather can
significantly impact which assets to use

• Any of these aspects of terrain can
significantly impact which assets to use

– Will a UAV be able to successfully fly to its
assigned location, collect the appropriate
information, and then communicate that
information back?
– Will the weather significantly impact the terrain to
impede the ability of the UGV to navigate to its
assigned location, collect the appropriate
information, and then communicate that
information back?

– Will a UGV be able to successfully navigate to its
assigned location, collect the appropriate
information, and then communicate that
information back?
– Will the terrain significantly impact the UAV’s
ability to view its assigned location, collect the
appropriate information, and then communicate
that information back?

Summary
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Summary

Planning is time-critical
Do not ask superiors for help
Use all your assets
UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and
can only provide an overview rather than specific
details
Always consider using an Augmenting or
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does
not utilize all assets

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
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Planning must be accurate
Ask superiors for help if you are missing
information
Protect your assets as much as possible
UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one
place to another
Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all
assets

Emphasis on Not asking for Help (Module 1) vs. Asking for Help (Module 2)
Module 1

Module 2

Developing R&S Plan

Developing R&S Plan

• R&S planning is extremely time-critical

• R&S planning must be as accurate as possible

– Continued…

– Continued…

• If you are missing information, you must make your
best educated guess and plan accordingly
• You are discouraged from requesting additional
information from your superiors because there is no
guarantee that they have that information or can get
it to you in time
• Keep this time-critical factor in mind as you learn
about the different types of information you may or
may not have available

• If you are missing information, you should
never guess what that information might be
• You are encouraged to request additional
information from your superiors in order to
make sure your information is up-to-date
• Keep this accuracy factor in mind as you learn about the
different types of information you may or may not have
available

– Do not sacrifice accuracy for quickness!! It is better
to be correct than fast.

– Do not sacrifice quickness for accuracy! It is
better to be fast than perfect.

Summary
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Summary

Planning is time-critical
Do not ask superiors for help
Use all your assets
UAVs can travel great distances quickly, but they
are strongly impacted by weather conditions and
can only provide an overview rather than specific
details
Always consider using an Augmenting or
Redundancy strategy before a strategy that does
not utilize all assets

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
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Planning must be accurate
Ask superiors for help if you are missing
information
Protect your assets as much as possible
UGVs can get very close to the enemy to provide
specific details, but they are strongly impacted by
terrain conditions and take longer to travel from one
place to another
Always consider using a Cueing strategy or one
asset only strategy before a strategy that uses all
assets

APPENDIX O
SCENARIO MATERIALS
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Training Scenario Materials
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OPERATION ORDER 99-A
References:
Map of Baghdad provided on your computer display. Baghdad is the capital of
Iraq. It is the second largest city in Southwest Asia. The city sits on the Tigris
River and was once the center of the Islamic civilization. The city is mostly flat,
with the western side of the city having wider boulevards, more expensive homes
and more government buildings. Low-income housing is generally located in the
east. The map provided is an up to date map.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time
Task Organization: There is one asset available for this mission: one unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV). The UAV available for this mission is the Hunter, seen in the pictures
below. The Hunter is a short range joint-tactical unmanned aircraft system for
surveillance and reconnaissance missions. The endurance of the aircraft is more than 11
hours and the cruise speed is 70 knots. The Hunter aircraft is 23 ft in length and has a 29
ft wingspan. The system operates at an altitude of 15,000 ft and at a range of 200
kilometers. A C-Band datalink ties the vehicle to a ground station. The sensor package
sends day television or night infrared imagery to the ground. A sample image taken by a
Hunter is shown below. You will be in charge of planning the route for the Hunter
UAV.
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SITUATION
Enemy Forces
Weather and Light Data and General Forecast
Skies: Clear skies morning and night. Partly cloudy over night, cloud base 10,000 ft.
There should be no problems with using any aerial assets.
Visibility: Unlimited at flying level.
Winds: North to Northwest. Speed not expected to exceed 10 knots. These conditions
will not affect the flying capabilities of the UAV.
Temperatures: from 65 degrees F to 73 degrees F.
Light Data: Sunrise 6:08 AM. Sunset 8:15 PM.
Trafficability: Good.
Precipitation: None predicted. Maximum precipitation per month: 20 inches. Average
precipitation per month: 5 inches.
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy is at OBJ B, OBJ A, OBJ D.
The enemy may or may not be present at OBJ C and OBJ E. The key terrain in this
mission is near the Tigris River. In order for us to have use of the river for transportation,
we need to secure stations along the river. OBJ A is a drawbridge that is a crucial
necessity in controlling the river. OBJ C is the National Assembly building directly on
the river. This building is frequented by important officials and therefore needs to be
protected. Finally, OBJ E is an open area that would be a good place to establish a
military post. In fact, while there are three Objectives, it would be best to travel as much
of the river as possible during the mission.
Activity: The enemy has been seen at Saddam Hussein Hall with missile launchers;
therefore you should not fly over the area near the Hall because you could get shot down.
Also, there has been some activity near the zoo. In order to not alert the enemy that we
are in the area, do not fly over the zoo either.
Strength: No data has been provided as to the strength or hostility of the enemy.
Probable Course of Action: Unknown.
Friendly Forces: There are no friendly forces in downtown Baghdad that need to be
considered when planning your routes.
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Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments.
Assumptions: Even though we have no intelligence confirming, we must assume the
enemy is hostile.
MISSION
Commander’s Intent: There are two specific purposes for this mission. First, we must
take control of that River. That is the primary objective. I want to know everything
about those locations on the river first! I want to know if the enemy is there, how many
there are, what are they doing, and how they are traveling from one location to the other.
The second objective is to gain as much information about the enemy as possible while
keeping focus on the river. So, while we need info on the other Objectives as well, they
are not the priority. Taking control of that river is key!
EXECUTION
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV to complete this task. The asset can be
used as seen fit by the operator. The asset should be used to collect all of the information
requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives. Start time is set for midnight
and there is a 2 hour time limit.
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the asset with its route and its specific information
collection goals.
Fires: None.
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OPERATION ORDER 099-B
References:
Map of Baghdad provided on your computer display. Baghdad is the capital of Iraq. It is
the second largest city in Southwest Asia. The city sits on the Tigris River and was once
the center of the Islamic civilization. The city is mostly flat, with the western side of the
city having wider boulevards, more expensive homes and more government buildings.
Low-income housing is generally located in the east. The map provided is an up to date
map.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time
Task Organization: There is one asset available for this mission: one unmanned ground
vehicle (UGV). The UGV available for this mission is the Talon, seen in the pictures
below. The Talon is a powerful, durable, lightweight tracked vehicle designed for
reconnaissance, communications, sensing and security. The robot has a top speed of 5.2
miles per hour and a single-charge run time of two to four hours. It weighs less than 100
lbs (45 kg) and can be easily carried and instantly ready for operation. The Talon has allweather, day/night and amphibious capabilities and can navigate virtually any terrain.
The Talon can hold up to seven color cameras, including night vision and zoom options.
The Talon’s control station and a sample image are shown below. You will be in
charge of planning the route for the Talon UGV.
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SITUATION
Enemy Forces
Terrain
Terrain: For downtown Baghdad, as seen in map. Downtown Baghdad is located in a
desert area, characterized by flat, sandy land. The downtown area contains many
residential and government buildings. The Tigris River flows through the center of
downtown.
Obstacles: The Zawra Park and Zoo should be avoided at all costs, both on the ground
and in the air. Frightened animals could alert the enemies of our presence. Additionally,
the Jumhuriyah Bridge (Republic Bridge) was bombed last week and can no longer be
used to cross the river.
Key terrain: The key terrain in this mission is near the Tigris River. In order for us to
have use of the river for transportation, we need to secure stations along the river. OBJ A
is a drawbridge that is a crucial necessity in controlling the river. OBJ C is the National
Assembly building directly on the river. This building is frequented by important
officials and therefore needs to be protected. Finally, OBJ E is an open area that would
be a good place to establish a military post. In fact, while there are three Objectives, it
would be best to travel as much of the river as possible during the mission.
Decisive terrain: OBJ D is a main intersection on the NE side of the downtown area and
is a prime location to observe the traffic coming in and out of the city. It would be an
excellent place to set up an observation post. OBJ B is an enemy stronghold. We will
need to determine their numbers and weaponry to determine if we should attempt to
attack.
Other key terrain: The desert conditions could make ground travel difficult. To avoid
any issues, stick to the roads on the map.
Avenues of approach: The main avenues of approach are Port Said Street and the River.
This is why it is crucial that we have control of both. You will enter the city from the
north. Your line of departure is noted on the map.
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy is at OBJ B, OBJ A, OBJ D.
The enemy may or may not be present at OBJ C and OBJ E.
Activity: Previous intelligence reports suggest that the enemy has not been engaging in
any significant activity that would affect your route planning.
Strength: No data has been provided as to the strength or hostility of the enemy.
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Probable Course of Action: Unknown.
Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments.
Friendly Forces: There are no friendly forces in downtown Baghdad that need to be
considered when planning your routes
Assumptions: Even though we have no intelligence confirming, we must assume the
enemy is hostile.
MISSION
Commander’s Intent: There are two specific purposes for this mission. First, we must
take control of that River. That is the primary objective. I want to know everything
about those locations on the river first! I want to know if the enemy is there, how many
there are, what are they doing, and how they are traveling from one location to the other.
The second objective is to gain as much information about the enemy as possible while
keeping focus on the river. So, while we need info on the other Objectives as well, they
are not the priority. Taking control of that river is key!
EXECUTION
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UGV to complete this task. The asset can be
used as seen fit by the operator. The asset should be used to collect all of the information
requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives. Start time is set for midnight
and there is a 2 hour time limit.
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the asset with its route and its specific information
collection goals.
Fires: None
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Scenario 1 Materials
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OPERATION ORDER 101-A
References:
Map of Samarra provided on your computer display. Sāmarrā is a town in Iraq
situated on the bank of the river Tigris some sixty miles from the city of Baghdad.
The city is of outstanding importance because of its two shrines. The map is a
satellite image from November 2003.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time
Task Organization: There are two assets available for this mission, one unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). The UAV available for this
mission is the Predator, seen in the pictures below. The Predator is a long endurance,
medium altitude unmanned aircraft system for surveillance and reconnaissance missions.
The endurance of the aircraft is more than 40 hours and the cruise speed is over 70 knots.
The Predator aircraft is 27 ft in length and has a 49 ft wingspan. The system operates at
an altitude of 25,000 ft and at a range of 400 nautical miles. The synthetic aperture radar,
video cameras and a forward looking infra-red (FLIR) can provide surveillance imagery
in real time both to the front line soldier and to the operational commander or worldwide
via satellite communication. The Predator’s camera and sample image taken by a
Predator are shown below. You will be in charge of planning the route for the
Predator UAV.
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SITUATION
Enemy Forces
Weather and Light Data and General Forecast
Skies: Clear skies morning and night. Partly cloudy in the afternoon, cloud base 3,000 ft.
A cloud ceiling of at least 2,500 ft is desired when using UAVs. There should be no
problems with using any aerial assets.
Visibility: Unlimited at flying level. Limited ground level when wind gusts lift sand off
ground. This means that a UAV might not get a clear picture of the ground. Remember
that limited visibility can benefit the enemy because you might not be able to see them.
Winds: North to Northwest. Speed expected to exceed 20 knots until at least 9:00 PM.
Occasional gusts up to 30 knots in afternoon. These conditions will affect the flying
capabilities of the UAV. These conditions will also lift sand from the desert floor and
hamper observation.
Temperatures: from 90 degrees F to 98 degrees F.
Light Data: Sunrise 6:00 AM. Sunset 8:20 PM.
Trafficability: Good.
Precipitation: None predicted. Maximum precipitation per month: 20 inches. Average
precipitation per month: 5 inches.
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy is at OBJ Cat, OBJ Dog, OBK
Elk, and OBJ Fish. The enemy may or may not be present at OBJ Ant and OBJ Bird.
Activity: Previous intelligence reports suggest that the enemy has not been engaging in
any significant activity that would affect your route planning.
Strength: Unknown.
Probable Course of Action: No enemy aircraft are expected to be in the area; therefore
you should not concern yourself with avoiding enemy aircraft when planning your route.
Friendly Forces: There are no friendly forces in downtown Samarra that need to be
considered when planning your routes.
Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments.
189

Assumptions: None.
MISSION
Commander’s Intent: There are two specific purposes for this mission. First, I want to
know if the enemy has strongholds in the positions that our previous intelligence
suggests. The goal is to swiftly enter the city, gather the information, and then report
back to base. We need to move into the city in full force tomorrow and thus we need all
this information ASAP.
EXECUTION
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV and a UGV to complete this task. The
assets can be used as seen fit by the operators. The assets should be used to collect all of
the information requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives. The assets have
3 hours to collect all of the information.
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the assets with their route(s) and their specific
information collection goals. The UAV and UGV are equal assets in that one does not
command the other. They can work together or separately as you, the operators, see fit.
Fires: None.

190

OPERATION ORDER 101-B
References:
Map of Samarra provided on your computer display. Sāmarrā is a town in Iraq
situated on the bank of the river Tigris some sixty miles from the city of Baghdad.
The city is of outstanding importance because of its two shrines. The map is a
satellite image from November 2003.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time
Task Organization: There are two assets available for this mission, one unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). The UGV available for this
mission is the Matilda, seen in the pictures below. The Matilda is a small-scale, tracked
vehicle designed for remote reconnaissance, inspection, assessment and sampling. The
robot has a top speed of 3 feet (1 meter) per second and a single-charge run time of four
to six hours. It weighs 61 lbs (28 kg) with the batteries, can be carried by one or two people
and fits in the trunk of a car. Matilda provides reconnaissance in limited-access areas,
including under vehicles, aircraft, and inside buildings. Matilda is a tele-operated robot
that responds to radio signals and the technology allows vehicles it get from one ground
point to another and avoid obstacles on its own. The Matilda’s control station and
cameras are shown below. You will be in charge of planning the route for the
Matilda UGV.
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SITUATION
Enemy Forces
Terrain
Terrain: For downtown Samarra, as seen in satellite map. Downtown Samarra is located
in a desert area; therefore any open spaces are sandy. The buildings are both residential
and commercial. Samarra sits in a valley, with the center of the downtown area being the
low point of that valley.
Obstacles: The Tigris River only has one main road that crosses over it to depart from
downtown Samarra. This bridge is very well guarded and cannot be crossed by any
ground vehicles.
Key terrain: OBJ Ant and OBJ Bird are two intersections that are essential to ensuring
safe routes for friendly patrols and caravans that need to travel through Samarra. Both of
these intersections will need to be visited and assessed in order to determine if the enemy
has patrols there and what their capabilities are. OBJ Dog is the station in the middle of
the bridge that crosses the Tigris River. Because that bridge is currently heavily guarded,
it would be in our best interest to gain control of the area near OBJ Dog. By gaining
control of the bridge, we could control who comes in and out of the city from the west
side. This would be extremely beneficial in terms of both offensive and defensive future
missions.
Decisive terrain: OBJ Cat, OBJ Elk, and OBJ Fish are three areas in Samarra where we
believe the enemy has strongholds. We need to determine whether these are in fact
strongholds before we can develop a plan of attack.
Other key terrain: The white building in the middle of downtown Samarra is the alAskari Mosque. It is a holy building and no US forces should go near it. To the NE of
that Mosque is a large rectangular wall with the open sands around it. That is the Great
Mosque of Samarra and should also be avoided when planning your mission. No ground
vehicles should approach either Mosque and no aerial vehicles should fly over them.
Avenues of approach: The main roads in Samarra are the only ones that should be used.
All of the smaller roads and alleyways that connect the main roads are potentially enemy
territory. In the past, US forces have been ambushed in these alleys. You will enter the
city from the south. Your line of departure is noted on the map.
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy is at OBJ Cat, OBJ Dog, OBK
Elk, and OBJ Fish. The enemy may or may not be present at OBJ Ant and OBJ Bird.
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Activity: Previous intelligence reports suggest that the enemy has not been engaging in
any significant activity that would affect your route planning.
Strength: Unknown.
Probable Course of Action: If the enemy is moving, it is likely they will do so via the
alleyways and small roads. Therefore, it is advisable to keep ground vehicles to the main
road.
Friendly Forces: There are no friendly forces in downtown Samarra that need to be
considered when planning your routes.
Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments.
Assumptions: Even though we have no intelligence confirming, we must assume the
enemy is hostile.
MISSION
Commander’s Intent: There are two specific purposes for this mission. First, I want a
coordinated move into the city. I want to collect specific information about the two
intersections so that we know whether these are safe routes for us to move through. I
want as specific as possible information about the bridge facilities and whether we can
capture that location easily.
EXECUTION
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV and a UGV to complete this task. The
assets can be used as seen fit by the operators. The assets should be used to collect all of
the information requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives. Start time is set
for noon.
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the assets with their route(s) and their specific
information collection goals. The UAV and UGV are equal assets in that one does not
command the other. They can work together or separately as you, the operators, see fit.
Fires: None.
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Scenario 2 Materials
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OPERATION ORDER 202-A
References:
Map of Al Kufah provided on your computer display. Al Kufah is a city in Iraq
situated on the bank of the middle river Farut some 88 miles south of Baghdad.
The city is almost 22 meters above sea level. It was a center of Arab culture and
learning from the 8th to the 10th century. The map is a satellite image from
November 2003.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time
Task Organization: There are two assets available for this mission, one unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). The UAV available for this
mission is the Raven, seen in the pictures below. The Raven is a small, short endurance,
low altitude unmanned aircraft system used for surveillance and reconnaissance missions.
With a wingspan of 4.5 feet and a weight of 3.8 pounds, the hand-launched Raven
airplane provides aerial observation at line-of-sight ranges of 10 to 15 kilometers at
altitudes up to 1,000 feet. (Most missions are flown at 100 to 300 feet.) The Raven can
only fly for 45 to 60 minutes on one battery. The Raven has three different cameras that
attach to the nose of the plane, an electrical optical camera that sends data either through
the nose or a side camera, an infrared camera in the nose, and a side-mounted infrared
camera. A sample image taken by the Raven is shown below. You will be in charge of
planning the route for the Raven UAV.
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SITUATION
Enemy Forces
Weather and Light Data and General Forecast
Skies: Cloudy skies and heavy fog, cloud base 200 ft. A cloud ceiling of at least 1,000 ft
is desired when using small UAVs, such as the Raven. The clouds will impact the
visibility of the UAV as well as the flying capabilities.
Visibility: Limited at flying level and partially at ground level. Limited visibility will
definitely hinder the UAV’s ability to see targets on the ground. Limited visibility will
also make maneuvering the UAV more difficult.
Winds: North to Northeast. Speed expected to exceed 10 knots. Occasional gusts up to
15 knots in early evening. The winds will not be strong enough to impact the UAV.
Temperatures: from 72 degrees F to 80 degrees F.
Light Data: Sunrise 7:04 AM. Sunset 5:04 PM.
Trafficability: Fair.
Precipitation: Uncharacteristic thunderstorms with heavy rains throughout the day and
night. Intermittent thunder and lightning expected. Possibility of lightning striking the
UAV is minimal, but still a risk. Rain can limit the visibility of the UAV. Maximum
precipitation per month: 6 inches. Average precipitation per month: .2 inches.
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy has used each of the Objectives
in the past as hideouts. OBJ Arm, OBJ Foot and OBJ Leg are all buildings located in a
residential area of Kufah. OBJ Neck and OBJ Hand are commercial buildings where the
enemy may be hiding. OBJ Torso is a small building located in a wooded, uninhabited
area of the city.
Activity: The enemy has kidnapped three US soldiers and is holding them hostage at one
of the Objectives. It is likely they are all being held in the same location, but that has not
been confirmed. They should be staying at the stronghold for the next 48 hours, before
moving the hostages again.
Strength: There is a group of 50 enemy soldiers who are heavily armed and dangerous
guarding the hostages.
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Probable Course of Action: It is likely that the enemy will remain in its current location
for approximately 48 hours before relocating to an unknown location outside of Kufah.
Once the enemy has moved, it will be much more difficult to track them and to recover
the hostages.
Friendly Forces: Unknown.
Attachments and Detachments: No attachments or detachments.
Assumptions: We can assume that the enemy will be waiting for our approach; therefore,
we must take the most extreme cautions when nearing each OBJ. If the enemy detects
our presence, the chances of recovering the hostages will greatly decrease.
MISSION
Commander’s Intent: This mission has one main goal. The enemy has captured three of
our own men. We need to go in there, find out where they are, and rescue them. We
only have a limited amount of time to gather R&S information. The enemy will be
moving out within 48 hours and thus we need to know where they are ASAP. The first
part of this task will be to send in the robotic assets to determine exactly where the
hostages are being kept. Once we have that information we can begin the rescue mission.
This is a time-critical mission and it is imperative we get to those men before anything
happens to them!
EXECUTION
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV and a UGV to complete this task. The
assets can be used as seen fit by the operators. The assets should be used to collect all of
the information requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives. The assets have
only 1 hour to collect the necessary information.
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the assets with their route(s) and their specific
information collection goals. The UAV and UGV are equal assets in that one does not
command the other. They can work together or separately as you, the operators, see fit.
Fires: None.
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OPERATION ORDER 202-B
References:
Map of Al Kufah provided on your computer display. Al Kufah is a city in Iraq
situated on the bank of the middle river Farut some 88 miles south of Baghdad.
The city is almost 22 meters above sea level. It was a center of Arab culture and
learning from the 8th to the 10th century. The map is a satellite image from
November 2003.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local Time
Task Organization: There are two assets available for this mission, one unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) and one unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). The UGV available for this
mission is the PackBot, seen in the pictures below. The PackBot is a rugged, lightweight
robot designed to conduct search, surveillance and reconnaissance, hostage rescue and
other tasks. The robot can move more than 8 mph and has a run time of up to 2 hours. It
weighs 40 lbs (18 kg) with the batteries and is designed to fit in the Army’s new standard
backpack. With its compact profile and patented mobility platform, PackBot operates

with confidence on the toughest terrain – from the stairs, curbs and rubble of urban
terrain to the rocks, sands and mud of the battlefield. A sample display from a Packbot is
shown below. You will be in charge of planning the route for the Packbot UGV.

198

SITUATION
Enemy Forces
Terrain
Terrain: For downtown Kufah, as seen in satellite map. Downtown Kufah is densely
populated with both residential and commercial inhabitants. Kufah sits on flat land,
approximately a mile above sea level.
Obstacles: The major highway that divides the downtown area is well traveled at all
hours and would be extremely difficult for the small PackBot to cross. The PackBot
could travel down the side of the highway but must stay on one side or the other because
crossing would be too difficult.
Key terrain: OBJ Foot is one of the more likely hiding places. It is a small apartment on
the first floor of a three story building. The building is located on a fairly well traveled
intersection, so pedestrians will likely be present on any given day. OBJ Hand is far
enough away from the residential area that it would require vehicles. A quick check for
vehicles would tell us whether the enemy is there. OBJ Leg is a local hangout for enemy
trainees. There is only a slight chance the hostages may be there, but some specifics
about who is there may shed light on where the hostages are.
Decisive terrain: OBJ Torso and OBJ Arm have seen some recent activity; though that
activity may be unrelated to the kidnappings. OBJ Torso is in a wooded, sandy area.
This area would be quite difficult for a UGV to navigate, especially in adverse weather
conditions.
Other key terrain: OBJ Neck, while being the possible location of the hostages, is also
the likely command base for the enemy. This location must be surveyed for the hostages,
but also for its general characteristics and enemy strength. If possible, both assets should
be sent to OBJ Neck.
Avenues of approach: Any routes throughout the city should follow the established
roads. No ground assets should take shortcuts through buildings or parks. The main
highway should be used to get into the city and back out of the city after the mission is
complete.
Locations: Previous intelligence suggests that the enemy has used each of the Objectives
in the past as hideouts. OBJ Arm, OBJ Leg and OBJ Foot are all buildings located in a
residential area of Kufah. OBJ Neck and OBJ Hand are commercial buildings where the
enemy may be hiding. OBJ Torso is a small building located in a wooded, uninhabited
area of the city.
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Activity: The enemy has kidnapped three US soldiers and is holding them hostage at one
of the Objectives. It is likely they are all being held in the same location, but that has not
been confirmed. They should be staying at the stronghold for the next 48 hours, before
moving the hostages again.
Strength: There is a group of 50 enemy soldiers who are heavily armed and dangerous
guarding the hostages.
Probable Course of Action: It is likely that the enemy will remain in its current location
for approximately 48 hours before relocating to an unknown location outside of Kufah.
Once the enemy has moved, it will be much more difficult to track them and to recover
the hostages.
Friendly Forces: Unknown
Assumptions: We can assume that the enemy will be waiting for our approach; therefore,
we must take the most extreme cautions when nearing each Objective. If the enemy
detects our presence, the chances of recovering the hostages will greatly decrease.
MISSION
Commander’s Intent: This mission has one main goal. The enemy has captured three of
our own men. We need to go in there, find out where they are, and rescue them. We
only have a limited amount of time to gather R&S information. The enemy will be
moving out within 48 hours and thus we need to know where they are ASAP. The first
part of this task will be to send in the robotic assets to determine exactly where the
hostages are being kept. Once we have that information we can begin the rescue mission.
The safety of our men depends on the accuracy of our information. If we send our rescue
team to the wrong location, the hostages might not survive. So make sure we get the
most accurate and specific information as possible!
EXECUTION
Concept of the Operation: The unit has a UAV and a UGV to complete this task. The
assets can be used as seen fit by the operators. The assets should be used to collect all of
the information requested by the Commander for each of the Objectives. Start time is set
for 10 am.
Maneuver: It is up to you to task the assets with their route(s) and their specific
information collection goals. The UAV and UGV are equal assets in that one does not
command the other. They can work together or separately as you, the operators, see fit.
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